As the Bulletin continues to publish erudite analysis and opinion pieces from the world's top experts, these writings will be archived here to create a valuable resource for our readers.
The risk-assessment method that engineers currently use to predict the probability of a severe nuclear accident is unreliable and creates a false sense of security.
Re-examining Japan's nuclear history could not only help the country come to terms with the Fukushima disaster, but help it find a future without the US nuclear influence that has shaped its past.
Information and transparency are desirable, but they will not make the ambiguities surrounding the Fukushima crisis disappear. Technical expertise alone cannot provide the clarity we seek.
Like most people, nuclear experts may respond to crises with emotions such as anger and dread, which can lead to panic and regressive behavior.
The nuclear safety "stress tests" planned for Europe should be expanded to include tests that evaluate the security of nuclear materials around the world.
Although a catastrophic failure of emergency backup systems at a US nuclear reactor may be unlikely, solid planning and preparations are in order -- and should begin with determining whether an emergency zone extends 10 or 20 miles from a nuclear power plant.
A probabilistic approach to risk leaves us unprepared for "infrequent catastrophes." Nuclear plants require a "possibilistic" approach that allows us to design safeguards against the worst-case scenario.
The ongoing crisis at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant is not a cause for panic but rather an opportunity to improve safety worldwide.
The origins of civilian nuclear power positioned our society, and the nuclear industry, to favor military needs and financial gain over public understanding. Until this approach is changed, history will continue to repeat itself in devastating ways.
The success of the CTBT's global monitoring system in response to the tragedy in Japan has demonstrated its effectiveness in responding to natural disasters, further evidencing its value to US and global security.
Since the 1970s, Japan has turned to nuclear as a secure source of energy. But this security has a double meaning.
Japan faces prolonged anxiety and distress in its quest to find answers to the Fukushima disaster. One answer may be that a conventional back-up system was in the wrong place. There is much to learn.
Before the world's nations refine energy development plans, countries must ensure that one word -- safety -- is not lost in translation.
The energy future must take into account the needs of the world's growing population and protect the future viability of the planet. And this does not come without risk.
If the nuclear disaster teaches us anything, it is that a perfect safety system is unattainable. Will the United States learn from Japan's mistakes?
Not to be overlooked is the necessity for a twofold nuclear-safety strategy: stricter standards for reactor designs and systematic efforts to reduce the consequences of accidents.
Before this month's tragedy in Japan, many were confident that reactor design and safety had matured and catastrophic accidents were simply not going to happen. Fukushima has proven these assumptions wrong -- and it will have a number of implications for the energy debate.
With science unable to accurately determine major geologic events, a reassessment needs to be made of how much nuclear site planning relies on such predictions.