## Table 1. Russian nuclear forces, 2025.

Type/NATO designation	Russian designation	Launchers	Year deployed	Warheads x yield (kilotons)	Total warheads <sup>a</sup>
Strategic offensive weapons					
ICBMs					
SS-18 M6 Satan	RS-20V (Voevoda)	34 <sup>b</sup>	1988	$10 \times 500-800$ (MIRV)	340 <sup>c</sup>
SS-19 M4	Avangard	12	2019	$1 \times \text{HGV}$	12
SS-27 Mod 1 (mobile)	RS-12M1 (Topol-M)	18	2006	1 × 800?	18
SS-27 Mod 1 (silo)	RS-12M2 (Topol-M)	60	1997	1 × 800	60
SS-27 Mod 2 (mobile)	RS-24 (Yars)	180	2010	$4 \times 100?$ (MIRV)	720 <sup>d</sup>
SS-27 Mod 2 (silo)	RS-24 (Yars) <sup>e</sup>	26	2014	$4 \times 100?$ (MIRV)	104
SS-29 (silo)	RS-28 (Sarmat)	-	(2025)	$10 \times 500?$ (MIRV)	-
?	? (Sirena-M)	3	2022	Command and control module	_f
Subtotal		333			1,254 <sup>9</sup>
SLBMs					
SS-N-23 M2/3	RSM-54 (Sineva/Layner)	5/80	2007	$4 \times 100 \text{ (MIRV)}^{h}$	320 <sup>i</sup>
SS-N-32	RSM-56 (Bulava)	7/112	2014	$6 \times 100$ (MIRV)	672 <sup>j</sup>
Subtotal		12/192 <sup>k</sup>			992 <sup>1</sup>
Bombers/weapons					
Bear-H6/16	Tu-95MS6/MS16/MSM <sup>m</sup>	52	1984/2015	6–16 $\times$ AS-15A ALCMs or 14 $\times$ AS-23B ALCMs	430 <sup>n</sup>
Blackjack	Tu-160/M	15	1987/2021	$12 \times AS-15B ALCMs$	156
				or AS-23B ALCMs, [Kh-BD], bombs	
Subtotal		<b>67</b> °			586 <sup>p</sup>
Subtotal strategic offensive forces		<b>592</b> <sup>q</sup>			2,832
Nonstrategic and defensive weapons					
Naval					
Submarines/surface ships/air				LACMs, SLCMs, ASWs,	704
·				SAMs, DBs, torpedoes	
Land-based air					
Bombers/fighters (Tu-22 M3(M3M)/Su-24 M/Su-34/ MiG-31K)		289	1974–2018	ASMs, ALBMs, bombs	333
ABM/Air/Coastal defense					
S-300/S-400 (SA-20/SA-21)		750	1992/2007	$1 \times low$	250 <sup>r</sup>
53T6 Gazelle		68	1986	1 × 10	68 <sup>s</sup>
SSC-1B Sepal (Redut)		8 <sup>t</sup>	1973	1 × 350	4 <sup>u</sup>
SSC-5 Stooge (SS-N-26) (K-300P/3 M–55)		56	2015	$(1 \times 10)^{v}$	23 <sup>w</sup>
Ground-based					
SS-26 Stone SSM (9K720, Iskander-M),		150	2005	1 × 10–100	75 <sup>×</sup>
SSC-7 Southpaw GLCM ( <i>R</i> -500/9M728, Iskander-M) <sup>y</sup>					
SSC-8 Screwdriver GLCM (9M729) <sup>z</sup>		20	2017	1 × 10–100	20 <sup>aa</sup>
Subtotal nonstrategic and defensive forces					1,477 <sup>bb</sup>
TOTAL					4,309
Deployed					1,718 <sup>cc</sup>
Reserve					2,591 <sup>dd</sup>
Retired warheads awaiting dismantlement					1,150
Total inventory					5,459

Abbreviations used: ABM = antiballistic missile; ALCM = air-launched cruise missile; AS = air-to-surface; ASM = air-to-surface missile; ASW = antisubmarine weapon; DB = depth bomb; GLCM= ground-launched cruise missile; ICBM = intercontinental ballistic missile; LACM = Land-Attack Cruise Missile; MIRV = multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle; SAM = surface-to-air missile; SLBM = submarine-launched ballistic missile; SLCM = sea-launched cruise missile; SRAM = short-range attack missile; SSM = surface-to-surface missile.

<sup>a</sup>All warhead numbers come with significant uncertainty because of the limited transparency of Russia's nuclear-capable forces. The numbers for nonstrategic nuclear weapons in particular are highly uncertain.

<sup>b</sup>It is possible that a third SS-18 regiment at Dombarovsky (175th) is also active, in which case there would be 40 SS-18s.

<sup>c</sup>It is estimated that the SS-18s now carry only five warheads each to meet the New START limit for deployed strategic warheads.

<sup>d</sup>It is estimated that the SS-27 Mod 2s carry only three warheads each to meet the New START limit on deployed strategic warheads.

<sup>e</sup>It appears that there are multiple variants of the Yars system: one is reportedly equipped with "light warheads," and another (known as Yars-S) is reportedly equipped with more powerful, medium-yield warheads for use against hardened targets.

<sup>f</sup>Although they would presumably still be counted as launchers under New START, the Sirena-M systems at Yurya serve as back-up launch code transmitters and do not carry nuclear warheads. Therefore, the total number of nuclear-armed ICBMs is 330.

