Nuclear Risk

The new Australia, UK, and US nuclear submarine announcement: a terrible decision for the nonproliferation regime

By Sébastien Philippe, September 17, 2021

On September 15, US President Joe Biden, United Kingdom Prime Minister Boris Johnson and Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison launched a new major strategic partnership to meet the “imperative of ensuring peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific over the long term.” Named AUKUS, the partnership was announced together with a bombshell decision: The United States and UK will transfer naval nuclear-propulsion technology to Australia. Such a decision is a fundamental policy reversal for the United States, which has in the past spared no effort to thwart the transfer of naval reactor technology by other countries, except for its World War II partner, the United Kingdom. Even France—whose “contract of the century” to sell 12 conventional submarines to Australia was shot down by PM Morrison during the AUKUS announcement—had been repeatedly refused US naval reactor technology during the Cold War. If not reversed one way or another, the AUKUS decision could have major implications for the nonproliferation regime.

In the 1980s, the United States prevented France and the UK from selling nuclear attack submarines to Canada. The main argument centered on the danger of nuclear proliferation associated with the naval nuclear fuel cycle. Indeed, the nonproliferation treaty has a well-known loophole: non-nuclear weapon states can remove fissile materials from international control for use in non-weapon military applications, specifically to fuel nuclear submarine reactors. These reactors require a significant amount of uranium to operate. Moreover, to make them as compact as possible, most countries operate their naval reactors with nuclear-weapon-usable highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel.

With tons of weapons-grade uranium out of international safeguards, what could go wrong?

The United States, UK, and Australia are giving themselves 18 months to hammer out the details of the arrangement. This will include figuring out what type of submarine, reactors, and uranium fuel will be required. Similarly, questions about where to base the submarines, what new infrastructure will be needed, how maintenance will be conducted, how nuclear fuel will be handled, and how crews will be trained—among many others—will need to be answered.

Australia has no civilian nuclear power infrastructure beyond a 20 megawatt-thermal research reactor and faces a rough nuclear learning curve. It will need to strengthen its nuclear safety authority so it has the capability to conduct, review, and validate safety assessments for naval reactors that are complex and difficult to commission. How long this new nuclear endeavor will take and how much it will cost are anyone’s guesses. But the cancelled $90 billion (Australian) “contract of the century” with France for conventionally powered attack submarines will most likely feel like a cheap bargain in retrospect. Beyond these technical details, the AUKUS partnership will also have to bend over backwards to fulfill prior international nonproliferation commitments and prevent the new precedent created by the Australian deal from proliferating out of control around the world.

The United States and UK operate naval reactors in their submarines that are fueled with 93.5 percent enriched uranium (civilian power plants are typically fueled with three to five percent uranium-235) in quantities sufficient to last for the lifetime of their ships (33 years for attack submarines).Having resisted domestic efforts to minimize the use of HEU and convert their naval reactors to LEU fuel, the United States and UK have no alternative fuel to offer. France, on the other hand, now runs naval reactors fueled with LEU. The new Suffren-class submarine, from which the French conventional submarine offered to Australia was derived, even runs on fuel enriched below 6 percent.

So Australia is likely to receive HEU technology, unless an LEU crash program is launched that could take more than a decade to complete or in a dramatic reversal, France is pulled back into a deal—two scenarios that remain unlikely at this point and at any rate do not solve all proliferation concerns. Assuming the high-enrichment route is followed, if Canberra wants to operate six to 12 nuclear submarines for about 30 years, it will need some three to six tons of HEU. It has none on hand and no domestic capacity to enrich uranium. So unless it kickstarts an enrichment program for military purposes, the material would need to come from the United States or the UK.

One can only imagine the drops of sweat trickling down the neck of the International Atomic Energy Agency leadership in Vienna when an Australian delegation comes knocking at its door bringing the good news. The agency, which is currently battling to prevent Iran from acquiring enough fissile material to build a nuclear weapon—25 kilograms (0.025 ton) of HEU according to the internationally agreed standard—will have to figure out how to monitor and account for 100 to 200 times that amount without gaining access to secret naval reactor design information.  Managing that feat while keeping its credibility intact will be difficult to pull off.

What could happen if AUKUS moves forward? France clearly feels “backstabbed” by its Anglo-Saxon allies and angered to the unimaginable point of cancelling a gala celebrating the 240th anniversary of the Revolutionary War Battle of the Capes during America’s war of independence. In response, the French could relax their position on not transferring naval reactor technology to Brazil as part of helping the country build its first nuclear attack submarine. South Korea just successfully launched a ballistic missile from a conventional submarine and recently floated the idea of starting a nuclear submarine program in response to growing nuclear threats from North Korea. Seoul could now ask the United States or other nations for an arrangement similar to Australia’s.

Russia could begin new naval reactor cooperation with China to boost China’s submarine capabilities in response to the AUKUS announcement. India and Pakistan, which already have nuclear weapons, could benefit from international transfers as well, possibly from France and China respectively. Iran, of course, has already expressed interest in enriching uranium to HEU levels to pursue a submarine program.

Until now, it was the US commitment to nonproliferation that relentlessly crushed or greatly limited these aspirations toward nuclear-powered submarine technology. With the new AUKUS decision, we can now expect the proliferation of very sensitive military nuclear technology in the coming years, with literally tons of new nuclear materials under loose or no international safeguards.

Domestic political opposition to the nuclear submarine deal is already brewing in Australia. The Green Party has announced that it will fight the deal “tooth and nail.” Meanwhile, Australian Prime Minister Morrison is very much struggling in the polls and could lose next year’s election—before the end of the 18-month review process announced by AUKUS. The nuclear submarine project could then be buried before it takes off, saving the international community further headaches.

