China’s openness about its latest nuclear missile test shows growing confidence vis-à-vis the United States

China’s Ministry of National Defense announced last month that the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) had successfully launched an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) carrying a simulated warhead into the Pacific Ocean and that the missile accurately fell into the designated area. This was the first time since 1980 that China had test-fired an ICBM into international waters.

But the test launch was part of routine annual training, the ministry added, in line with international law and international practice, and not directed against any country or target.

Just as observers were vigorously speculating about the type of missile used in the test, China Junhao (China’s military media wing) cut short the discussions, releasing pictures of the launch site—a very rare step given that the Chinese army has not made public a photo of the launch of a new ICBM for decades.

The pictures show that the missile was launched from a transporter erector launcher (TEL) vehicle located in a wasteland on Hainan Island, the southernmost province of China. The dimensions and features of the missile canister and missile body indicate that the missile is the Dong Feng-31 (DF-31)AG—one of China’s newest and most advanced ICBMs. This three-stage, road-mobile missile DF-31AG is an improved version of DF-31A that includes an upgraded TEL with improved off-road capabilities for more maneuverability and survivability. It has a reported range of 11,200 kilometers, making it capable of reaching targets in most of the continental United States. (According to some Chinese analysts, the fight range of the test may have been up to 12,000 kilometers.)

First seen in a 2017 parade, the DF-31AG has been in service since 2018, and Beijing sees it—along with the DF-31A, DF-41, and DF-5 variants—as a component in China’s efforts to deter US nuclear use.

With this new launch test, China certainly wants to show a forceful response to suspicion about its nuclear deterrence capabilities in the wake of recent corruption scandals and command instability in its rocket force. The test shows that the rocket force has an operational and credible nuclear force that can help ensure China’s ability to maintain a strong nuclear deterrent—a key element of President Xi Jinping’s long-held military objectives and emphasis on strengthening China’s nuclear forces, an emphasis initiated in 2015.

The rare public ICBM test seems to have been specifically aimed at dissuading Washington from using nuclear weapons in a potential conflict across the Taiwan Strait. The unusual transparency surrounding the test shows how China is becoming increasingly confident vis-à-vis the United States. It also could offer a rare opportunity for engaging in risk reduction talks.

A new missile type. Unlike the United States, which usually tests its ICBMs in international waters, China has usually fired its ICBMs over its homeland, using a lofted or depressed trajectory to keep the missile inside Chinese territory. China’s last full-trajectory flight test of an ICBM (the DF-5) was conducted in May 1980.

The DF-5 ballistic missile was China’s first-generation nuclear weapon with a liquid-fueled missile and the first-generation thermonuclear warhead with a solid core primary. Today’s DF-31AG missile, tested on September 25, is a second-generation nuclear weapon with a solid-fueled missile and a second-generation warhead with a gas-boosted core primary.^[1]

The implications of these two full-trajectory launch tests are significantly different.

In 1980, Beijing made a low-profile announcement of the launch test by calling the DF-5 ICBM as a “carrier rocket,” in line with Deng Xiaoping era’s moderate diplomacy. This year, however, Beijing announced its test with a high-profile public statement, addressing the device explicitly as an “ICBM with a dummy warhead,” which conveys Xi’s more assertive diplomacy. This announcement, combined with the release of the photos of the DF-31AG launch, shows more transparency and confidence by China about demonstrating its nuclear deterrence capabilities.

Also, the 1980 DF-5 launch was just a developmental test; the DF-5 weapon system wasn’t deployed until 1986. This year’s DF-31AG test is a PLARF training exercise of a practical weapon system in service. As China’s official news agency Xinhua stated, the launch “effectively tested the performance of weapons and equipment as well as the training level of the troops, and achieved the desired goals,” adding that “China had notified relevant countries in advance.” In other words, with this ICBM test, China sought to demonstrate it possesses an operational, combat-ready, and reliable nuclear force to provide deterrence against the United States.

Where the 1980 test was meant to be a trump card for deterring Moscow, today’s DF-31AG test is aimed at deterring Washington.

Early strategic missile force. China’s nuclear weapons development has been very sensitive to its leadership’s perception of key external threats, ensuring the country had a reliable retaliatory strike capability against its designated adversary.^[2] However, China’s perception of the key threats has changed over time.

Originally, the development of nuclear weapons was driven by Mao’s desire to counter US nuclear blackmail of the kind he felt China had suffered during the Korean War and the crises over Taiwan in the 1950s. After the Sino-Soviet border conflict, especially the 1969 conflict near the Damansky (Zhenbao) Island on the Ussuri River, China’s leadership then perceived the Soviet Union as a major adversary. In a February 1980 meeting of the Central Special Committee, tasked with overseeing China’s nuclear and missile projects, the Chinese leadership emphasized the significance of the DF-5 missile, which would cover the entire Soviet Union, to deter a nuclear attack by Moscow.

