By Mariana Budjeryn, October 2, 2024
A Russian missile explodes on Kyiv in Ukraine on June 26, 2022. With victory in sight but not yet in hand, Russia may be tempted to launch a nuclear-armed missile on a secondary Ukrainian city and demand Ukraine’s immediate and unconditional surrender. (Photo by uwstas / depositphotos.com)
Russia’s war against Ukraine has been a conventional conflict. But it is very much a nuclear crisis, too.
Russia, the aggressor, is in possession of the world’s largest nuclear arsenal, including a vast cache of battlefield nuclear weapons. Since the beginning of the war, the Kremlin relied heavily on nuclear threats and signaling to intimidate the West and thwart its military assistance to Ukraine, with some—albeit limited—success. The latest instance in Russia’s nuclear signaling are changes to its nuclear doctrine, recently announced by Russian President Vladimir Putin, that expand permissible scenarios for Russia to resort to nuclear weapons and add ambiguity and interpretative space for the Russian leadership to define whether and when such scenarios occur.
While Russia uses nuclear rhetoric politically, there’s an ever-present danger that it could resort to an actual use of a nuclear weapon in Ukraine.
From the first days of the invasion, the received wisdom has been—and remains—that the most likely scenario for Russia’s limited nuclear use is to reverse an imminent military defeat or possibly break a hurting stalemate in Ukraine. The nuclear scare of October 2022 seems to corroborate the supposition that Russia might resort to nuclear weapons if it’s in retreat. Then, as Ukraine was making rapid gains in liberating the Kharkiv and Kherson regions, Russian military-political leadership allegedly considered using nuclear weapons to thwart Ukrainian advances. In public, Russia concocted a bogus accusation that Ukraine was planning to use a “dirty bomb,” which many feared was creating a pretext for a Russian nuclear strike. The US intelligence community estimated the risk of Russia’s nuclear use in fall 2022 at 50 percent, possibly a historic high.
But has the international community overlooked another scenario—a situation in which Russian nuclear use might not only be possible but even more likely? What if Russia resorts to nuclear use not when it’s losing—but when it’s winning the war?
The nuclear calculus, then and now. Much is still unknown about Russian deliberations two years ago, and what ultimately worked to dissuade Russia from using nuclear weapons then. Likely, it was some combination of US threat of game-changing consequences for Russia, including conventional strikes against Russian military assets on occupied Ukrainian territory, intervention by China that might have come with a promise of increased conventional military assistance, and the dubious military utility of battlefield nuclear use. The nuclear use Russia considered in the fall of 2022 would have been well beyond the pale of Russia’s nuclear doctrine, before and after the announced changes. That reality points to the limited restraint a declaratory doctrine is likely to impose on considerations of whether to use nuclear weapons in a war.
Fears of nuclear escalation remain real, and Ukraine’s Western partners continue to carefully consider escalation dynamics when they decide which weapon systems to release to Ukraine and how to mandate their end use. The current reticence to allow Ukraine to strike Russian homeland with Western-supplied weapons is a case in point. The underlying operating assumption is that Ukraine cannot be too audacious in its resistance, lest it provokes Russia’s nuclear ire.
But what are the nuclear risks of the opposite scenario: when the conventional fighting in Ukraine shifts decisively in Russia’s favor?
Consider that the only use of nuclear weapons in armed conflict so far was by a nuclear power that was on a winning path. The United States decided to drop two atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, when Japan was nearly defeated by conventional means, but stubbornly refused to stop resistance and accept US conditions for surrender. While reasons and justifications for the US decision to employ nuclear weapons in Japan are still subject of debate among historians, it is safe to say that the bombings achieved at least three goals. They terminated the war with Japan more quickly, possibly saving the United States from having to mount a costly invasion of the home islands. They allowed the United States to impose the conditions of war termination and post-war settlement—that is, unconditional surrender and US military occupation of Japan. And finally, they made a strong impression on the Soviet Union.
While historical precedents should not be applied uncritically across time and context, they can be mined for insights. The set of incentives for Russia to resort to nuclear use when it is about to win in Ukraine would not be dissimilar from those animating the US decision in 1945. Perhaps, Putin’s mention of Hiroshima and Nagasaki precedents in his September 2022 speech was more than a trope.
A winning Russia might indeed have more to gain and less to lose from a nuclear strike than a retreating Russia.
The possible nuclear scenario, if Russia is winning. Imagine Russia has broken through Ukraine’s defensive lines and is steadily pushing against stubborn if desperate pockets of Ukrainian resistance—a scenario that today looks far more likely than the sudden routing of Russian troops from Ukraine. With victory in sight but not yet in hand, it would be mighty tempting for Russia to launch a nuclear-armed missile on a secondary Ukrainian city and demand Ukraine’s immediate and unconditional surrender or else another major city would be next.
