The Doomsday Clock is an internationally recognized design that conveys how close we are to destroying our civilization with dangerous technologies of our own making. First and foremost among these are nuclear weapons, but the dangers include climate-changing technologies, emerging... Read More
If the Obama administration does not put in place an affordable nuclear weapons strategy for the coming decades, nuclear strategy will be set by bureaucratic struggles and congressional politics. This is not strategy; it is an accident waiting to happen.
The author argues that the United States should de-emphasize nuclear weapons in national security strategy because Washington’s advanced strategic conventional weapons can function both as a deterrent and as a means of wreaking mass destruction on an adversary—without presenting the moral dilemmas
Lynn EdenRobert RosnerRod EwingSivan KarthaEdward "Rocky" Kolb Lawrence M. KraussLeon LedermanRaymond T. PierrehumbertM. V. RamanaJennifer SimsRichard C. J. SomervilleSharon SquassoniElizabeth J. WilsonDavid TitleyRamamurti Rajaraman
Today, more than 25 years after the end of the Cold War, the members of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Science and Security Board have looked closely at the world situation and found it so threatening that the hands of the Doomsday Clock must once again be set at three minutes to midnight.
The nuclear weapons production and laboratory system created during the Cold War is simply far too large for the current military situation and needs drastic consolidation that includes the closing of labs and other facilities
In 2014, Bulletin authors opined and analyzed not only from the United States, but from Russia, China, Iran, Ukraine—and even, it seems, Westeros, one of the continents in the hit HBO television series Game of Thrones.
The author argues that the Obama administration’s refusal to accept limits on missile defense makes it impossible to achieve nuclear goals such as maintaining strategic stability and pursuing disarmament.
The author argues that treating minimum deterrence as a useful interim step toward total nuclear disarmament makes no sense because nuclear weapon states aren't serious about disarmament to begin with.
The author argues that reducing nuclear arsenals to the point that they represent only a minimum deterrent might be a useful interim step for disarmament, but complete abolition must remain the eventual goal.