An oft-repeated maxim of foreign relations holds that “[n]ations do not have permanent friends or enemies. They have permanent interests.” The realism of this insight, and the permanence of certain of Russia’s interests, is on display in the current crisis in Ukraine involving Russia, the European Union, and the United States.
Every year governments report several cases of radioactive sources being lost or stolen. When Mexican thieves recently hijacked a truck containing cobalt-60—cargo considered “extremely dangerous” by the International Atomic Energy Agency—the news made international headlines, but the event was just one of the more visible of its kind.
Lessons Unlearned? As Third Year of Anniversary Nears, Expanded Version of Fukushima Review Panel Report Published in English in Book Form by the Bulletin of Atomic the Scientists.
As a Russian military siege of Ukrainian military installations in Crimea continued, Russian and Western leaders seemed to occupy separate policy universes. President Vladmir Putin and his administration's diplomats contended that Russia had responded to a political coup in Ukraine, sending thousands of Russian troops to take effective control of Crimea because ethnic Russians there were being set upon by Ukranian extremists.
The Mark 36 was a second-generation hydrogen bomb. It weighed about half as much as the early thermonuclears—but 10 times more than the new, sealed-pit bombs that would soon be mass-produced for SAC [the Strategic Air Command]. It was a transitional weapon, mixing old technologies with new, featuring thermal batteries, a removable core, and a contact fuze for use against underground targets. The nose of the bomb contained piezoelectric crystals, and when the nose hit the ground, the crystals deformed, sending a signal to the X-unit, firing the detonators, and digging a very deep hole.