Columnists
Malcolm Dando
Synthetic biology: Harbinger of an uncertain future?
Getting to grips with the implications of the rapid advances in the life sciences.
Neuroethicists are not saying enough about the problem of dual-use
Potential hostile misuses of neurotechnologies and neurological drugs should be examined as new dual-use issues emerge.
Reality check: No time to waste before the 2011 BWC Review Conference
Civil society and BWC member states must begin discussions now, rather than later, if they want to present viable options and strategies that will influence next year's conference.
From nose to brain: New route for chemical incapacitation?
Discoveries that drugs and bioregulators can quickly be routed to the brain through the nose illustrates the scope of dual-use threats and the need to prevent future misuse.
Better incorporating ethicists into the life sciences
As advances in the life sciences continue at a breakneck pace, bioethicists will be needed to guide researchers through serious dual-use dilemmas.
Down the rabbit hole of BWC verification
The inconsistent U.S. message on verification of the Biological Weapons Convention compared with other international treaties leaves some with nightmares.
Bringing a "culture of responsibility" to life scientists
After years of discussion around teaching a "culture of responsibility" to life scientists, it's about time to put talk into practice.
Bringing increased biological and chemical weapons provisions to the ICC
Despite some criticism, opponents of biological and chemical weapons recognize the opportunity for increased weapons control that lies in the next two meetings of ICC Member States.
Closing the biology-security gap
Few policy makers can say they are familiar with the intricate connections between biology and security. But two recent publications point the way toward refocusing policy on this important relationship.
How civil society could be the key to a new BWC
Civil society can play an important role in the discourse that will define the Biological Weapons Convention into the future. But action must start now if there is to be meaningful change.
The British Parliament wants details on BWC progress
It's time to give credit where credit's due. A Westminster report shows British MPs are looking closely at their government's biosecurity policies.
Biodevelopment and the Biological Weapons Convention
Although the BWC lacks an enforcement mechanism, for the moment it's the most efficient way of reconciling the best and worst of biotechnology.
Can the U.S. lead the way on dual-use education?
A new report by a prominent U.S. biosecurity group presents a strategy for getting the word out on dual-use life science research. Will the world follow?
Do U.S. biodefense efforts need systems analysis?
Two recent papers suggest that U.S. security and U.S. biomedical science could benefit from the complex assessment that the systems analysis approach provides.
Bioethicists enter the dual-use debate
Two recent bioethical studies assess current efforts to prevent the misuse of the life sciences and suggest alternatives.
Biotechnology's crossroads
Despite a number of dire assessments, advances in biotechnology don't have to lead to a bioweapons arms race.
The risks of the "pathogen research enterprise"
Expanded biodefense research that lacks transparency compounds the risk that states will engage in biological arms races.
Opportunities to improve the bioweapons regime
The arms control community needs to shed its bitterness about past efforts to reform the bioweapons regime and begin developing a new agenda for action.
Profile
Malcolm Dando
A biologist, Dando researches international security at the University of Bradford's Department of Peace Studies. His expertise is in chemical and biological weapons, arms control, and biosecurity. An author and contributor to countless books on bioweapons and biotechnology, including The New Biological Weapons: Threat, Proliferation, and Control (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), Dando’s recent interests include how the ongoing revolution in the life sciences might open up possibilities for new forms of biological weapons. Prior to working at the University of Bradford, Dando held a Ministry of Defence funded fellowship in operational research at the University of Sussex. Since 2002, he has travelled extensively, focusing on the in-depth national implementation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.
Columnist Resources
Recent Work
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"The Impact of Scientific and Technological Change"
Bioterrorism: Confronting a Complex Threat (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007) -
"Preventing the Future Military Misuse of Neuroscience"
Technology and Security (Palgrave Macmillan, 2007) -
"Scientific Outlook for the Development of Incapacitants"
Incapacitating Biochemical Weapons: Promise or Peril? (Rowan and Littlefield, 2007) -
"A Scientific Advisory Panel for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention as an Element in the Web of Prevention"
The Web of Prevention: Biological Weapons, Life Sciences, and the Governance of Research (Earthscan Publications Limited, 2007) -
"A Hippocratic Oath for Life Scientists"
EMBO Reports (July 2006)
Recommended Links
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The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Website
Accurate, up-to-date information about the BTWC -
The Genomics Gateway
International treaties, conventions, standards, and guidelines applicable to biotechnology -
The Harvard/Sussex Program on CBW Armament and Arms Limitation
Interuniversity collaboration for research, communication, and training in support of informed public policy toward chemical and biological weapons -
Center for Nonproliferation Studies' Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Program
Research on the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons -
BioWeapons Prevention Project
A project aimed at strengthening the norm against the use of disease as a weapon -
U.N. Office for Disarmament Affairs
Detailed website dealing with all aspects of disarmament