

Table 2. Chinese missile brigades, 2025. <sup>a</sup>					
Base Number (Provinces)	Unit	Location <sup>b</sup> (° N, °E)	Weapon type <sup>c</sup>	Nuclear role	Notes
PLARF HQ		Beijing (40.0352, 116.3197)			
Base 61	HQ	Huangshan (29.6956, 118.2997)			
(Anhui, Fujian, Guangdong, Jiangxi, Zhejiang)	611 Brigade	Qingyang (30.6903, 117.9011)	DF-26	Yes	Major upgrade underway.
	612 Brigade	Leping (28.9797, 117.1205)	DF-21A (DF-31AG)? <sup>d</sup>	Yes	Possibly upgrading to DF-31AG.
	613 Brigade	Shangrao (28.4745, 117.8954)	DF-15B (DF-17)? <sup>e</sup>	No	Possibly upgrading to new missile.
	614 Brigade	Yongan (26.0596, 117.3151)	DF-17 <sup>f</sup>	No	First DF-17 brigade.
	615 Brigade	Meizhou (24.2828, 115.9708)	DF-11A <sup>g</sup>	No	
	616 Brigade	Ganzhou (25.8892, 114.9587)	DF-17 <sup>h</sup>	No	New base added since 2020. <sup>i</sup>
	617 Brigade	Jinhua (29.1508, 119.6153)	DF-16A <sup>j</sup>	No	Second DF-16 brigade. Status uncertain.
	? Brigade*	Nanchang (28.5004, 115.9214)?	(GLCM?)	No	Status uncertain.
Base 62 <sup>k</sup>	HQ	Kunming (24.9888, 102.8346)			Base expansion underway.
(Guangxi, Guangdong, Hainan, Sichuan, Yunnan)	621 Brigade	Yibin (28.7607, 104.7914)	DF-31AG? <sup>l</sup>	Yes	Upgraded from DF-21A.
	622 Brigade	Yuxi (24.3601, 102.4942)	DF-31A	Yes	Former DF-21A brigade.
	623 Brigade	Liuzhou (24.3856, 109.5726)	DF-10A	No	First DF-10A brigade.
	624 Brigade	Danzhou (19.4721, 109.4570)	DF-21D	No	Possibly upgrading to new missile.
	625 Brigade	Jianshui (23.7354, 102.8713)	DF-26	Yes	Possibly second DF-26 brigade.
	626 Brigade	Qingyuan (23.6845, 113.1768)	DF-26 <sup>m</sup>	Yes	Possible third DF-26 brigade.
	627 Brigade	Puning (23.4122, 116.1816)	DF-17 <sup>n</sup>	No	Base expansion underway.
Base 63	HQ	Huaihua (27.5747, 110.0250)			
(Huaihua, Hubei, Hunan)	631 Brigade	Jingzhou (26.5783, 109.6703)	DF-5B (DF-5C?)	Yes	6 silos, adding 6 more plus training. <sup>o</sup>
	632 Brigade	Shaoyang (27.2532, 111.3859)	DF-31AG	Yes	Upgraded from DF-31.
	633 Brigade	Huitong (26.8935, 109.7388)	DF-5A	Yes	6 silos. <sup>p</sup>
	634 Brigade	Yueyang (29.3321, 113.2150) <sup>q</sup>	(DF-5C?)	(Yes)	New 12-silo field under construction.
	635 Brigade	Yichun (27.8869, 114.3862)	DF-17?	No	Previously DF-10A.
	636 Brigade	Shaoguan (24.7579, 113.6797)	DF-16A	No	First DF-16A brigade.
Base 64	HQ	Lanzhou (35.9387, 104.0159)			
(Gansu, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia, Qinghai, Shaanxi, Xinjiang)	641 Brigade	Hancheng (35.4754, 110.4468)	(DF-31)	(Yes)	Was last DF-31 base.
		Hancheng (35.3876, 110.3745)	DF-31AG	Yes	New base completed in late-2024.
	642 Brigade	Datong (36.9495, 110.6663)	DF-31AG <sup>f</sup>	Yes	At least three dispersed launch units.