Continued resistance from Kyiv would be suddenly rendered foolhardy, if not suicidal. In this scenario, the Kremlin could terminate the war more quickly, with fewer casualties, and on conditions favorable to Russia. It could impose on Ukraine unconditional surrender, occupation, and other punishing conditions it would feel entitled to after a long and costly war. The prospect of lording over a smoldering radioactive ruin would unlikely be an obstacle for Russia. The wanton destruction of Mariupol, Bakhmut, Avdiivka, Marinka, and other Ukrainian cities by the Russian artillery and bombs before Russia occupied them resembles what could be achieved by a single non-strategic nuclear missile, minus efficiency and radioactivity. And after all, Hiroshima and Nagasaki were rebuilt in just a few years and are perfectly habitable today.
Russia would still likely incur international political costs for breaking the eight-decades-long taboo on nuclear use, but these costs could be better mitigated by a winning Russia than a losing Russia. The United States and NATO allies might not deliver on their threat to impose severe military costs in response to a Russian nuclear strike if Ukraine looks like a lost cause. Opprobrium from China will matter less to a Russia that won its war in Europe. Finally, Russia’s nuclear use is bound to make an impression in NATO capitals and allow Russia to shape the broader post-war settlement in Europe to its advantage.
As long as nuclear weapons exist, their use remains possible. In times of crisis and conflict, their use becomes more probable. Kremlin’s heavy reliance on nuclear rhetoric for political coercion since February 2022 should not obscure the very real danger that Russia might resort to an actual nuclear strike on battlefield Ukraine. As Western capitals balance their support for Ukraine with fears of nuclear escalation, they should bear in mind that allowing Russia to achieve significant military advantage in Ukraine might create greater risk of nuclear weapons use than Russia’s retreat.
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Well, when US used nukes, Japan didn't see it as a threat, because they felt if we had more of them, we would've used them all. It was only because Russia joined did they surrender.
No it is not you are absolutely wrong Japan was almost finished when America dropped the bombs anyway it was due to stubborn resistance after showing them that we won they would not give up. Russia didn't have a thing to do with it.lol
Japan would of lasted at least months if not years. It would of cost hundreds of thousands lives!
1945 was a different scenario completely. It was a world wide war. The decision to drop the bombs was to shorten the war. Hundreds of thousands would of died before it was over. Russia defeating Ukraine is not an existential issue for Russia. Just a matter of Putin's psychosis and Russian pride. They already violated the 1994 Budapest Accords. But what else is new! Russian leaders lie!
The quality and degree of motivated reasoning here are such that I would encourage the author to sit down, and carefully consider how the emotional impact of recent events is affecting her ability to function in an intellectually credible, never mind, objective way.
It is quite true that the US, or more precisely, US president Truman, did in fact use atomic bombs against Japan even though this was regarded as unnecessary by many significant figures in the decision chain, and Allied high command, including Admiral William Leahy, White House chief of staff and chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the war, Dwight Eisenhower, the Allied commander in Europe during World War II, and Admiral William Halsey, the commander of the U.S. Third Fleet, which participated in the American offensive against the Japanese home islands in the final months of the war.
This use of atomic weapons was however, opposed by these figures, because it was in fact, regarded as unnecessary to win the war. This means that the only historical example used in this article is utterly inapplicable in the sense that there would not in fact, have been any disagreement in the Allied command against using atomic weapons to achieve that goal. To the extent that the use of atomic weapons in WW2 tells us anything, it is that Ukraine winning the war in any way would increase the risk of the use of atomic weapons significantly.
It seems quite possible however, that the best US example is not the example where the US used atomic weapons, at a time when there was no risk of retaliation in kind, but rather, any examples where the US was willing to risk an atomic war despite the horrible effects it would experience, and despite the US loss of life.
There is in fact, such an example, in the Cuban Missile Crisis. In that case, the US was willing to risk nuclear war and a high probability of being nuked itself, rather than accept the extension of a hostile alliance on its doorstep.
Now there are intellectual consequences of considering this example, because it would suggest that true equality of states, and actual sovereignty of alliance choice are not in fact, actually accepted and respected by the great powers in the 20’th century or today. This would suggest that either small nations near the great powers will need to bow to their big neighbor’s desires, that they will need to chose neutrality, or that the world will face a significant risk of nuclear war when one great power extends it’s alliances in a way deemed intrusive within the sphere of influence of another.
Some thinkers are willing to embrace additional nuclear risk, just as some people are willing to accept additional personal risk in their diet, or through dangerous activities, but for any intellectual or academic, they have an obligation to prioritize calling attention to real risks, rather than obscure those risks, or pretend that, to use a physical example, a cliff and gravity will fail to exert their harmful effects on a romantic figure, because he or she has an upcoming wedding, family obligations, or a noble cause.