The DF-5 missile had a range of about 9,000 kilometers, enough to cover the whole Soviet Union, but not enough to reach the continental United States. Although the original design was to have a 12,000-kilometer-range missile, the central government felt little urgency to extend the range to cover the United States.^[3] China saw little threat from the United States at that time; Mao even joined with Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger in opening a US-Chinese partnership, starting in 1970. Therefore, China did not see not having an ICBM able to reach the continental United States as a weakness.

Leaders of the Second Artillery Corps (known as the PLARF since 2015), however, were still determined to advance to the next stage and upgrade the DF-5 missile to the DF-5A with an increased range—approximately 13,000 kilometers—enabling China to possess a genuine ICBM. The DF-5A was seen as crucial for enhancing China’s strategic deterrence, elevating its strategic status within the “grand triangle” of relations with the United States and the Soviet Union, and balancing the trilateral dynamic.^[4]

In 1993, the DF-5A underwent its first flight test, and the missile was deployed by 1995.^[5] China now possessed a full-scale ICBM capability to reach the continental United States, but even then, the central government did not consider this new capability a priority.

By 1989, when Sino-Soviet relations achieved normalization, China had an operational nuclear arsenal of over 100 warheads available for its land-based missiles.^[6] Even if 10 percent survived after accepting a first nuclear strike—an estimate then-commander of the Navy and later vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission Liu Huaqing predicted as early as 1984^[7]—there would still be about 10 remaining warheads, which Chinese leaders may have considered enough to deter against a Soviet first nuclear strike.

Changing target. China now perceives the United States as being its main threat, and the question of whether China has a credible and reliable deterrent against a US first nuclear strike has become more important in Chinese government circles. At least, this appears to be the strategic calculation that Xi currently pursues.

By 2010, before Xi Jinping came to power, China had only about 20 silo-based DF-5A ICBMs that had extremely low survivability from a US nuclear first strike and had deployed about 10 road-mobile DF-31A ICBMs. Even if all mobile missiles survived a pre-emptive strike, they would not have been sufficient to penetrate a then-deployed Ground-Based Midcourse Defense system that had about 30 interceptors.* In short, China had no ensured nuclear retaliation capability against the United States.

Since 2012 and Xi’s presidential tenure, however, China has been substantially modernizing, expanding, and diversifying its nuclear forces to address perceived threats from the United States. In December 2015, as a major achievement of the new round of military transformation initiated by Xi, the PLA Second Artillery Force was renamed the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) and was upgraded from an independent branch to a full service. This decision reflects the importance China now attaches to its strategic missile force.

At the inauguration ceremony for the PLARF in 2015, Xi called it China’s “core force of strategic deterrence, a strategic buttress for [China]’s position as a major power, and an important building block in upholding national security.” Xi also called on the new Rocket Force to “enhance a nuclear deterrence and counter-strike capacity which is credible and reliable, medium- and long-range precision strike ability, as well as a strategic check-and-balance capacity to build a strong and modern Rocket Force.”

Since then, China has expanded its nuclear arsenal at unprecedented speed and scale. It has increased its total warhead count from about 260 in 2016 to about 500 in 2024. Most of the increase has come in the shape of ICBMs capable of reaching the continental United States—from about 65 in 2016 to about 240 in 2024. The US Defense Department projected that China would possess over 1,000 warheads by 2030.

The observable transformation of China’s nuclear posture and the projections for its expansion over the next decade raise the question of whether China has changed its nuclear strategy.^[8] Until recently, Chinese officials and government documents reaffirmed China’s commitment to a no-first-use policy and a self-defense nuclear strategy.^[9] Under this nuclear policy and strategy, China has always confirmed that it “keeps its nuclear capabilities at the minimum level required for national security.” The major question is how to interpret the “minimum” needs of a nuclear force for a secured second-strike capability.

Searching for a minimum and “effective” deterrent. China’s officials have never declared a specific number of weapons required for its minimum level. Such a level is never static. It depends on several factors, including estimates of survivability during a nuclear attack and a projected enemy’s missile defense systems. A former president of China’s nuclear weapon lab, Hu Side, argued that “[t]he continued stability of China’s nuclear strategy does not mean that the scale and specific applications of nuclear forces remain unchanged.” To ensure effective nuclear deterrence, he said, a Chinese nuclear force had to respond to international military advances, including strategic missile defense, outer space surveillance, and precision tracking and strike capabilities.^[10]

Indeed, since 2000, the US missile defense plan has been a major driver of China’s nuclear modernization and buildup. After President George W. Bush declared on May 1, 2001, that the United States would deploy missile defenses, then-Senator and next chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Joe Biden warned that if the United States unilaterally withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and deployed missile defenses, China would increase the number of ICBM from about 20 to “closer to 800”—a clear understanding of what was driving China’s nuclear forces.

