Nuclear Weapons

Why a nuclear weapons ban would threaten, not save, humanity

By Zachary Kallenborn, January 10, 2024

On January 22, 2021, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons entered into force with 69 state parties. The treaty aims to ban nuclear weapons, bringing global nuclear weapons arsenals down to zero. Treaty states, the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, and other global zero activists that pushed for the treaty frequently highlight the existential harms from nuclear weapons, including in the second meeting of state parties to the treaty. The concern is legitimate. A 2022 study in Nature estimated a nuclear war between the United States and Russia would blast massive amounts of soot into the atmosphere, disrupting the global climate, and causing massive food shortages that could kill over five billion people.

But nuclear weapons are not the only threat to humanity. An asteroid over 1 kilometer in diameter striking the Earth, genetically engineered biological weapons, super volcanoes, extreme climate change, nanotechnology, and artificial superintelligence all could generate existential harm, whether defined as the collapse of human civilization or literal human extinction. To address those challenges, humanity needs global cooperation to align policies, pool resources, maintain globally critical supply chains, build useful technologies, and prevent the development of harmful technologies. Nuclear deterrence—alongside robust international organizations, laws, norms, alliances, and economic dependencies—helps make that happen.

Global governments and organizations aiming to reduce existential risks should support nuclear risk-reduction measures but oppose quick, complete abolition of nuclear weapons. Nuclear abolition creates serious risk of returning to an era of great power conflict, which could drastically increase existential risk. A global war between China, Russia, the United States and their respective allies risks the survival of the global cooperative system necessary to combat other existential threats, while threatening infrastructure necessary for risk mitigation measures and accelerating other existential risk scenarios. As Iskander Rehman wrote in his recent in-depth study of great power war: “Protracted great power wars are immensely destructive, whole-of-society affairs, the effects of which typically extend well beyond their point of origin, spilling across multiple regions and siphoning huge amounts of personnel, materiel and resources… Ultimately, protracted great-power wars usually only end when an adversary faces total annihilation, or collapses under the weight of its own exhaustion.” If the great powers collapse, the global system may collapse with them. Nuclear deterrence can help prevent that.

Nuclear weapons place a cap on how bad great power conflict can become and may deter the emergence and escalation of great power war. If China, the United States, or Russia faced a genuine existential threat, the nuclear weapons would emerge, threatening nuclear retaliation. As Chinese General Fu Quanyou, head of the People Liberation’s Army General Staff until 2002, once said: “The U.S. and Soviet superpowers both had strong nuclear capabilities able to destroy one another a number of times, so they did not dare to clash with each other directly, war capabilities above a certain point change into war-limiting capabilities.” Mutually assured destruction also helps prevent serious great power conflict from breaking out in the first place. During the current war between Ukraine and Russia, Russian President Vladimir Putin has used nuclear threats to deter direct NATO involvement and keep the conflict local. The United States might wish to support Ukraine against Russia, but it’s not willing to risk a Russian nuclear strike on New York City or Washington, DC to do more than provide money and material. Removing that deterrence by banning nuclear weapons means a potential return to protracted, global great power war.

To emphasize: Opposing quick, complete abolition does not mean opposing reduction of nuclear arsenals or risk reduction measures like improved crisis management and ensuring human control over nuclear weapons. Massive nuclear war is the most likely scenario for existential harm to humanity in the near term. As the Chinese nuclear arsenal grows, and China potentially aims for nuclear parity with the United States in the coming decades, that problem is going to get worse. Current nuclear weapon strategies depend on targeting adversary nuclear weapons, which means as an adversary builds more nuclear weapons, the United States must build more too. If the United States builds more, so too will Russia and China. Unchecked, nuclear arsenal sizes could quickly spiral upwards, passing the heights of the Cold War when the United States had 23,000 nuclear weapons and the Soviet Union had 39,000.

