By Victor Gilinsky, November 21, 2024
The Three Mile Island nuclear plant partially melted down in 1979. The accident demonstrated flaws in the "defense in depth" principal that guides the design of nuclear power plants. Credit: US Nuclear Regulatory Commission. CC BY 2.0.
The US Congress overwhelmingly approved the ADVANCE Act in July to accelerate licensing of “advanced” reactors. These consist mainly of fast reactors, which radically differ from those operating today, and include “fusion machines.” There were no public hearings on the act, and it shows every sign of having been written by interested parties and with little vetting.
The Energy Department and the US nuclear industry are promoting fast reactor demonstration projects, the prime being TerraPower’s Natrium project in Wyoming. The project broke ground in June but still awaits a full construction permit. No commercial reactors of this type are operating today. TerraPower foresees selling hundreds of such reactors for domestic use and export. The new law is largely directed at clearing the way for the rapid licensing of such reactors by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). It does so in part by providing additional resources but also—more ominously—by weakening the agency’s safety reviews and inspections in the name of efficiency.
Efficiency over safety. The act’s insidious approach is, first, to direct the NRC to modify its “mission statement” to add a provision that its licensing and safety reviews will “not unnecessarily limit the benefits of nuclear energy to society.” The addition sounds innocuous: No one is going to defend unnecessary work. But the message is clear. To make sure it works its way down to the daily decisions made by NRC’s safety engineers, the act then gives the commissioners one year to supply Congress with a report on what guidance they will provide to the professional engineering staff to “ensure effective performance” under the new mission.
In a bureaucracy, you get what you incentivize for: Congress wants the commissioners to make clear to safety reviewers that every hour they will take is an hour that society will be deprived of nuclear energy (and someone’s grandmother will sit in the dark). This sort of pressure spells trouble. The safety of complex systems with inherent dangers is a subtle trade and requires unbiased attention to avoid serious errors. That is especially true of newly commercialized technology. NRC safety reviews and inspections are especially critical in protecting the public because, with nuclear power, there is no customer feedback loop like there is with, say, commercial flying. If people get worried about flying, they can vote for more safety by not buying tickets. Once a nuclear plant is turned on, there is realistically not much the public can do.
The Energy Department’s web page said the new law would help to “build new reactors at a clip that we haven’t seen since the 1970s.” But the department seems to forget that the 1970s spurt of licensing—encouraged by the commissioners of the old Atomic Energy Commission—resulted in light-water power reactors with many safety problems. These problems were then left for the newly independent NRC to resolve, taking years and leading to considerable expense.
Weaker definition of safety. For Congress to address the mission statement of a federal agency is itself strange. Mission statements, like “vision” statements, are products of business schools and management consultants and are typically brief generalities that hardly anyone pays much attention to. The Energy Department says its mission is “to ensure the security and prosperity of the United States by addressing its energy, environmental, and nuclear challenges.” Congress could have told the department to speed up the reactor development process, but it didn’t. Instead, it acted on the assumption that the stumbling block to a nuclear future lies in the NRC licensing system.
The ADVANCE Act acknowledges the need for the NRC to continue to enforce the safety requirements of the Atomic Energy Act while pursuing the goal of “efficiency.” But in doing so, the new act does not cite the Atomic Energy Act’s original safety standard of “adequate protection” (Section 182), but rather a watered-down version of “reasonable assurance of adequate protection.” In the law, words matter.
The commission has been using that weaker standard of safety for some years—not legitimately, in my view. The new act now validates it. The NRC lamely claims that the additional three words are just explanatory—needed to avoid the implication that “adequate protection” would mean perfect safety—and do not affect the basic standard. But the commissioners don’t dare apply that logic to the security part of the NRC’s responsibilities, which, if they did, would read: “to promote reasonable assurance of the common defense and security.” There is no question that the addition changes the meaning.
Deja vu. For Congress to put the onus on NRC’s safety engineers to speed along the reactors of a yet-untested type is reminiscent of the situation before the 1974 Energy Reorganization Act separated the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) regulators from the agency’s reactor developers. The 93rd Congress did not give the nuclear regulators independent status out of some concern for administrative neatness. It was done because the AEC commissioners neglected their safety responsibilities. The AEC kept the regulatory staff on a short leash, mainly so that they would not get in the way of the project the commissioners cared most about—as it turns out, also a demonstration fast reactor that was supposed to be followed by hundreds and even thousands of commercial orders. In the end, it all came to nothing. Glenn Seaborg, the then-chairman who was largely responsible for the debacle, would later admit: “[N]one of the [underlying] assumptions proved correct.”
