Why US sanctions against Pakistan’s ballistic missile program might backfire

In December, the United States sanctioned four Pakistani entities involved in Pakistan’s ballistic missile program. According to the US State Department, this action was taken due to “the continuing proliferation threat of Pakistan’s long-range missile development.” While this is not the first round of sanctions on Pakistan’s ballistic missiles under the Biden administration, it is certainly more significant because it directly targets the National Defense Complex—Pakistan’s missile production facility sometimes called the National Development Complex.

Pakistan took strong exceptions to this new installment of US sanctions. Its Ministry of Foreign Affairs dubbed the decision “unfortunate and biased,” adding that it aims to “accentuate military asymmetries” affecting strategic stability in the region.

This war of words escalated after US Deputy National Security Advisor Jon Finer said that Pakistan’s development of long-range ballistic missiles raised “real questions” about its aims: “Pakistan has developed increasingly sophisticated missile technology, from long-range ballistic missile systems to equipment that would enable the testing of significantly larger rocket motors.” According to Finer, if such trends were to continue, “Pakistan will have the capability to strike targets well beyond South Asia, including in the United States.” Through these words, Finer became the first US official toPakistan’s ballistic missiles as potentially a direct threat to the United States. Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs was quick to give an official response, contending that such claims are “devoid of rationality.” The ministry added that “Pakistan’s strategic capabilities are meant to defend its sovereignty and preserve peace and stability in South Asia.”

These policy statements underline the enduring importance for Pakistan of its nuclear and missile capabilities. This suggests that Islamabad will likely resist US attempts to undermine such capabilities, which in Pakistani eyes are critical to maintaining a robust nuclear deterrent vis-à-vis India. This resistance will have at least two negative implications for the United States.

Erosion of US sanctions’ coercive value. Pakistan will likely seek to evade US sanctions to enhance and diversify its missile forces, which are seen as necessary to deter external aggression from India. Pakistan’s bolstering of its missile force is aimed at plugging any gaps in its deterrence mosaic that India might exploit at all levels of conflict. Pakistan’s objective—formally known as “full-spectrum deterrence”—is to ensure that all Indian targets and territories are within reach of its missile force. Pakistan, therefore, will see US sanctions as a hurdle that must be leapt over.

Voices in support of this view will likely become louder in Pakistan as these new US sanctions against Islamabad are contrasted with Washington’s growing partnership with New Delhi.

In recent years, the United States and India have taken their defense and strategic partnerships to the next level, ostensibly to counter China. This partnership gave India greater access to advanced US defense technologies. The two countries have also expanded their cooperation in the space domain, which is concerning to Pakistan for two reasons: India has a history of using space-launch vehicles to augment its ballistic missile capabilities, and this collaboration will likely also accelerate India’s development of military capabilities in space. All this will not only increase Pakistan’s anxiety but might also push it to take measures to counter India’s militarization of space. For instance, it could compel Pakistan to develop large-diameter solid rocket motors that are important for space-launch vehicles.

Pakistan’s concerns vis-à-vis the US-Indian partnership will likely leave little room for Islamabad to accept US sanctions. The costs of scaling back its ballistic missile program would be too prohibitive, in Pakistan’s eyes, compared to those that these sanctions could generate.

Advancements in Pakistan’s India-specific ballistic missile program, despite sanctions, will add to the existing skepticism about the coercive value of such tools. Should Pakistan, which is not even a US adversary, successfully dodge sanctions, it will reinforce the idea that such measures might not work against other countries, such as Iran and North Korea, exactly at a time in which the United States would like to see its sanctions be effective. Because the United States appears insensitive to Pakistan’s security concerns, sanctions could backfire: Pakistan will likely circumvent them while telling the world that its nuclear and missile programs are non-negotiable.

Pakistan might get closer to China. Any US attempt to target Pakistan’s nuclear weapons and missiles will contribute to alienating Pakistan from the United States, which might cause Islamabad to strengthen its relations with China in response. As Washington and New Delhi are committed to countering Beijing, Islamabad could argue that India gaining a strategic advantage over it will ultimately jeopardize China’s investments and interests in the region. This argument could resonate well with China, not least because of its growing stakes in Pakistan.

Another reason that Pakistan-China relations might further mesh is the confidence they have gained from their record of navigating US sanctions. Their cooperation in the field of missile development started in 1989, coinciding with the end of the halcyon days of Pakistan-United States relations. A year after Islamabad and Beijing signed a 10-year defense production contract, the United States imposed sanctions under the 1985 Pressler Amendment on Pakistan. These sanctions, however, did not stop China from transferring its M-11 ballistic missiles to Pakistan, even though the shipment of these short-range ballistic missiles later triggered two rounds of US sanctions on Chinese and Pakistani entities in 1991 and 1993. But these steps did nothing to sever close cooperation between Islamabad and Beijing, which proved to be critical for Pakistan in successfully fielding its first ballistic missiles, Ghauri and Shaheen. These launches coincided with those of India’s Prithvi and Agni-2 missiles, highlighting the failure of sanctions to impede Pakistan’s missile development.

Today, with Pakistan not being a foreign policy priority for the United States, it will be much easier for it and China to stave off sanctions that the Biden administration has imposed since 2023. Washington’s efforts to contain Beijing and sanction Pakistan might result in solidifying Pakistan-China relations and pushing China to firmly protect its burgeoning interests in the region. Such an outcome could present an even bigger conundrum for Washington because Beijing has also entered into a strategic partnership with Iran.

Meaningful, sincere engagement is important. So long as the India-Pakistan acrimony continues to fester, India’s nuclear and missile capabilities will drive those of Pakistan. US sanctions will do little to change this. If anything, sanctions will only boost Pakistan’s nuclear force modernization. More important, however, such measures might rupture Pakistan-United States relations for good and bring Islamabad closer to Beijing.

The United States can avoid the undesired effects of its sanctions by engaging in more substantive conversations with Pakistan across tracks. Track II diplomacy through engagements between think tanks and universities must be rejuvenated to allow for both sides to share their concerns.

For Pakistan, it is important to reassure US interlocutors that all present and future modernization plans are meant solely to deter India. It would also be useful for Pakistan to discuss why testing large-diameter solid rocket motors does not represent an increased threat to the United States. For its part, the United States should acknowledge Pakistan’s threat perceptions. A refusal to recognize those will only reduce the prospect of cooperation and contribute to arms racing in South Asia.

At a time of increased nuclear risk, US policy in South Asia should commit to strengthening, not weakening, strategic stability in the region. Dialogue, not sanctions, should lie at the heart of any such commitment.