The risks of great power war. War among great powers increases existential risk in at least four ways. First, the global cooperative system necessary to combat existential threats may be seriously damaged or destroyed. Second, combatants might target and destroy infrastructure and capacity necessary to implement existential risk mitigation measures. Third, military necessity may accelerate the development of technologies like artificial intelligence that create new existential risks. Fourth, a great power war following nuclear abolition could touch off rapid, unstable nuclear rearmament and proliferation.

After World War II, the United Nations, NATO, the International Monetary Fund, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and numerous other international organizations were built to stabilize the world and prevent such a global catastrophe from happening again. That cooperative framework allowed for the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, enabled global partnerships on biosecurity through the G-7, and facilitated high-level discussions on the risks of artificial intelligence. However, a massive global war would undermine the very foundations of this order, because it would show the economic, political, and institutional ties between nations were never enough to prevent global conflict. Plus, World War III might result in the crippling or destruction of the powerful states and institutions that hold up global governance: China, France, Russia, the United States, the United Kingdom, the European Union, NATO, and others. The global community may lose the cooperative institutions necessary for climate change reduction, limiting or controlling risky biological research, prevent the creation and proliferation of artificial superintelligence, and generally defend the planet.

Great power war could accelerate a broad range of technologies that generate new and increase other existential risks. Russian President Putin noted in 2017 that, “[w]hoever becomes the leader in [artificial intelligence] will become the ruler of the world.” A great power war would almost certainly accelerate research, development, and implementation of artificial intelligence. One can easily imagine a Manhattan Project for artificial superintelligence, bringing together NATO’s leading artificial intelligence researchers and organizations to create a superintelligence (or close enough to it) to defend friendly cybernetworks and attack adversarial ones, manipulate adversary decision-making, or create and manage insurgent forces.  Although quantum computing is not an existential risk, accelerating development to help break adversary encryption or other military purposes would exacerbate artificial intelligence-related risks, too. Quantum computing offers potentially millions of times more computing power than classical computers, and computing power is a critical resource necessary to train artificial intelligence models. Great power war might also spur massive investment in biotechnologies like genetic engineering to enhance soldier effectiveness. Improvements and proliferation in genetic engineering generate a range of biological warfare concerns from creating new biological warfare agents to making existing agents more harmful.

In a war for survival, infrastructure necessary to mitigate existential risks might be destroyed. Space launch capabilities constitute a prime example: On November 24, 2021, NASA launched the Double Asteroid Redirection Test from Vandenburg Space Force Base near Santa Barbara, California. If China and the United States were at war, Vandenburg Space Force Base would be a viable and desirable target for Chinese attacks. China has long recognized that the United States military depends heavily on space assets for communication, remote sensing, and position, navigation, and timing. And Vandenburg is home to the Combined Space Operations Center, the Space Force center responsible for executing “operational command and control of space forces to achieve theater and global objectives.” Damaging or destroying the base, including its space launch capabilities, could help China win the war. At the same time, damaging or destroying the base would make it harder for the United States to carry out asteroid deflection research and, depending on timing, prevent the United States from launching a planetary defense mission when an asteroid is inbound.

General loss of state capacity could also draw resources and policy attention away from existential risk mitigation. Research by, Greg Koblentz of George Mason University and King’s College London researcher Filippa Lentzos mapped 69 Biosafety Level 4 laboratories around the world. At these labs, research is conducted on the most dangerous pathogenic material, like the microorganisms that cause smallpox and Ebola. The United States and global community expends significant resources to secure those facilities: President Biden’s Fiscal Year 2023 budget provides $1.8 billion to strengthen biosecurity and biosafety. But in a World War III involving the United States and China, biosecurity may fall by the wayside. Even if the United States prevails, rebuilding Tokyo, Los Angelos, Seoul, or other major cities demolished during the fighting would command tremendous resources, and attention.

Finally, a World War III breaking out after nuclear abolition could trigger rapid, unstable nuclear rearmament and proliferation. The United States, Russia, China, and other nuclear powers would almost certainly realize that nuclear abolition was a mistake and rearm themselves. A post-abolition World War III would also likely demonstrate to many other states that nuclear weapons are necessary to defend their sovereignty. Rapid nuclear rearmament and proliferation could be highly destabilizing, with significant new risks of nuclear war, because new nuclear arsenals may not be accompanied by the necessary crisis communication, secure second-strike, and general deterrence doctrine necessary to ensure stability.