Xi may feel more confident with a large nuclear arsenal (say, of about 1,000 warheads) to ensure a credible and reliable retaliation capability even in a worst-case scenario—such as considering a low survivability rate (say, 10 percent) of its warheads after a large-scale US pre-emptive strike and that only about 10 percent of the warheads that survived (10 warheads in total) would be able to penetrate a much larger and more advanced missile defense system the United States may deploy in the future.

At this stage, it is not clear whether Xi Jinping has decided to empower the country’s nuclear force beyond assuring such a reliable second-strike capability. However, while there is little evidence to show that China has changed its long-standing nuclear strategy and no-first-use policy, recent qualitative and quantitative improvements in the nuclear forces demonstrate that Chinese leaders may now pursue a more ambitious nuclear strategy.

A more confident China—and the need to reduce risk. Without a clear understanding of China’s goals and motivations, a new arms race could be triggered with the United States, which would reverse China’s long-standing policy against such engagements. It is now the time for both countries to conduct dialogues to avoid a nuclear arms race and reduce the risk of nuclear conflict. Both sides should undertake risk-reduction and military confidence-building measures to address security concerns, clarify strategic intentions, and increase transparency. They should also engage in “strategic stability” talks.

As a first step, China and the United States could negotiate a bilateral agreement on mutual notification for ballistic missile and space launches, which would significantly reduce the risk of misperception and miscalculation. China and Russia signed such a notification agreement in 2009 and extended it by another 10 years after it expired in 2020. On September 25, a Pentagon spokesperson confirmed that the United States had received “some advanced notification” of the recent intercontinental ballistic missile launch test from Beijing, calling it “a step in the right direction” as it “prevented any misperception or miscalculation.”

That China notified in advance what it considers as “relevant countries” about its ICBM test and subsequently publicly released the on-site launch photos is a sign that China is moving toward more strategic transparency. As it seeks to establish itself as a responsible global power, China should actively—and decisively—engage in talks on more nuclear transparency, risk reduction, and nuclear arms control.

* Editor’s note (October 17, 2024): The asterisked sentence was edited after posting to clarify that it referred only to road-mobile DF-31A missiles, not all ICBMs. The 20 silo-based DF-5A ICBMs were assumed to be almost all destroyed given their extremely low survivability.

Notes

[1] For more details about the technical history of China’s nuclear weapon development program, see Hui Zhang, China’s nuclear weapon development and testing, MIT Press (Cambridge, MA), forthcoming in 2025.

[2] See details in Zhang, China’s nuclear weapon development and testing.

[3] The Second Artillery Political Department editing, Glory Days 1978-2008—Looking back the development and advances of the Second Artillery in the [economic] reform and opening up, Central Party Literature Press, Beijing, 2008 (in Chinese), pp. 246-248.

[4] Ibid, pp. 248-249.

[5] Xu Jian, ‘Li Xuge’, in The Second Artillery Political Department editing (ed.), Biography of Senior Generals of the Second Artillery, The Second Artillery Political Department Press, Beijing, June 2006 (in Chinese), pp. 437–95.

[6] See, Robert Norris, Andrew Burrows, and Richard Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons Databook Volume V: British, French, and Chinese Nuclear Weapons (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), p.359. Here I focus on the land-based warheads.

[7] John Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb, Stanford University Press, 1988, p. 230; Du Zhongwei, et al. “The Sea, the Navy, and the New Technology Revolution: An Interview with Navy Commander Liu Huaqing,” p. 9. Liu predicted in 1984 that fewer than 10 percent of China’s land-based missiles would survive a large-scale first strike.

[8] “China’s Accelerated Expansion of its Nuclear Arsenal Represents a Shift in China’s Nuclear Strategy and Doctrine: A Debate with Dr. Tong Zhao and Dr. Fiona Cunningham,” October 5, 2023, China Power Project of CSIS. https://chinapower.csis.org/chinas-power-up-for-debate-2023/.

[9] Statement by Director-General of the Department of Arms Control of the Foreign Ministry of China Sun Xiaobo at the General Debate of the First Meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the 2026 NPT Review Conference,2023-08-01, Upholding the authority of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Serving international security and development (Vienna, August 2023). http://vienna.china-mission.gov.cn/eng/hyyfy/202308/t20230801_11120895.htm; Also, Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China, “Defense Policy,” 2023. http://eng.mod.gov.cn/xb/DefensePolicy/index.html

[10] Hu Side and Liu Chengan, Nuclear Technologies in the Military Application—Nuclear Weapons, Shanghai Jiaotong University Press, Shanghai, 2016 (in Chinese), p.183.