<sup>g</sup>Through analysis of satellite imagery, New START data, and statements from high-ranking Russian generals, we estimate that only about 878 of these warheads are deployed; the rest are in storage for potential loading.

<sup>h</sup>The current version of the RSM-54 SLBM might be the Layner (SS-N-23 M3), a variant of the previous version—the Sineva (SS-N-23 M2). However, the US Air Force's National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) did not include the Layner in its 2020 report on ballistic and cruise missile threats, and there is some uncertainty regarding its status and capability. In 2006 US intelligence estimated that the missile could carry up to 10 warheads, but it lowered the estimate to 4 in 2009. The average number of warheads carried on each missile has probably been limited to 4 multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) to meet the New START limits.

<sup>1</sup>At any given time, only 256 of these warheads are deployed on four operational Delta IV submarines, with the fifth boat in overhaul. Sometimes two boats are out for maintenance.

<sup>j</sup>It is possible that Bulava SLBMs now carry only four warheads each for Russia to meet the New START limit on deployed strategic warheads.

- <sup>k</sup>The first figure is the number of operational SSBNs; the second is the total number of missiles (launchers) on the SSBNs. Note that several SSBNs may be in overhaul at any given time.
- At any given time, one or two SSBNs are in overhaul and do not carry nuclear weapons, so not all 992 warheads are deployed—perhaps only around 640.
- <sup>m</sup>The START Treaty distinguished between the Tu-95MS6 and Tu-95MS16 variants, of which the MS6 could carry six ALCMs internally and the MS16 an additional 10 on wing pylons for a total of 16. However, it is unclear whether the MS16 configuration is still used or whether the external pylons were moved, which would effectively turn them back into Tu-95MS6 variants. The current MSM upgrade adds four pylons with a capability to carry eight Kh-101/102 cruise missiles plus, potentially, six Kh-55 missiles internally.
- <sup>n</sup>This number assumes that approximately 20 of the Tu-95s have been modernized, therefore enabling them to carry up to 280 warheads, whereas 25 legacy Tu-95MS6 versions can carry up to 150 warheads. It also assumes that seven aircraft are out either for maintenance or modernization.
- °Only about 58 of the bombers are thought to be deployed.
- <sup>p</sup>The total bomber force can theoretically carry more than 650 nuclear weapons, but weapons are probably only assigned to deployed bombers for a total of 586 weapons. Bomber weapons are not deployed on the aircraft under normal circumstances, but we estimate a couple hundred weapons are present at bomber bases, with the remainder in off-base central storage.
- <sup>q</sup>This number of total fielded strategic launchers is higher than those listed in the most recent New START aggregate data as of September 1, 2022, because some bombers are not counted as deployed. This is the total number of operational launchers (ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers) in service. Russia also has more than 250 non-deployed launchers, many of which are mothballed or in the process of being dismantled.
- The estimated number of warheads assigned to Russian air-defense comes with considerable uncertainty. This estimate assumes that only about one-quarter of the air-defense warheads that remained after the end of the Cold War are left today.
- <sup>s</sup>We estimate that the warheads for the remaining Gazelle interceptors are kept in central storage under normal circumstances. All previous 32 Gorgon missiles have been retired.
- <sup>t</sup>It is assumed that all SSC-1B units, except a single silo-based version in Crimea, have been replaced by the K-300P by now.
- <sup>u</sup>The SSC-1B is dual-capable so it is assumed that nuclear warheads only exist for half the launchers.
- <sup>v</sup>The US National Air and Space Intelligence Center lists the ground-, sea-, and sub-launched 3M55 as "nuclear possible.."
- "The SSC-5 is dual-capable, so it is assumed that nuclear warheads only exist for half of the launchers.
- \*This estimate includes warheads for both SS-26 and SSC-7. Since the Iskander is dual-capable, it is assumed that warheads are only assigned for roughly half of the launchers.
- <sup>y</sup>A 2021 US National Air and Space Intelligence Center report listed the *R*-500/9M728 as "Conventional, Nuclear Possible.."
- <sup>z</sup>It is possible that SSC-8 launchers are co-located with some of the Iskander brigades.
- <sup>aa</sup>This figure assumes five SSC-8 battalions, each of which is equipped with four launchers. Since each launcher appears to be equipped to carry four missiles, this would indicate a total of 80 missiles per battalion (possibly 160 if each battalion has one reload missile). However, it is assumed that each launcher is only assigned one nuclear warhead on average (with the rest being equipped with conventional warheads), for a total of 20 warheads across five battalions.
- <sup>bb</sup>US Intelligence has for several years estimated that Russia has 1,000–2,000 nonstrategic nuclear warheads (including retired warheads awaiting dismantlement). The precise number comes with significant uncertainty. Warheads for nonstrategic forces are believed to be in storage and are not collocated with their launchers, and therefore are not formally counted as "deployed" in this Nuclear Notebook; however, many regional storage sites are located relatively close to their launcher garrisons, and in practice warheads could be transferred to their launch units on short notice.
- <sup>cc</sup>New START counts fewer deployed warheads because it does not count weapons in storage and because at any given time, some SSBNs are not fully loaded. The US State Department's January 2025 report concluded that "The United States assesses with high confidence that Russia did not engage in any largescale activity above the Treaty limits in 2024," but added that "Russia was probably close to the deployed warhead limit during much of the year and may have exceeded the deployed warhead limit by a small number during portions of 2024.."
- <sup>dd</sup>Of Russia's approximately 2,591 warheads in reserve, about 1,114 of these are strategic and about 1,477 are non-strategic.