The Doomsday Clock is an internationally recognized design that conveys how close we are to destroying our civilization with dangerous technologies of our own making. First and foremost among these are nuclear weapons, but the dangers include climate-changing technologies, emerging... Read More
The author argues that there is no feasible way to ensure autonomous weapons will never be built. What's feasible—through effective international regulation—is to ensure that development of autonomous weapons is analyzed and tracked on a case-by-case basis.
Those concerned about international security should pay attention to the Volkswagen case, since arms-control verification tools often use the same kind of proprietary technology that prevents transparency and independent scrutiny.
Contrary to popular opinion, Washington and Moscow should strive now to make progress on bilateral arms control. A more ambitious treaty that limits modernization plans can help stabilize a volatile situation.
The difference between past nonproliferation failures and the current Iran agreement is made clear by the record of nuclear diplomacy involving four countries that did not sign the NPT or withdrew from it: Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea.
Superintelligence is propounding a solution that will not work to a problem that probably does not exist, but now is the time to take the ethical and policy implications of artificial intelligence seriously
The author argues that banning research and development programs for hypersonic missiles will be difficult. Limited transparency measures might be within reach, but even these mechanisms will require persistent effort and engagement from the major players.
Over the last two years, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists and the University of Chicago have created an online tool that will help countries understand the true cost of choosing the reprocessing route—and perhaps help limit the spread of nuclear reprocessing. Here's how.
The author argues that if all nuclear-armed nations espoused unequivocal no-first-use policies, and maintained tight managerial control over small arsenals, it would be much harder to envision antisatellite capabilities leading to a nuclear war that nobody wanted.