Even if nuclear abolition were achieved, the basic knowledge underlying nuclear weapons would not disappear. Even if all nuclear warheads were dismantled, weapon designs were destroyed, and enrichment facilities closed, the historical and scientific knowledge of nuclear energy and nuclear weapons would not disappear. Nuclear weapons knowledge would need to be retained even in a global zero world to support any monitoring or verification programs aimed at ensuring that a nuclear global zero stays “zero.” That knowledge could provide the seeds for rearmament. So, while nuclear abolition might reduce nuclear-related existential risks in the short-term, abolition might counterintuitively increase nuclear existential risk in the long-term.

Navigating the zone of uncertainty. Effectively managing the existential benefits and risks of nuclear weapons requires two questions to be addressed. First, how many nuclear weapons are minimally necessary to deter great power conflict? Second: At what point does a nuclear war go from just a moral horror and catastrophic loss of life to truly existential harm? Unfortunately, neither answer is clear and requires significantly more modeling and analysis than has been done.

Reducing nuclear arsenals only to the minimum amount necessary to deter great power war requires a nuclear state having sufficient, survivable nuclear weapons to reliably inflict unacceptable harm on an adversary. But how much harm is “unacceptable” will depend on the conflict context, leader personality, domestic and international politics, and other factors. Plus, nuclear forces might be destroyed in an initial nuclear strike; adversary air, missile, and submarine defenses might defeat delivery systems; and nuclear weapons might simply fail to cause expected harm. Finding that right balance will no doubt be hard and change over time, especially with nuclear-relevant emerging and evolving military technologies, but modeling and simulation, red teaming, war games, and similar exercises can all help. Global international organizations, alliances, and complex economic and social interdependence between great powers can also help to ensure nuclear weapons are not the only guarantor of great power peace.

The modeling of global cooling from nuclear war—often called nuclear winter—has been ongoing since Carl Sagan and team raised the concern in October 1983. The results of researchers vary drastically. When looking at the same regional nuclear war scenario, one group of researchers concluded the environmental harms could be globally catastrophic, while the other concluded the climate impact would be minimal. Assumptions regarding how much soot a nuclear war generates, how much soot reaches the upper atmosphere, how food consumption changes, effects on global trade, and the degree to which livestock feed is diverted to human use all affect estimated harm, sometimes drastically.

Unfortunately, political biases and agendas have often colored those assumptions. Fortunately, the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine launched an independent study on potential environmental effects of nuclear war to assess the environmental effects and social consequences of nuclear war, including potential nuclear winter scenarios. The committee’s work continues, but the findings should merit significant attention. More generally, the global community should also invest financial, scientific, and computing resources to better assess the climate effects of nuclear detonations, connecting it with ongoing work on modeling climate change. Nuclear war would be a global problem that deserves global attention to understand and mitigate the effects.

The United States and global governments can also take action to reduce the risk of nuclear war causing existential harm by strengthening food security. Because the existential harm of a nuclear war that caused nuclear winter would come primarily through massive starvation, the global community can work together to build new and enhance existing long-term food reserves. In addition, the United States and others should think through and develop post-catastrophe plans for a broad range of extreme events, including nuclear war. For example, the United States could develop plans to use the military for emergency food supply, as in the Berlin airlift, when American and British aircraft delivered 2.3 million pounds of food, and other supplies to West Berlin. The United States and global community should also invest in research and development towards synthetic and resilient food sources like methane single cell proteins. These activities would not just be useful for life after nuclear war, but also enhance food security in the near term and be useful for a broad range of ecological and social disasters.

Of course, the best way to reduce the risks of nuclear war is to ensure it never happens in the first place.

