Second installment of a series on on how Libya was persuaded to relinquish its weapons of mass destruction

Former Los Alamos National Laboratory director Siegfried Hecker details one of the world’s great nonproliferation stories—the effort to secure the Semipalatinsk Test Site in Kazakhstan.

Last month three terror attacks once again struck Mumbai, killing approximately 25 people. The attacks turned out to be the doing of an India-based Islamist outfit, the Indian Mujahedeen, and did not involve Pakistan-based Islamist militants. In the media coverage since, terrorism experts on South Asia have posited that this attack was not a decisive shift in Islamist terrorism in India -- their argument, instead, was that Pakistan-based militants, increasingly autonomous in their operations, still remain the most likely source of a large-scale attack on Indian soil.

Over recent decades, the United States has dedicated enormous resources -- in terms of money, manpower and national credibility -- to reducing the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, and the global economic crisis. These commitments have been made not necessarily because the potential dangers are expected to materialize often -- many of them are low-probability risks -- but because the consequences if they do are so large as to be considered unacceptable.

Of the 15 terrorism and natural disaster scenarios used by the Department of Homeland Security for planning purposes, the first scenario is the most feared: Terrorists detonate a 10-kiloton improvised nuclear device at ground level in the National Mall in Washington at 10 a.m. on a weekday morning.

Since 1950, a remarkable number of American and European horror movies have used radiation as a central plot device. It is a rich, if not distinguished, history. In fact, it is a mostly miserable history, full of bad production values, bad plots, and bad acting. But that doesn’t mean these radioactive B-movies are unimportant. They reflect the fears and misconceptions of their era as they relate to scientific advances—and scientific arrogance.

It would be reckless to throw away the only treaty that commits the major nuclear powers to work toward disarmament. Rather than eroding the NPT, here’s how we can strengthen it.

How have U.S.-Russian relations changed in the post-Cold War era?

Not as much as they should have changed. The Cold War confrontation had ideological and historic roots that are irrelevant today for either Russia or the United States. Unfortunately, however, the inertia of the Cold War has proved difficult to overcome, and the notion that nuclear weapons somehow contribute to national security persists.

In his keynote address delivered at the International Conference on Science and International Security: Addressing the Challenges of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism in Madrid on November 9, Sen. Richard Lugar, Republican of Indiana, stressed the need to expand the 20-year-old Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program, which he and former Sen. Sam Nunn, Democrat of Georgia, developed in 1991 to secure and destroy nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons in the former Soviet Union.

Two years ago, in an almost simultaneous policy turnaround, British Prime Minister Tony Blair expressed his determination to develop both a further generation of nuclear weapons and a host of new nuclear power plants--ideally before he left office. Though he made his personal preference (a staunch yes) clear in both cases, he and his government promised open debate and consultations that would involve "the wider public."

Harvard psychologist Steven Pinker’s most recent book, Enlightenment Now, makes a detailed, data-driven argument that the world has indeed gotten better and can get better still. But what of the catastrophic risks that nuclear war and climate change pose to human progress? Here, in conversation with Bulletin senior editor Lucien Crowder, Pinker addresses those risks—and also addresses his published, highly pointed criticisms of the Bulletin’s signature Doomsday Clock.

This five-year plan to address security gaps in Turkmenistan starts with a better-trained border patrol and adoption of European Union export controls.

An intergovernmental body that promotes international anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing standards just kicked the can down the road when it comes to Iran. Which may not be such a bad thing, depending on your perspective.

Fears that terrorists could get and use nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons are overblown

The Bulletin is thrilled to welcome its 2024 board fellows, Giovana Rodrigues Manfrin and Reja Younis. As board fellows, these women will contribute to the Bulletin’s board work, while “pulling back the curtain” on the regular workings of a governing board.