	643 Brigade	Tianshui (34.5315, 105.9103)	DF-31AG	Yes	First DF-31AG brigade.
	644 Brigade	Hanzhong (33.1321, 106.9361)	DF-41	Yes	First DF-41 integration base. <sup>5</sup>
	645 Brigade	Yinchuan (38.5919, 106.2266)	(DF-41)?	(Yes)	Rumored second DF-41 base.
	646 Brigade	Korla (41.6946, 86.1734)	DF-21C and DF-26 <sup>t</sup>	Yes <sup>u</sup>	Only base with both DF-21 and DF-26.
	647 Brigade	Zhangye (38.8591, 100.4356) <sup>v</sup>	DF-26?	(Yes)	New brigade base under construction.
	? Brigade*	Hami (42.2806, 92.4959)	(DF-31A)	(Yes)	120 missile silos.
	? Brigade*	Yumen (40.1449, 96.5518)	(DF-31A)	(Yes)	110 missile silos.
Base 65	HQ	Shenyang (41.8586, 123.4514)			
(Jilin, Liaoning, Shandong)	651 Brigade	Chifeng (42.2574, 118.8249)	DF-41 <sup>w</sup>	Yes	New base completed in late-2024.
	652 Brigade	Jilin (43.9362, 126.4507) <sup>x</sup>	DF-31AG	Yes	New base.
		Tonghua area <sup>y</sup>	(DF-31A)? <sup>z</sup>	(Yes)	DF-31A seen training in area.
	653 Brigade	Laiwu (36.2332, 117.7154)	DF-21D	No	Possibly upgrading to new missile.
	654 Brigade	Dengshahe (39.3028, 122.0654)	(DF-26) <sup>aa</sup>	(Yes)	Former DF-21A used for DF-26 support.
		Dengshahe (39.2353, 122.0440)	(DF-26)	(Yes)	New base construction paused.
		Huangling (40.8452, 122.7682)? <sup>bb</sup>	DF-26 <sup>cc</sup>	Yes	Renovated brigade base.
	655 Brigade	Tonghua (41.6681, 125.9548)	(DF-17)	No	Base upgrade underway.
	656 Brigade	Linyi (36.246, 117.65326) <sup>dd</sup>	(CJ-100)?	No	Rumored first CJ-100 brigade.
	657 Brigade	?	?	?	Rumored new base.
	? Brigade*	Yulin (Ordos) (40.1597, 108.1113)	(DF-31A)	(Yes)	90 missile silos.
Base 66	HQ	Luoyang (34.6405, 112.3823)			
(Henan)	661 Brigade	Lushi (34.5165, 110.8620) <sup>ff</sup>	DF-5B	Yes	6 silos.
		Sanmenxia (34.7294, 111.1773)	DF-5 <sup>gg</sup>	Yes	New base.
	662 Brigade	Luanchuan (33.7927, 111.5899) <sup>hh</sup>	(DF-5C?)	(Yes)	New 12-silo field under construction. <sup>ii</sup>
	663 Brigade	Nanyang (33.0117, 112.4145)	DF-31A	Yes	First DF-31A brigade.
	664 Brigade	Xiangyang (31.9443, 112.1197) <sup>jj</sup>	DF-31AG	Yes	Includes at least four launch unit sites.
	665 Brigade	Changzhi (36.2580, 113.1785) <sup>kk</sup>	(DF-26)?	(Yes)	New brigade base. <sup>ll</sup>
	666 Brigade	Xinyang (32.1675, 114.1257)	DF-26	Yes	First DF-26 brigade base.
<b>Total:</b>	<b>45 Brigades</b>			<b>~30</b>	
Base 67		Central nuclear weapons storage complex. Headquartered in Baoji city. Responsible for storing and handling nuclear warheads at nearby underground storage facility as well as smaller regional storage sites located in each regional base area.			
(Shaanxi)					

