Illustration by KLYONA / depositphotos.com.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s Friday visit to the White House turned into disaster. Vice President J.D. Vance provoked a fight in front of the press that poisoned the meeting and left US-Ukraine relations reeling. This comes after three weeks of President Donald Trump making concessions to Vladimir Putin, for which the United States received nothing in return.
February 28 will go down as a bad day for Ukraine and a good one for the Kremlin. It will also go down as a bad day for US security interests. If Ukraine loses the war—on the battlefield or as result of a shoddy peace deal—the Russian threat to Europe and the United States will grow.
European leaders met with Zelensky on Sunday to discuss how to move forward and hopefully reengage Washington. They also should be contemplating how they will proceed if Trump is unwilling to do so and ends US assistance for Ukraine.
An ugly day for American diplomacy. Zelensky came to Washington with reason for hope. He had in hand an agreement allowing the United States a privileged position in developing Ukraine’s rare earth minerals. That deal sparked Trump’s interest. French President Emmanuel Macron and British Prime Minister Keir Starmer prepared the way earlier in the week with their Oval Office discussions with Trump on settling the Russia-Ukraine war.
The White House meeting began amicably enough. However, after an unusually long press spray, Vance—who famously said “I don’t really care what happens to Ukraine one way or the other” —launched the ambush. Things spiraled downhill from there. As one commentator observed, as the meeting broke up in discord, “Mr. Vance smirked. His work was done.” The president canceled the planned lunch. The agreement on rare earth minerals went unsigned. White House officials asked Zelensky to leave.
The disgraceful treatment of a US partner whose country has suffered three years of grievous assault by Russia will go down as one of the ugliest encounters in American diplomatic history. The apparent rejection of Zelensky and Ukraine becomes more ominous, however, when one considers the previous three weeks of Trump administration policy.
Concessions to Moscow. Over the last three weeks, Trump and his administration made concession after concession to Russian positions. A by-no-means exhaustive list: On February 12, Trump commented that Ukraine would not recover all its territory or join NATO, thereby endorsing two major Russian desires before Russian and Ukrainian officials had even begun to negotiate. The same day, Trump said he would meet with Putin, breaking ranks with Western leaders, who have boycotted meeting the Russian for three years.
On February 13, Trump broke ranks with G7 leaders over Russia and the G8. The G7 expelled Russia after it annexed Crimea in 2014; Trump said Putin should be allowed to return. On February 18, Trump bizarrely—and falsely—blamed Ukraine for starting the war with Russia.
On February 20, representatives of G7 countries said US officials had opposed a reference to “Russian aggression” in a statement by the group to mark the third anniversary of Moscow’s all-out assault on Ukraine. Four days later, the United States joined with Russia, North Korea, and Iran to vote against a UN General Assembly resolution drafted by European and Ukrainian diplomats because the resolution—accurately—named Russia as the aggressor.
What did the United States receive in return for leaning toward Russian positions on key peace deal issues (territory and security guarantees), for breaking Putin out of his isolation from the West, and for trying to protect Moscow from being fingered as the aggressor? Nothing. On a February 23 morning news show, billionaire Trump negotiator Steve Witkoff was asked to specify a concession from Russia. He did not name a single concession the United States had received from Moscow, or even one that US officials had asked of Russia.
Picking up the pieces? The White House disaster left US-Ukraine relations, at least at the highest level, in tatters. One would hope that administration officials who recognize the US interests at stake—people such as Secretary of State Marco Rubio and National Security Advisor Mike Waltz—will step in and help the president correct his current course. Zelensky said he believed the relationship is salvageable. But Rubio and Waltz seemed to double down on White House criticism of Zelensky. Restoring a workable relationship between Washington and Kyiv will not be easy.
Finding an end to the war will prove a daunting task requiring hard negotiating. Trump very much wants the photo op of signing a deal, but does he have the bargaining skills and patience needed to achieve a just and durable settlement? After Friday, Trump can blame Zelensky, whom he claims is not “ready for peace.” In truth, Zelensky wants peace for his battered country, but details matter; he will not accept a capitulation on Russian terms.
Will Trump now pursue his desire to engage Putin? If so, he will find the past three weeks have done him little good. After receiving a string of concessions, Putin has not responded in kind. He will await further concessions. And following the breakdown between Washington and Kyiv, Russian military assaults on Ukraine could well escalate.
Starmer hosted a meeting of European leaders and Zelensky on Sunday and later said they had agreed to: maintain the flow of military assistance to Ukraine and raise pressure on Russia’s economy; insist that a peace settlement had to protect Ukraine’s security and sovereignty and to include Kyiv in the negotiation; help Ukraine increase its defense capabilities; and build a “coalition of the willing” that would guarantee a settlement by putting forces on the ground in Ukraine. Starmer noted the importance of U.S. backing. He earlier said that Britain, France and Ukraine would present their agreed plan to Washington.
Still the fear is that Trump and Vance wanted and welcomed the Oval Office clash.
Time for plan B for Ukraine and Europe? Starmer has taken the lead, apparently along with Macron, of a European effort at damage control. It makes good sense for Kyiv and its European partners to test whether a better US-Ukraine relationship can be restored.
However, Europe and Ukraine also need to think seriously about the alternative, one in which Trump refuses to reengage Zelensky, ends US assistance to Ukraine, and proceeds on a solo course to rebuild relations with Putin. In that case, Europe and Ukraine would seem a good match. European countries have the finances, with the right political will, but need time to build up their military capabilities. Kyiv has a large battle-hardened army that for three years has defended not just its own country but Europe as a whole from Putin’s neo-imperialist aggression.
The Europeans should now move to seize frozen Russian Central Bank assets and put those monies into a fund to support Ukraine’s defense and reconstruction. Trump may not agree to give Ukraine arms, but the transactional president no doubt would likely be amenable to selling them.
European members of NATO and Canada also should consider an even grimmer possibility, one foreshadowed by Vance’s shocking performance at the Munich Security Conference. Given Trump’s skepticism about the alliance and apparent readiness to throw Ukraine under the bus, can Europe count on the United States? Hopefully, America will remain a committed ally. NATO has proven key to a stable and secure trans-Atlantic community, a vital US interest. But the past three weeks give reason to doubt that Trump shares any such commitment.
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