The Doomsday Clock is an internationally recognized design that conveys how close we are to destroying our civilization with dangerous technologies of our own making. First and foremost among these are nuclear weapons, but the dangers include climate-changing technologies, emerging... Read More
In a welcome but little-noticed development, the United States recently encouraged fellow members of the Biological Weapons Convention to take a deeper interest in “tacit knowledge,” a key determinant of bioweapons development, but one that nonproliferation efforts have largely ignored.
Implementation of the Iran nuclear deal is only months away, yet a key incentive for Tehran could be missing: International banks and insurance providers are still reluctant to do business in the Islamic Republic.
With this final issue of 2015, the Bulletin looks forward from its first seven decades of publishing to address a future that will include not just a continuing and expanded threat of thermonuclear catastrophe, but also an array of other global dangers, including climate change and the potential
Contrary to popular opinion, Washington and Moscow should strive now to make progress on bilateral arms control. A more ambitious treaty that limits modernization plans can help stabilize a volatile situation.
The US Energy Secretary takes a little time this week to provide Bulletin readers with a quick update on the administration's efforts to convince Congress and the American people to support the Iran nuclear agreement
The author argues that minimizing the harm associated with hypersonic missiles requires that hypersonics be included in nuclear arms control discussions and in arrangements limiting or reducing strategic arms.
The Hiroshima anniversary provides an opportunity to reflect on lessons learned (or not learned) from nuclear war and seven decades of trying to prevent its recurrence, and to apply that knowledge to the current situation in the Middle East
The author argues that, rather than banning hypersonic missile tests, it is better to use the time before hypersonics are deployed to debate their risks, develop deterrents to their use, and work out necessary confidence-building measures.