Although the course of the war for Ukraine has been so disasterous that this might seem to be absolutely the most important priority for the author, given her connections to that nation, I would encourage her to consider the potential risks that nuclear war presents to not only every Ukrainian in Ukraine, but every Ukrainian living outside of Ukraine, and indeed, those people who are not Ukrainians, in her intellectual and advisory role. Motivated and compromised reasoning could endanger many new people, and cannot simply be viewed through the lens of advocacy and ethnic and national identity. Nuclear risks, and the risks that Great Powers will run to protect a sphere of influence, do not end with what is going to happen in Ukraine, but will be seen in the Mideast, or Taiwan in East Asia.
I would encourage you to sit down, and carefully consider how the emotional impact of recent events is affecting your ability to function in an intellectually credible, never mind, objective way.
You seem to have conveniently forgotten that nuclear powers lose wars all the time and do not resort to nuclear strikes. The Soviet Union lost the Afgan war, Russia lost the First Chechen War, the US lost its Afgan War and also the Vietnam War, France lost in Algeria and there were no nuclear strikes. And these are not the only examples as you well know.
Russia is a weak state which proven by this war. Putin knows that Ukraine has its own nuclear deterrent: the dozens of nuclear power plants located all around Russia. Ukraine has proven that it can hit anything it pleases in Russia whether through drones, missiles or sabotage and this capability is only growing. Putin, who cares more about his looks than about the lives of his people is not suicidal. He won't risk a nuclear attack because he knows what forms the retaliation will be. This is why Ukraine has no fears about attacking everything it can in Russia and even occupying Russian territory. So, sleep tight, everything will be fine.
Be cautioned...lest we forget about the unpredictable nature of human beings. If there were no nuclear weapons... it's a certainty that their use would not be an option as...you can't use something that doesn't exist...No doubt about that.
The fact that they do exist is the issue. The fact that they have been used does exist... meaning they can be used. The fact that the maintenance and care of these weapons is in question on all sides is an ongoing concern.
I have personally known individuals who have been in command or have worked within silos who never ever should have been placed in these positions, IMO.
Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and many other supposedly secure, never worry about nuclear related issues, that weren't so, have taught us that humanity is not ready to handle such responsibility.
Criticizing those that are rightfully concerned utilizing round about conjecture based on a structured and reasonably well thought out premise, while ignoring the reality of historical human activity, behavior and evidence is, IMO, a skewed argument designed to diffuse an issue that should not be diffused.
We need to evolve as a species in sync with our technology. There are 100's of examples out there that prove conclusively that we haven't.
You've raised a crucial point about the enduring cost of nuclear warfare. Even if a nation could achieve a "victory" in such a conflict, the long-term consequences – environmental devastation, economic collapse, and the potential for endless cycles of retaliation – would far outweigh any perceived short-term gains. It's a dangerous fallacy to think any country could "casually" use these weapons, even in a limited capacity.
Historical examples like Hiroshima and Nagasaki tragically illustrate the devastating power of nuclear weapons. But the current geopolitical landscape adds another layer of complexity. In a multipolar world with multiple nuclear-armed nations pursuing their own interests, the risk of miscalculation or escalation is significantly heightened.
Furthermore, the use of nuclear weapons as a political tool creates a climate of fear and mistrust, further increasing the likelihood of miscalculation and escalation. It's a dangerous game, akin to holding a gun to someone's head during a robbery. The threat may serve a purpose, but the weapon is real, and the consequences of using it are irreversible.
Therefore, it's crucial to recognize that the true cost of nuclear war extends far beyond any immediate destruction. It leaves a legacy of suffering and instability that can last for generations, making any notion of "winning" such a war utterly meaningless.
Our future hinges on the choices we make today. A relentless pursuit of nuclear armament will inevitably lead to its catastrophic use, with every nation acting on the predictions of scholars. Conversely, a genuine commitment to peace can, and will, create a more harmonious world.
However, to reach this peaceful future, scholars must explore optimistic scenarios with the same rigor they apply to analyzing conflict. An intellectual focus solely on war, with no counterbalancing effort towards peace, makes a positive outcome improbable. Without dedicated and sincere efforts to build peace, a future free from conflict will remain out of reach.
Dr. Herman Kahn founded the Hudson Research Institute after he left the Rand Corporation. I suggest everyone read "On Thermonuclear War" and "Thinking About the Unthinkable". The Russians have as well as the Chinese.
Every sane scientist and nuclear weapons expert should petition their governments, write articles, publish books and appear on media to place their efforts into pursuing peace, trade and US policy of moving NATO Eastward and readying for an "inevitable" war with China is self-defeating to all parties and does not serve the civilian populations of their respective nations.