The survival of humanity needs to be a global priority, because humanity’s survival transcends every social, economic, and political issue. What importance is war in the Ukraine, Taiwanese sovereignty, global poverty reduction, or Icelandic fishing rights, when all of mankind is in danger? For better or worse, ensuring human survival means keeping nuclear weapons for their deterrent effects, accompanied by diligent efforts to ensure that they are never used.

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  • No mention of the " wannabes" and new comers: South Africa, India, Pakistan, Israel, North Korea, and Iran. What say you?

  • Interesting, and apt, that the author describes himself as "an officially proclaimed U.S. Army 'mad scientist,."

  • It would take hours to list the different kinds of wrongheadedness in this. As the kidz say: "I can't even..."

    Question: Can you imagine the fury and derision this would provoke from Szilard's ghost or Pauling's or Amy Swerdlow's or Jonathan Schell's or Gorby's or Kissinger's ghost...? Even Herman Kahn would roll his eyes at this miasma of conflated clichés.

    What, precisely, is to be gained by giving this sort of think-tank chop-logic a platform as powerful as The Bulletin?

    Perhaps the next time the editorship feels impelled to give vent to this sort of stentorian speciousness, you might take the afternoon off and rewatch Countdown to Zero, The Atomic Café, Command & Control, Wiseman's MISSILE--or just thumb through Perry's The Button. Or read the I.C.A.N. lady's Nobel Speech, or the text of the U.N.'s Prohibition treaty.

    The psychology, logic and morality of "deterrence" has always been on par with the aerodynamics of Santa's sleigh. High octane hokum from would-be mandarins aside, it's nonsense.

    Dig up HARPER's from 1978. Rosenbaum: "And there it is again, in the most graphic terms possible, in, of all places, STRATEGIC REVIEW, one of the most militantly---albeit scholarly--hawkish nuclear strategy journals. In the February 1976 issue of STRATEGY REVIEW military strategy writer R. J. Rummel asks, 'If deterrence fails would a President push the button? Of course not.'"

    Perry & Collina, THE BUTTON: Chapter 10 The Atomic Titanic
    "The story of nuclear weapons will have an ending...will it be the end of nuclear weapons, or will it be the end of us?"
    --Beatrice Fihn, 2017 Nobel Speech

    onward ho we go, eh?

    • I concur with Peter Cook; there is so much that is factually and theoretically incorrect about this BAS article that it is hard to know where to begin a critique, but even glancing at the vast, constantly updating literature on nuclear winter will dispel Kallenborn's ontologically weird spin that we need more nuclear weapons to avoid using them.

      Classical deterrence theory, which is basically a first strike-justifying mechanism, has been walking dead for decades, yet it keeps appearing in journals, Zombie-like. Why? Not only does Kallenborn work for a weapons industry funded "think tank" that is constantly agitating for war, CSIS -- https://www.csis.org/about/financial-information/donors -- his analysis of the science of nuclear winter regurgitates 40 year old tropes about quantitative "uncertainties" in the theory of nuclear winter regarding predicting amounts of black soot generation from nuclear blast caused firestorms and resultant global cooling, tropes that have long been disproved and transcended. Even a limited nuclear war is now an existential issue, as the paper by Robock et al that Kallenborn links to in the first paragraph of his piece amply demonstrates.

      Oddly, to make a political point about disagreements with the science of global cooling, Kallenborn links to polemical arguments advanced in 1988 by an Australian self-described socialist, Brian Martin, who insisted that research on nuclear winter was a government plot to scare nuclear freeze activists into giving up in despair. Nutty.

      As a partial antidote to the barrage of corporate lobbying for continuing with the trillion dollar modernization of nuclear weapons, worldwide, that even makes it into the pages of BAS, I suggest Ward Wilson’s excellent 2023 book, It Is Possible: A Future Without Nuclear Weapons, which shreds arguments that the use of nuclear weapons has military or political utility, and makes an informed and logical case for simply abandoning them as useless.

