Malcolm Dando | Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

Better incorporating ethicists into the life sciences

Malcolm Dando — Mon, 01 Mar 2010 10:10:50 -0800

In interdisciplinary discussions there are usually disagreements over terminology. I noticed this firsthand at a January seminar I attended in Australia that brought together some 40 natural scientists, social scientists, philosophers, ethicists, and policy makers to discuss the role and limits of ethics in regards to the dual-use problem in the life sciences.

Down the rabbit hole of BWC verification

Malcolm Dando — Mon, 25 Jan 2010 08:05:05 -0800

Everyone is familiar with the nightmare in which they haven't studied for tomorrow's exam. As I've gotten older, and become a teacher myself, this nightmare has mutated into one in which I've forgotten to prepare the exam for my students! I recently had this nightmare in novel form on a subject I hold dear--international treaty verification.

Bringing a "culture of responsibility" to life scientists

Malcolm Dando — Fri, 18 Dec 2009 11:22:12 -0800

In a 2005 essay entitled "Biomedical Research and Biosecurity," Robert Steinbrook, the national correspondent of the New England Journal of Medicine, concluded, "Establishing biosecurity policies for biomedical research without obstructing scientific progress or disrupting the usual procedures for scientific communication is a complex matter." Indeed it is--and has been.

Bringing increased biological and chemical weapons provisions to the ICC

Malcolm Dando — Wed, 11 Nov 2009 08:36:16 -0800

This month, the States Parties to the International Criminal Court (ICC) will come together in The Hague to prepare for their review of the Rome Statute, the ICC's governing document, in Uganda in 2010. The primary goal of this meeting is to assess how the ICC and its governing documents can be improved.

Closing the biology-security gap

Malcolm Dando — Mon, 26 Oct 2009 08:38:07 -0700

Contrary to popular opinion, I think that the international community has been relatively successful in constraining the proliferation of nuclear weapons over the last 60 years. I also believe that we may see a substantial reduction in the number of nuclear weapons over the next decade. Yet I am much less optimistic when it comes to the proliferation of biological weapons. In part, because it's easier to account for fissile material than biological material.

How civil society could be the key to a new BWC

Malcolm Dando — Tue, 22 Sep 2009 13:36:06 -0700

People say my office is a mess. While I don't necessarily disagree with them, I would argue that there is order in the chaos. For example, one pile of papers is labelled "Interesting (All Topics)." I usually reread them during the summer. But making my way through this pile this summer has been difficult because I have spent so much time following the Ashes cricket series and the World Athletics Championships.

The British Parliament wants details on BWC progress

Malcolm Dando — Wed, 19 Aug 2009 08:21:34 -0700

It isn't a good time to be a Member of Parliament (MP) in London. With the roasting the domestic media gave to some MPs for their inflated expense claims during a recession, many people must surely feel that little of value goes on in the Westminster Parliament. Nevertheless, it's important to give credit where credit is due.

Biodevelopment and the Biological Weapons Convention

Malcolm Dando — Tue, 14 Jul 2009 09:57:01 -0700

It's not uncommon for some biosecurity colleagues to dismiss the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) as a regime with an inadequate mandate. Peter Singer and Abdullah Daar, for example, suggest as much in a recent Bulletin article.

Can the U.S. lead the way on dual-use education?

Malcolm Dando — Tue, 16 Jun 2009 10:35:06 -0700

Since the Second Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) in 1986, States Parties have made suggestions for how to educate life scientists about and raise awareness of the dual-use implications of their benignly intended work. But little truly has been done to engage scientists on the subject.

Do U.S. biodefense efforts need systems analysis?

Malcolm Dando — Mon, 18 May 2009 09:12:28 -0700

As a young biologist I was offered a post-doctoral fellowship at the University of Michigan. When I arrived in the United States I considered my previous work on the characteristics of neuronal circuits and decided to examine it in a broader context. This spurred me to begin reading all I could find on systems analysis--the assessment of large, complex events or structures through the examination of their constituents. Although the only writings of systems analysis I found satisfactory were those of Sir Geoffrey Vickers, I could not shake this interest.