\*Question marks (?) indicate the information is unknown or uncertain.

<sup>a</sup>This table is based on: US Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China, October 19, 2024 (and previous years), <https://media.defense.gov/2024/Dec/18/2003615520/-1/-1/0/MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA-2024.PDF>; Decker Eveleth, *People's Liberation Army Rocket Force Order of Battle 2023*, Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey, June 2023, [https://nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/peoples\\_liberation\\_army\\_rocket\\_force\\_order\\_of\\_battle\\_2023.pdf](https://nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/07/peoples_liberation_army_rocket_force_order_of_battle_2023.pdf); Ma Xiu, PLA Rocket Force Organization, CASI, October 2022, <https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Research/PLARF/2022-10-24%20PLARF%20Organization.pdf>; Mark Stokes, *PLA Rocket Force Leadership and Unit Reference*, Project 2049 Institute, April 9, 2018; P.W. Singer and Ma Xiu, "China's missile force is growing at an unprecedented rate," *Popular Science*, February 25, 2020; individual researchers such as Ben Reuters, Vinayak Bhat, and others who prefer to remain autonomous; and this author's observations and estimates. The table is a work in progress and is updated as new information becomes available.

<sup>b</sup>Each brigade has several launch battalions (up to six) and support units located in the region. Question mark indicates unknown or uncertain location. In addition, PLARF operates several training areas, such as Jilantai and Haixi/DaQaidam, where launch units visit to exercise or integrate new equipment.

<sup>c</sup>Missiles in parenthesis indicate additional uncertainty or upgrade.

<sup>d</sup>Possibly upgraded to DF-31AG. Ma Xiu, PLA Rocket Force Organization, CASI, October 2022, p. 62. <https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Research/PLARF/2022-10-24%20PLARF%20Organization.pdf>.

conversion will require significant upgrades of base infrastructure and visible construction appears limited. Until recently brigade was thought to have DF-21A (seen in 2021). Decker Eveleth, [https://twitter.com/dex\\_eve/status/1355210408831795200](https://twitter.com/dex_eve/status/1355210408831795200).

<sup>6</sup>Possible conversion to unidentified system in 2021. Ma Xiu, PLA Rocket Force Organization, CASI, October 2022, p. 63. <https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Research/PLARF/2022-10-24%20PLARF%20Organization.pdf>. Possible DF-21 TELs seen in 2022.

The 613 Brigade conducted missile test launches from Jilantai in August 2021 to a range of approximately 1,400 kilometers, significantly longer than the 800-km range of the DF-15B the brigade is normally associated with. "Uncovering the truth Behind the PLA Rocket Force's August 2021 Missile Launch," *China Aerospace Studies Institute (CASI)*, Air University, Maxwell AFB, August 2021), <https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Research/CASI%20Articles/2021-08-30%20PLARF%20missile%20test%20Aug%202021.pdf>.

<sup>f</sup>Probably completed upgrading to DF-17 in 2022 with infrastructure upgrade. New garage complex added and DF-17 TELs visible.

<sup>g</sup>A possible DF-17 TEL was seen in April 2022.

<sup>h</sup>New base under construction north of Ganzhou is larger and has highbay-garage seen at other bases upgrading to DF-17.

<sup>i</sup>The old 616 Brigade base with DF-15 is downtown Ganzhou (25.8337, 114.9098).

<sup>j</sup>In addition to DF-16, satellite photos occasionally show trucks that resemble DF-21C and DF-26, but they appear to be transporters.

<sup>k</sup>Base 62 was previously an important nuclear DF-21 area.

<sup>l</sup>Both CASI and Eveleth list 621 with DF-31AG but a Weibo article from 2019 found by Ben Reuters shows two DF-31A TELs in a twin-garage. CASI in 2024 mysteriously listed the base with DF-26.

<sup>m</sup>It is possible 626 Brigade includes the DF-26B anti-ship version.

<sup>n</sup>Appears to have achieved operational capability with new highbay garage area. Two DF-17s seen on December 9, 2022.

<sup>o</sup>The brigade has 5–6 silos (plus possibly decoy silos) and an underground missile storage facility.

<sup>p</sup>The brigade has 5–6 silos plus possibly decoy silos.

<sup>q</sup>This location was first reported by Ben Reuter. Tweet, December 31, 2022, [https://twitter.com/benreuter\\_IMINT/status/1609136561496461313](https://twitter.com/benreuter_IMINT/status/1609136561496461313).

<sup>r</sup>DF-31 launchers were displayed in June 2011. Hans M. Kristensen, "Chinese Mobile ICBMs Seen In Central China," *FAS Strategic Security Blog*, March 1, 2012, <https://fas.org/blogs/security/2012/03/df-31deployment/>. In June 2019, a possible DF-31AG was seen at the 642 Brigade launch unit training site at Haiyan.

<sup>s</sup>Decker Eveleth, "China's Mobile ICBM Brigades: The DF-31 and DF-41," *aboyandhis.blog*, July 2, 2020, <https://www.aboyandhis.blog/post/china-s-mobile-icbm-brigades-the-df-31-and-df-41>.