  • I thought abolitionists talking about the catastrophic consequences of nuclear weapons and nuclear war were the ones usually criticized as fear-mongers. Kallenborg gets the gold! Rather than examine the premises that nuclear deterrence works and that eliminating nuclear weapons would be a proximate cause of catastrophic "great power" war, or, at the very least, the collapse of global cooperation and governance, he simply takes these notions on faith and proceeds to pile on one extreme and horrifying possibility after another. Never mind that some of his nightmare scenarios, such as the rapid and dangerous development of AI, are already happening irrespective of the nuclear status quo. The entire article reduces to a series of cheap and transparent rhetorical tricks and logical fallacies.

    A replacement premise is that eliminating nuclear weapons would require an extraordinary level of global cooperation and institution-building that would carry over to other collective threats, existential or otherwise. We've already seen some of this promising willingness to elevate the common good, though not nearly enough, in the climate crisis talks and the pandemic response. We saw it in the process leading up to adoption of the TPNW itself. We should be encouraging such behavior, not abandoning it.

    The faith-based claim that deterrence works can't be proven and has never been supported with convincing evidence. The most that can be said, even by those who argue that it has worked to prevent nuclear war up until now, is that it will work until it stops working. As Jeff Goldblum's character said in the Jurassic Park sequel, "It starts with the oohs and aahs. Then there's the running and the screaming."

  • The long discussion about the effects of a conventional WW-III are superfluous, as is the discussion of various non-nuclear existential threats. The key near-term question that is touched on here is, "What is a stable step downwards along the path to zero?" Too bad we don't get any exploration of answers to this question. In my writings here at the Bulletin I have suggested eliminating all silo-based ICBMs worldwide and all sub-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe. Both classes of weapons are destabilizing and superfluous. While we are at it, let's not add more destabilizing weapons systems, like a nuclear-tipped sea-launched cruise missile.

  • Zachary Kallenborn is of course quite right that "the survival of humanity needs to be a global priority" and that the possibility of a nuclear war that could kill as many as 5 billion people is a "legitimate" concern. And of course no one would argue that there are not also other legitimate concerns, such as an asteroid hitting the earth, a more dangerous and uncontrollable pandemic, and of course climate change.

    As Kallenborn says, "A global war between China, Russia, the United States and their respective allies risks the survival of the global cooperative system necessary to combat [these] other existential threats." And yet he goes on to suggest that it is nuclear weapons that make the global cooperative system possible and that without them global war would not just be more likely but more dangerous.

    This is a truly absurd argument that even the high priests of nuclear deterrence would be hesitant to make. Nuclear deterrence is nothing more and nothing less than the explicit threat to utterly annihilate another country (and in all likelihood one's own country in the process) if push comes to shove. Making such a threat never has been and never will be a basis for building international cooperation or promoting international goodwill. It is the exact opposite of that.

    Furthermore, no threat is effective as a deterrent unless it is believed that the threat will be carried out. When the Soviets backed down over Berlin in 1948, the US was still the only country to possess nuclear weapons and it was only 3 years since they had used them on Japan. Daniel Ellsberg has argued that in that specific case, nuclear weapons "worked" as a deterrent.

    But since then there is absolutely no evidence (other than by logical fallacy of post hoc ergo propter hoc) that nuclear deterrence has "worked" in any other case. In fact, Sechser and Fuhrmann, in their important book, Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy, found no statistical correlation whatsoever between the possession of nuclear weapons and the outcome of international disputes.

    And of course the real danger with nuclear deterrence thinking is that the longer the time interval between the actual use of nuclear weapons (ie. in 1945) and the threat to use them (ie now or in the future), the less likely it is that an adversary will believe that the threat will actually be carried out. That means that nuclear weapons are more likely to be used the longer this ridiculous and danger game of chicken goes on, if only to prove to an adversary that the threat represented by nuclear deterrence is a real one.