We’ve gone through several iterations of nuclear power over-enthusiasm since the AEC thought fast reactors would soon power the world: The “nuclear renaissance” during the George W. Bush administration was to produce dozens of power reactor orders by 2010; then its Global Nuclear Energy Partnership was going to build fast reactors to burn spent fuel and obviate the need for additional geologic storage; and now fast power reactors are hyped again. None of the earlier expectations worked out. But each time, the certainty of the predictions was used to lean on the regulators to smooth the way. The ADVANCE legislation’s assumption that many orders for fast reactors will soon be coming and that the NRC must be disciplined to avoid a holdup has the makings of another such episode.
Congress’s main concern about the NRC should be that it is an effective protector of public safety.
Nothing in the ADVANCE Act is so revealing of the credulous thinking that went into it than its treatment of fusion. No one has yet demonstrated a fusion power proof of principle, one analogous to Enrico Fermi’s 1942 demonstration of a controlled fission chain reaction. Yet, the act blithely requires the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to prepare a study within a year, in consultation with the private fusion sector, on “licensing frameworks for mass-manufactured fusion machines.” One thing is certain: Congress has the fusion cart before the horse.
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While the article raises concerns about the ADVANCE Act’s potential to compromise safety, these arguments fail to consider the pressing realities of climate change, energy security, and the urgent need for advanced nuclear technologies. A balance between safety and efficiency is not only achievable but essential for progress, and the ADVANCE Act reflects this necessity.
1. Safety and Efficiency Are Not Mutually Exclusive
The concern that prioritizing efficiency undermines safety misrepresents the intent of the ADVANCE Act. The addition of “reasonable assurance of adequate protection” as a standard acknowledges that perfect safety is unattainable in any engineering discipline. This phrasing aligns with modern risk-informed, performance-based regulatory approaches, which ensure safety while avoiding unnecessary regulatory burdens. Streamlining does not mean cutting corners; it means avoiding redundant processes that delay innovation without adding value to public safety.
2. Lessons from History Should Inspire Progress, Not Stagnation
The article leans heavily on historical examples of unmet nuclear expectations, such as the AEC's struggles and the delayed nuclear renaissance. However, it fails to recognize that today’s landscape is vastly different:
- Advancements in Technology: Modern simulation tools, materials science, and reactor designs have drastically reduced uncertainties compared to earlier eras.
- Global Competitiveness: Countries like China and Russia are rapidly advancing their nuclear programs. Excessive caution in the U.S. risks ceding leadership in nuclear innovation and geopolitical influence to these nations.
- Urgency of Decarbonization: The pressing need to replace fossil fuels with clean energy sources demands swift and bold action. Delays in deploying advanced reactors prolong dependence on carbon-emitting technologies.
3. The Role of the NRC Is to Enable Safe Innovation
The NRC’s mission must evolve to reflect the needs of the 21st century. Safety remains paramount, but the agency must also facilitate the development of new technologies that meet the energy and climate challenges of our time. The ADVANCE Act’s call for efficient processes does not mean safety will be ignored—it ensures that safety evaluations are focused, transparent, and timely.
4. Fusion Licensing Encourages Investment and Innovation
The inclusion of fusion frameworks is not premature; it is forward-looking. While commercial fusion remains a work in progress, providing a clear regulatory pathway now ensures that developers have confidence to invest and innovate. The comparison to Enrico Fermi’s fission experiment in 1942 ignores the fact that fusion research today is bolstered by decades of scientific and technological advancements, enabling faster progress toward commercialization.
5. Optimism Is Necessary for Innovation
The article’s skepticism of “nuclear over-enthusiasm” is misplaced. While past predictions may not have materialized as planned, this does not justify halting forward momentum. The ADVANCE Act’s vision of streamlining regulatory processes reflects the confidence needed to meet ambitious energy goals. Without optimism, coupled with rigorous but efficient oversight, progress stalls, and the benefits of advanced nuclear technologies remain unrealized.
