Zaporizhzhia: Hurdle or catalyst for a peace deal in Ukraine?

In all the peace proposals the United States, Russia, Europe, and Ukraine have made public, one item always shows up: the reopening of the damaged six-reactor Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant—Europe’s largest. The United States wants to rebuild and operate it. Russia insists the plant is theirs. And Ukraine says that it must remain Ukrainian. But lost in this contest over who will control the plant—which sits at the frontline of the war between Russia and Ukraine—is just how difficult, or even worthwhile, it will be to repair and restart the plant.

Given how costly and technically challenging bringing Zaporizhzhia back online will be, it is unclear if any of these parties are up to the task. Russia insists it can get at least one of the reactors up and running within several months. The United States has put no timestamp on revitalizing Zaporizhzhia. Ukraine says, if there is a solid peace and Ukraine has total control over the plant, getting all six reactors back online would still take up to two years.

It could take considerably longer to reopen Zaporizhzhia. And no one has ventured how much it would cost.

An avalanche of challenges. The obstacles to restarting the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant are certainly daunting. A prerequisite will be to secure a reliable supply of cooling water to keep the reactor from melting down. The Kakhovka dam feeding the Dnipro river reservoir—Zaporizhzhia’s go-to water source—lies in ruins after being breached during an attack in June 2023. The dam must either be rebuilt and the reservoir replenished, or alternative, reliable water sources will have to be devised to cool the plant.

The plant site also must be demilitarized for the reactors to safely restart. Russian forces currently occupy the plant and, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency, have laid anti-personnel land mines around the site. There is also a considerable amount of unexploded ordnance near the facility. It would help if Russia could pitch in on clearing these long-term hazards, although it is unclear if it will.

Then, there is the problem of nuclear-related hardware that Russia either looted or sabotaged at Zaporizhzhia. It all must be refurbished or replaced. And assuming this is done, the next step would be checking to see if this work was done properly to ensure safe operation.

This raises yet another challenge: Which nuclear regulatory standards should the plant meet after the war? Russia’s or Ukraine’s? Those of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission? Or more lenient standards that the International Atomic Energy Agency might assure? Depending on the answer, the parties involved will try their best to use this issue either to assert or contest sovereign control over the plant.

Staffing is another problem. When Russia seized the plant in March 2022, most of Zaporizhzhia’s trained workers fled. Others, less lucky, were detained and terrorized by Russian security agents, with some even relocated to camps in southern Russia. Before the invasion, nearly 12,000 trained workers operated the Zaporizhzhia plant. As of February 2024, these were down to less than 3,000. Today, there are fewer still. It is unclear if Russia, Ukraine, the United States, or the European Union have any trained staff to spare, much less staff qualified to work on Zaporizhzhia—a unique system of Russian nuclear reactors that have been upgraded over the years with many Western safety improvements. In addition, given that every worker newly dispatched to the plant will be seen as a potential security risk, the vetting of either Russian or Ukrainian personnel will take time.

Power for whom and at what cost? Even if the Zaporizhzhia reactors could be safely restarted, the problem of distributing the plant’s power remains. Before the war, Zaporizhzhia helped feed Ukraine’s electrical grid and exported surplus power to Europe. Now, the infrastructure connecting the plant to customers is shattered. Transmission lines must be rebuilt. Substations and transformers need replacement. Technical adjustments will need to be made and agreements negotiated over where the electricity will go and how: western Europe, southern Ukraine, or to Russian-controlled territories?

Another question is who will pay for all this work? Will seized Russian assets foot the bill? Or will it be European Reconstruction Bank funds? What of US investment, taxpayer funds, and any private entity potentially interested in chipping in? Once funds are allocated, who would receive the profits, if any, or be responsible for the losses? Who would assume responsibility for possible accidents and damage to property beyond the plant’s site? And, finally, who will bear the costs of ensuring the plant’s security so that its reactors do not become again the targets of future attacks? None of this is yet clear.

As Ukraine, the United States, and Russia have all made refurbishing and operating Zaporizhzhia a condition for peace, dodging these questions is a prescription for mischief. Without clear answers, resurrecting Zaporizhzhia could become more of an obstacle to than a catalyst for peace.