But if Morrison gets re-elected and the program continues, it will be for the United Stated to take up its responsibilities as the guardian of the nonproliferation regime. Poor nuclear arms control and nonproliferation decisions—such as leaving the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and approving the US-Indian nuclear deal—have so far been a trademark of the US Republican Party. It is difficult to understand the internal policy process that led the Democratic Biden administration to the AUKUS submarine announcement.  It seems that just like in the old Cold War, arms racing and the search for short-term strategic advantage is now bipartisan.

 

 

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  • The first time the paragraph 14 exception under IAEA NPT safeguards was raised was by me in January 1988, Aurora Papers 8: Opening Pandora's Box - Nuclear-Powered Submarines and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons >> which examined the Canadian Navy's plan to acquire 10-12 SSNs and exempt significant quantities of enriched uranium fuel from IAEA safeguards > no information would be shared with the IAEA on the enrichment level, isotopic composition of the fresh naval nuclear fuel nor on the spent fuel, nor would naval reactor operations be subject to monitoring. In a piece to be published soon, I recommend that the IAEA Board of Governors reject any exercise of IAEA INFCIRC/153 (Corr.) paragraph 14 exemptions for non-proscribed non-peaceful uses and also decides to declare para. 14 non-operational henceforth. If Australia gets away with sequestering weapon-grade HEU naval nuclear fuel from IAEA safeguards, others will follow such as Brazil, Iran, Israel, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan (China) and others. The Clinton administration effectively recognized India as a nuclear-weapon State in 1998 following its nuclear tests, then President Bush Jr amended the 123 agreement to enable nuclear supply to India and bludgeoned the Nuclear Suppliers Group to give India an exception - the IAEA to conclude an ineffective "Mickey Mouse"additional protocol with India; and now President Biden sticks another nail in the back of the nuclear non-proliferation system by providing SSN technology to Australia that will necessarily entail keeping HEU naval fuel permanently outside IAEA verification. Not a surprise, as Biden's non-proliferation record is poor and merits a C-minus. The US no longer can be considered as a leader in the nuclear non-proliferation field.

  • Hi, I don't see what all the fuss is about, clearly China has been building up a massive military force Air/ Sea / Land.

    Also it has turned small islands and atolls into bases from which to operate militarily. This alone should have been a wake up call for the Western world, not to mention Japan, Taiwan, and all the other countries that are a part of this area.

    I used to work on the UK's nuclear subs, as well as conventional ones. The thing that people don't realise is that nuclear powered only means that a small reactor heats water to operate turbines with steam; it's just a power mechanism that lasts for as long as needed, meaning that a nuclear powered sub can stay underwater for ages as opposed to a conventional sub which needs to surface for air.

    A nuclear powered sub isn't a nuclear weapon carrying sub, unless it is a ballistic missile carrying submarine. THIS is different as it is both nuclear powered and nuclear weapons carrying, the missiles being stored in silos. (I am not disclosing amounts / measurements / or other nuclear related information as I have many years ago signed our official secrets act.)

    So Australia is only getting nuclear powered subs not ballistic missile carrying ones.

    This does however make a difference to its operational efficiency, and will help keep a reign on China's expansion, aligned with the US and UK.

    Sorry about deal with France, I can understand their disappointment and of course financial loss, subs are expensive items whether conventional or nuclear. But one has to keep ahead of any adversarial powers that might, God forbid, attempt to destabilise through force such a huge area. For many countries, going nuclear is ( sadly in some ways although the hypothetical genie is out of the bottle) the only option now.

  • Xi Jinping’s building up of the largest military on the planet and acquisition of disputed islands in the South China Sea to build military bases are, of course, completely misunderstood. He just wants China to be a peaceful trading partner. Right?

  • Please be aware that the party that is predicted to replace Australia's current govt is the Australian Labor Party (Australia's other major party). They agree to most aspects of the AUKUS #NuclearSubs deal. So let's not be complacent.

    Let's build the campaign to stop the #NuclearSubs deal. One way to achieve this is to build support for the Australian Greens.

  • Arguably,the Aukus submarine deal is far away from significantly impairing the non-proliferation regime.In this respect,it is worth mentioned that the landmark treaty(NPT)regulating the nuclear proliferation was an everlasting compromise deal between the "Haves"(nuclear powers) and "Haves nots".The former was allowed not only to possess legally nuclear weapons but also to manage easily their large amount of fissile materials.As for the US providing the Australian SSNA, they're reportedly worldwide believed to stand guarantor for the nuclear order,as the iranian and North Korean crisis recently proved.To further sustain elusive damage impacting nuclear proliferation,the reports and comments in connection with the naval reactor technology have highlighted that except US and its very close allies operating their naval vessels with HEU,the remaining nuclear powers including Russia are navigating their nuclear-powered submarines with LEU.Russia's transfer of naval submarine technology and not the least Iran with very sensitive military technology is highly impredictible on account that the soviet-chinese quarrel is the key driver in disrupting nuclear assistance at the end of 1950's,exacerbated by determined us-soviet collusion in the next decade to obstruct both allies's search for acquiring nuclear weapons.More importantly,it is worth noting that Dean Rusk,us secretary of state at the time of the adoption of the NPT was quite clear in denying any contrast between curbing nuclear proliferation and deploying nuclear warheads in Nato's allies soil in the 1950's as he stressed"the treaty deals with only what is prohibited,not with what is permitted". Currently,the new Australian nuclear-driven submarines pact is absolutely not inconsistent with international law.