Conclusion
The ADVANCE Act strikes an essential balance between safety and progress. The world faces unprecedented challenges requiring swift action to deploy clean, reliable, and scalable energy solutions. The act does not undermine safety but modernizes the regulatory framework to support innovation without unnecessary delays. Critics must consider that the cost of inaction is far greater than the risks of cautiously moving forward. Congress has rightly recognized that enabling advanced nuclear technologies is not just an option—it is an imperative.
Thank you Eben. Choosing survival and sustainability over a “cover your butt” safety guise is getting to the tipping point. Sorry to be so blunt.
what urgent need for SMR technology? in all likelihood it will generate power at more expensive prices than conventional NPPs (thermal generation gains some efficiencies with scale) while increasing the radioactive isotope proliferation and nuclear weapons risks that we already have to monitor and prepare for today.
SMR are a solution searching for a problem. the reactors in nuclear powered submarines generate power at absurd energy costs, some i guess there’s a few nuclear powered subs in the world that could be upgraded. what other industry is going to want power at 10x the price of a mix of wind, water and solar (plus batteries for FC ancillary services and some of the fast response arbitrage)?
Dr. Mulder does not state his affiliation:
From X-energy's profile.
Eben Mulder, PhD. As X-energy's Chief Scientist, Eben Mulder, leads the development of X-energy's technology drive in expanding its high-temperature gas reactor (HTGR) technology applicability.
The best HTGR designs, since they rely on gravity as their fail-safe, are indeed an improvement. Gravity is not affected by tsunamis, earthquakes, or other unpredictable events. Water pumps can fail; so far, gravity seems quite reliable.
IF we are going to get serious about the accelerating collapse of the climate system and the current mass extiction event largely driven by it, we are going to need al lot more carbon-free energy. Fission is carbon-free. If, however, as seems likely, we are not going to bother ourselves with these challenges, the precipitous decline in human population will reduce our energy demand as our numbers are halved, quartered, or more. Our carbon output will fall proportionately, and (maybe) permit the climate system to recover.
I have observed a lot of times that NO technology is safe in the hands of finance capital. For different reasons, TMI and the history of LWR inspections in the U.S. prove the point.
Higher efficiency=> lower cost=> higher profitability is the mantra.
TMR illustrated what happens when a power reactor plant lacks on-site, 24/365 staff with an overview of the technology intimate enough to see, without fear, every variable of the state of the plant. That kind of knowledge comes from intensive education, not "training."
Inspection history provides a history of near misses that should keep us all up at night. The history of reactor degradation by boric acid leaks alone is a book of horror stories that should make us ALL ask, "Who is running this show?"
For comparison, France & the UK.
MAGIC WORDS
The author is correct about the importance of words. When it comes to the reworded phrase: “reasonable assurance of adequate protection" we only need a small amendment to make the phrase mind-clearingly effective.
“reasonable assurance of adequate protection" of PROFITABILITY.
Dr. Gilinsky makes an interesting argument.
Gilinsky is logically interested in defending the status quo. He was a long-serving NRC commissioner during the era when the sense of Congress was that nuclear energy was risky and unnecessary. Way back then we were frequently told that the US had enough coal to serve all of our energy needs for 300 years.
But today's House of Representatives, Senate and President have all decided – with overwhelming bipartisan agreement – that conditions have changed in the 50 years since the NRC was created.
We still have a lot of coal, but we now know that burning it poses a high risk to future – and current – generations. Some still consider nuclear to be too risky and too new, but others look at the 70 years worth of experience and see a technology that is well understood and much safer than many assumed.
If regulators take their sweet time, it doesn't improve public safety. In some cases, political pressure has been applied to force regulators to impose expensive requirements that even they admit are "not necessary" for reasonable assurance of adequate protection. A prime case in point is the Aircraft Impact Assessment rule imposed as a direct result of excessive fears associated with 911.
Finally, I'd like to point out an unprovable, but logical counter-factual. Gilinsky mentions several optimistic projections about nuclear deployment that never came to pass. But it seems logical to believe that they would have come closer if the NRC had not been effectively working to slow things down.
After TMI – an accident without any human health impacts or property damage outside of the plant fence – the NRC's overreaction extended a halt in new construction starts to a point where it took 30 years for the economics to work again. That reaction included a licensing moratorium – oops, Hendrie called it a "pause" not a moratorium.
It lasted about 2 years. Time is money. Uncompetitive power plants whose schedules cannot be controlled by owners and constructors lose in economic competition with easier alternatives, even if the alternatives are dirtier, more dangerous to human health and less reliable.