Bioethicists enter the dual-use debate

Malcolm Dando — Mon, 20 Apr 2009 09:00:42 -0700

Well-informed scientists disagree about whether classic dual-use experiments, such as the genetic manipulation of mouse pox and the sequencing and synthesis of 1918 Spanish Influenza, should have been carried out and/or published. Given this acrimony, an ethical analysis might help as the revolution in the life sciences continues apace. Bioethicists, who have not yet engaged much with the dual-use problem in the life science community, are beginning to apply their expertise to these questions, and the early results suggest that easy answers are still lacking.

Biotechnology's crossroads

Malcolm Dando — Tue, 24 Mar 2009 08:37:36 -0700

Starting in the early part of this millennium, scientists and analysts forecast that advances in biotechnology and the rush to develop biodefenses were likely to lead to the development of a range of new biological weapons that defenses wouldn't be able to keep up with. Nearly 10 years later, the likelihood of these trends has not diminished, yet it is not too late to discourage the hostile exploitation of biotechnology.

The risks of the "pathogen research enterprise"

Malcolm Dando — Wed, 04 Mar 2009 09:01:21 -0800

In one of his wonderfully funny children's books, Richard Scarry turned the idea of the clever fox on its head with his foxy character Mr. Fixit. Mr. Fixit is the repairman from hell, who wrecks everything he is called upon to repair. Rather unkindly perhaps, it was Mr. Fixit who appeared in my mind when I first heard that earlier this month the U.S. Army had stopped work at its Fort Detrick biodefense laboratories until it carried out an audit of what materials were in the labs. In expanding its research to protect against a perceived increase in the threat of bioterrorism, had the U.S.

Opportunities to improve the bioweapons regime

Malcolm Dando — Wed, 04 Feb 2009 10:47:49 -0800

In the February 2009 Jane's Intelligence Review, Richard Weitz, director of the Centre for Political-Military Analysis at the Hudson Institute, assessed the current status of the chemical and biological nonproliferation regime. After considering the outcomes of the annual meetings of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), which took place in December 2008, Weitz concluded that in 2009 these treaties would be challenged in many of the same ways they were in 2008.

Building a culture of responsible science

Malcolm Dando — Mon, 22 Dec 2008 07:54:45 -0800

Earlier this year, I wrote about preparations for the December 5th meeting between States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC). I warned that in addition to agreeing to a broad agenda, the States Parties needed to begin acting to make this agenda a reality.

Biological codes of conduct versus government oversight

Malcolm Dando — Wed, 26 Nov 2008 07:51:28 -0800

A recent conference, "Sustaining Progress in the Life Sciences: Strategies for Managing Dual Use Research of Concern," hosted by the World Health Organization and the U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) in Washington, addressed a range of issues, many of which map well on to the agenda of the States Parties meeting of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) which will be held next week.

Acting to educate life scientists

Malcolm Dando — Fri, 31 Oct 2008 09:12:53 -0700

Anyone familiar with the history of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) will know that for years participants in BWC meetings have spoken about the importance of education in preventing the malevolent dual-use of biological technologies. Yet for all the bluster, the practical results regarding, for example, scientists' understanding of the convention and their obligations under it, have been limited.

The merits of a biochemical framework convention

Malcolm Dando — Wed, 01 Oct 2008 09:10:43 -0700

The Bulletin has been hosting an engaging roundtable discussion on the "The Military Application of Neuroscience Research," during which neuroscientist Christopher Green challenged the notion that "traditional arms control approaches could be relevant to this domain." Referring to the recent National Academies study that he chaired, Military and Intelligence Methodology for Emergent Neurophysiological and Cognitive/Neural Science Research in the Next Two Decades, he wrote: "The

How to update the biological weapons treaty

Malcolm Dando — Wed, 03 Sep 2008 12:28:40 -0700

In late August, I travelled to Geneva for an intersessional meeting of the States Parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC). The meeting, which included representatives from the expert level, considered biosafety, biosecurity, and issues such as awareness raising, education, oversight of scientific activities, and codes of conduct for life scientists. (Concise daily accounts of these proceedings are available through the Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy).

European biosecurity efforts fall short

Malcolm Dando — Thu, 07 Aug 2008 06:43:48 -0700

The European Commission is on the right path among government institutions in putting issues of biosecurity and biosafety on the public agenda, yet even their efforts demonstrate how far governments have to go.