    Kallenborn argues that a recent example of nuclear deterrence "working" has been the Russian attempt to prevent the US from intervening in Ukraine. But surely that is more accurately an example of nuclear deterrence not working, since the US and its NATO allies haven't been deterred in the slightest from turning that into a proxy war and pumping billions of dollars worth of military hardware and other forms of military assistance into supporting Ukraine's war effort. To suggest that because there are no US troops on the ground (as far as we know) means that deterrence is working is once again to engage in a logical fallacy, since it is far from obvious that the US would prefer to send its own troops to be killed on the frontline when they can use Ukrainian troops instead.

    In short, Zachary Kallenborn has singularly failed to demonstrate why a nuclear weapons ban would "threaten, not save, humanity." He himself admits that "the best way to reduce the risks of nuclear war is to ensure it never happens in the first place." And the only way to reduce that risk to zero is to eliminate the weapons before it's too late. Everything else is wishful thinking.

    • Presently, the progress afoot in abolishing nuclear weapons far outstrips the coverage of that progress.  So it goes, Vonnegut’s ghost intones.

      Mr. Wallis’ Warheads to Windmills and the whole work of the people at Nuclear Ban dot US and Disarming Arguments dot com say more—even at a glance—than most of the nuke priesthood’s cant and twaddle ever could.  The “it’s-so-complicated” routine that tries to dismiss the very idea of abolishing nuclear weapons is still alive and kicking.

      Despite this need to catch up, the progress today, the potential to finally get nukes abolished, is really rather astonishing. Who would have ever thought that the likes of Kissinger and Shultz (Reagan’s head statesman) and Perry (Clinton’s head warrior) and Gorbachev (Reagan’s evil empire counterpart) would one day align with the hippies and flower power peaceniks of yore…Well.  C’mon, folks. 

      If that’s not progress, what is?

      Just listen to apostasy-in-action.  Here’s Henry Kissinger in “The Nuclear Tipping Point” (2010) from the Nuclear Security Project:

      “I have written about nuclear weapons for over fifty years, now.  I try to apply traditional diplomatic principles to a world with nuclear weapons—and, ah…I find it almost—I would say impossible. 

      “The consequences have to be looked at on two levels. One is—technically—what happens if, say, a 20-kiloton weapon hits downtown New York? And that’s a very small weapon. Most of the hospitals, most of the medical facilities, most of the power, most of the bridges, most of the communications would be gone.

      “There’s a second level. Namely, what do people think happened that permitted such casualties to occur? And what will they demand of their government? And if, they will probably say globally, if this can’t be prevented, what’s the use of any government?”

      Yes.  It’s true.  On camera, the author of 1957’s Nuclear Weapons & Foreign Policy, a pre-cursor to Herman Kahn’s 1960 On Thermonuclear War, gives us the best bumpersticker of the day: “If nuclear war can’t be prevented, what’s the use of any government?”

      Onward ho we go.

  • >Nuclear deterrence—alongside robust international organizations, laws, norms, alliances, and economic dependencies—helps make that happen.

    Wrong. Nuclear deterrence is a nonsensical chimera. A hundred Hiroshima-sized warheads detonated over urban targets would kill scores of millions quickly and hundreds of millions through nuclear winter-induced starvation within two years:

    https://www.nature.com/articles/s43016-022-00573-0

    Abolition is the only safe, effective and moral means to stave off the cold and the dark.

  • “If the great powers collapse, the global system may collapse with them. Nuclear deterrence can help prevent that.”
    Deterrence can keep the peace. But the doctrine can only work in perpetuity if it can prevent all the possible scenarios in which a nuclear state will be forced to use its weapons. All such states will use their nukes of certain conditions: otherwise the theory would flounder. Here we look to history, if we are to avoid nuclear Armageddon. It comes down to a simple syllogism: every empire/civilization eventually faces the war it is trying to avoid; everyone wants to avoid WW III; therefore that is the fate that awaits humanity. Paradoxically, the only chance of avoiding that fate is to accept it.

  • Mr Kallenborn reveals a shocking lack of courage. We must move beyond the madness of detente. Of course, nuclear abolition does not guarantee global safety, but is a step towards unlocking yet unimagined ways of making peace.