I knew Herman Kahn (Dr. Strangelove) and I can assure you, he'd agree. So would Robert Oppenheimer and Andrew Teller. Wake up folk and start working before foolish greedy politicians destroy our civilization.
Although I applaud the author for raising one more time this issue, which poses a real life danger, I do not agree with her conclusions.
The historical comparison is not applicable here, as the motivations for US to drop two bombs in Japan weren't military but to send a strong political signal. Which is not the case at hand in Ukraine.
The only real scenario for tactical weapons use would be a stalmate, but it happened already and Russia didn´t resorted to them.
So, the other possible scenario has more to do with NATO and mainly US meddling in this war; and in such a case the weapons used could certainly be strategic, not just tactical.
Thus, the sooner this absurd conflict finishes the better for life on earth.
my thought on US atomic attack on Japan was not so much to get Japan to surrender but to signal to a future potential adversary, namely USSR, that we had this destructive device and we are the big boy on the block. Truman did not know they had been given information on how to build their own device and were well on the way of doing just that.
to the gist of this article, come 16 Oct, it will have been 62 years since start of Cuban Missile Crisis of 16-23 Oct 1962. Russia did "back down" and did remove the ballistic missiles. Putin may look back on this and see that as just another stick in Russia's eye by USA. He blames the west, read that NATO and particularly America, for downfall of USSR. He would like to return to those heady days of Soviet Union military might. He could see the US embroiled in support of Ukraine, Israel and keeping an eye on China to defend Taiwan. US military is a shadow of what it was and he could see USA military as stretched thin and by using a small tactical nuke on Ukraine dare us to respond. I believe he is smarter than to do that but ambition sometimes overrides smarts.
I think you are framing Russia into a posture that suits US political perspectives but not necessarily representing why it is leveraging nuclear assets in this war. The objective is not to escalate to nuclear war or create an out-of-control chain reaction that ends up that way. Has Russia changed its doctrine? Putin's words have not changed much in 3 years, and he uses his henchmen and public media figures to inject bravado into the news: sometimes threatening Ukraine, sometimes the UK, and sometimes the US. Ambiguity is the razor's edge of strategic nuclear deterrence. Putin may not have a well-thought-through end game (ie Ukraine may be no good for anyone by the time this is over) but he has been a master of keeping the US and NATO at bay; creating cover as he grinds down Ukraine's resources and its political integrity. The Ukraine situation is the first time the world has seen real (explicitly backed by actual nuclear assets) and prolonged nuclear posturing to achieve territorial aims. It has made NATO walk softly. "Check" and maybe "check mate". With reciprocity in firepower and the promise of a "dead-hand", nuclear weapons have morphed into the best possible tools of extortion. The nuclear arsenal has become a paradox. It gives itself its own cover. If Putin nukes a Ukrainian industrial neighborhood to make a point and force them to capitulate at the negotiating table, no one will do anything. We can all see that Russia has succeeded, but it may never have peace.
Yes Ted to answer your question yes Russia has changed its nuclear doctrine this statement did not age well for you bud.
I hope that someone will discuss whether an air-burst tactical nuclear warhead, while releasing far fewer radioactive nuclides than a ground-burst warhead, in eastern or southeastern Ukraine would lead to radioactive products that contaminate the southwestern Russian Federation. Chernobyl accident was in northern Ukraine and released radioactive fission byproducts in Scandinavia and northeastern Russia. I don’t have the info to judge that. But if true, that might inhibit Putin from crossing the nuclear threshold.
What is imagined as a Russian use of a nuclear weapon in Ukraine? Presumably a Hiroshima/Nagasaki type of use i.e an air-burst with no local fallout, in weather such that the plume of fallout will be over some planned part of Ukraine rather than blowing into Russia. . . .
I think anyone talking about a Russian A-bombing of Ukraine really should give us some idea of what area is assumed to be nevertheless rendered useless, not worth capturing.
I believe Russia might resort to tactical nuclear strike if their "Special Military Operation" is failing and since they are making progress on the front then the likelihood is very remote. Its also not guaranteed that the use of a tactical nuclear strike will dissuade Ukrainians from continuing to resist the invasion. In view of Ukraine's daredevil resistance from the start of the till now, a tactical nuclear strike wouldn't stop the war but probably change its course. The Ukrainians might resort for example to guerilla warfare or terrorist attacks both in Ukraine and Russia. All said, no body can authoritatively predict the outcome of this conflict, neither the Ukrainians nor the Russians. The latter won't stop fighting without some kind of concrete political or territorial gain as this would diminish their super power status and Ukrainians will not stop because if they do, they will cease to exist as a state for at least another century.