The success of the CTBT's global monitoring system in response to the tragedy in Japan has demonstrated its effectiveness in responding to natural disasters, further evidencing its value to US and global security.
Since the 1970s, Japan has turned to nuclear as a secure source of energy. But this security has a double meaning.
Japan faces prolonged anxiety and distress in its quest to find answers to the Fukushima disaster. One answer may be that a conventional back-up system was in the wrong place. There is much to learn.
What began as a brief refueling pause has stretched into six years as the restart of Three Mile Island's other reactor has become the focus of charges against the utility and the NRC.
As the government considers restarting the Three Mile Island Unit 1 reactor, local opposition remains strong. This case raises fundamental questions about democratic decision making in the age of high technology.
Was the nuclear industry concerned that accident mitigation techniques, such as off-site preparations for emergencies and retrofitting with filtered venting systems, could be interpreted as tacit admissions that serious accidents can happen?
"Wherever we looked we found problems with the human beings who operate the plant; with the management that runs the key organizations; and with the agency that is charged with assuring the safety of nuclear power plants."
"No soothsayer reading the entrails for the nuclear industry ever found a more unambiguous omen. . ." As Carl Friedrich von Weizsaecker opened hearings in Hannover, West Germany on March 28, 1979, on a plan to build the world's largest civil nuclear installation, a feedwater pump failed on TMI.
A quarter century after the accident at Three Mile Island, remarkably few questions about the health effects of that near-catastrophe have been asked-let alone answered.
The final report on Three Mile Island offered within its voluminous pages almost any message an attentive reader wants to find.
Future prospects for nuclear power suffered a severe blow at Three Mile Island. Did the accident portend a "new beginning or "the beginning of the end"?
Public fears of nuclear accidents raise difficult problems for democratic institutions. Who can judge the risk? Who can fashion an energy policy?
The message from Three Mile Island that rightly received the most attention in almost every post mortem: Beware of human frailties.
The accident at Three Mile Island presented the U.S. nuclear power industry with very serious problems but, writes Commissioner Gilinsky, the industry was already in serious trouble.
Before the world's nations refine energy development plans, countries must ensure that one word -- safety -- is not lost in translation.
The energy future must take into account the needs of the world's growing population and protect the future viability of the planet. And this does not come without risk.
If the nuclear disaster teaches us anything, it is that a perfect safety system is unattainable. Will the United States learn from Japan's mistakes?
Not to be overlooked is the necessity for a twofold nuclear-safety strategy: stricter standards for reactor designs and systematic efforts to reduce the consequences of accidents.