<sup>t</sup>A DF-41 was seen in 2024 at the training complex east of Korla.

<sup>u</sup>Hans M. Kristensen, "China's New DF-26 Missile Shows Up At Base In Eastern China," *FAS Strategic Security Blog*, January 21, 2019, <https://fas.org/blogs/security/2020/01/df-26deployment/>.

<sup>v</sup>Possible new DF-26 base with two highbay garages with room for a total of 32 TELs. Another facility two kilometers to the west was previously rumored as the new 647 Brigade base but the infrastructure does not fit. DOD only lists one PLARF base in this area.

<sup>w</sup>Possibly DF-41. A video in late-2021 showed what appeared to be inspection of a possible DF-41 TEL. Roderick Lee, tweet, December 28, 2021, [https://twitter.com/roderick\\_s\\_lee/status/1475885536254599172](https://twitter.com/roderick_s_lee/status/1475885536254599172).

<sup>x</sup>First reported by Twitter account @pir34 on May 14, 2022, <https://twitter.com/pir34/status/1525473049297952769>. Location for 652 Brigade was previously rumored as Tonghua area. DOD does not list a PLARF base in Jilin but two in Tonghua (possibly 652 and 655).

<sup>y</sup>The 652 Brigade has long been reported to be in the Tongdao area and DF-31A launchers seen training. DOD reports two PLARF brigades in this area.

<sup>z</sup>Rumored to have been upgraded from DF-21C to DF-31A. DF-31s have been seen training at launch unit site in 2016 (<http://news.cntv.cn/2016/02/03/VIDEWF2tUUbzNYS7rBJ7kItH160203.shtml>) and 2020 (<https://new.qq.com/omn/20200206/20200206A0JEZ000.html>). However, despite large highbay garage added, base lacks TEL garages seen at other DF-31 bases.

<sup>aa</sup>Only the DF-26 is nuclear-capable, first seen here in 2019. Hans M. Kristensen, "China's New DF-26 Missile Shows Up At Base In Eastern China," *FAS Strategic Security Blog*, January 21, 2019, <https://fas.org/blogs/security/2020/01/df-26deployment/>. Dengshahe upgraded from DF-3A to DF-21A in 2014. Hans M. Kristensen, "Chinese Nuclear Missile Upgrade Near Dalian," *FAS Strategic Security Blog*, May 21, 2014, <https://fas.org/blogs/security/2014/05/dengshaheupgrade/>. PLARF operates a TEL training area east of Korla that includes numerous launch pads and technical areas. This includes test-launches of ballistic missiles, including the DF-26. In 2024, a DF-41 was observed at the site.

<sup>bb</sup>Rumored new location first suggested by Ben Reuter and listed by Decker Eveleth in 2023. DOD does not list a PLARF brigade base in this area but continues to list one in the Dengshahe area and added a second PLARF base north of Dalian.

<sup>cc</sup>Five possible DF-26 TEL seen in November 2023.

<sup>dd</sup>Some say 656 Brigade is in Laiwu to the east, which already has 653 Brigade.

<sup>ee</sup>The brigade probably has 4–5 silos plus possibly decoy silos.

<sup>ff</sup>Some place 661 Brigade HQ in Lingbao to the north (34.5166, 110.8619), which might be training unit.

<sup>gg</sup>The new base is identified in the 2024 CMPR as associated with the DF-5 missile.

<sup>hh</sup>Potential silos are located around Shecunzhen to the east.

<sup>ii</sup>Major HQ upgrade began in 2020 and finished in 2022.

<sup>jj</sup>664 Brigade is sometimes said to be located in Luoyang (34.5966, 112.4386), but that facility appears to be a rail transfer point without the infrastructure normally associated with a TEL brigade base. Instead, Xuyuan was rumored as in 2021 to be the new 664 Brigade area. @ljsxank, tweet March 3, 2021, <https://twitter.com/ljsxank/status/1367307966794190856>. This is still unconfirmed.

<sup>kk</sup>DOD indicate a PLARF brigade base in Weihui. A large new base was completed there in 2022 with infrastructure that could potentially indicate DF-26.

<sup>ll</sup>Chan zhi was rumored in 2021 to be new location for 665 Base. @ljsxank, tweet February 11, 2021, <https://twitter.com/ljsxank/status/1359757617107591169>.