Nuclear Weapons

India’s missile attack shows that managing an India-Pakistan crisis is easier said than done

By Syed Ali Zia Jaffery, May 6, 2025

A day after US Secretary of State Marco Rubio urged India and Pakistan to de-escalate tensions following the April 22 terrorist attack in Pahalgam, Indian-administered Kashmir, US Vice President JD Vance said the “hope here is that India responds to this terrorist attack in a way that doesn’t lead to a broader regional conflict.” Vance also said he hoped “that Pakistan, to the extent that they are responsible, cooperates with India to make sure that the terrorists sometimes operating in their territory are hunted down and dealt with.”

But on Tuesday, in what it code-named Operation Sindoor, India fired missiles at multiple sites in Pakistan, claiming that those sites were “terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan and Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir from where terrorist attacks against India have been planned and directed.” According to a report in The Guardian newspaper, no Pakistani military sites were targeted.

Before the missile attack, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi gave full operational freedom to the Indian military to avenge the Pahalgam attack, which killed 26 people in the portion of Kashmir controlled by India. In a statement, India’s armed forces claimed they had “demonstrated considerable restraint” in Tuesday’s missile attack, but Pakistan has vowed to give a befitting response to any Indian aggression. After India’s missile attack, Pakistan’s Dawn newspaper cited Pakistani Lt. Gen. Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry as saying: “Let me say it unequivocally: Pakistan will respond to this at a time and place of its own choosing. This heinous provocation will not go unanswered.”

The Line of Control (LoC) dividing Kashmir had not been quiet since the Pahalgam incident, with both sides trading fire every day since the start of the crisis. While both countries have been embroiled in similar nuclear-tinged crises in the past, the escalation of hostilities this time may be harder to control. There are three reasons why this might be the case.

India’s desire to do something bigger. India has still not shared evidence—direct or indirect—of Pakistani involvement in the Pahalgam attack, and Pakistan has denied any. But India believes Pakistan masterminded the mayhem in Pahalgam, and before Tuesday’s attacks, Modi had said India would pursue and punish terrorists and their abettors to the “ends of the earth.” Opposition leaders, like Shashi Tharoor, have also urged Modi to take smart, hard, and prompt action against Pakistan.

It was unclear precisely how Pakistan might respond to Tuesday’s attacks, but it seemed likely Islamabad would calibrate its responses to at least equal India’s missile assault. An inability to give a calibrated response on the part of Pakistan would fail to reestablish deterrence in the Kashmir region. Also, Pakistan’s leadership is still struggling to find legitimacy at home after the forced ousting of former Prime Minister Imran Khan; it will not want to appear weak by delivering anything less than a tit-for-tat response to Indian aggression.

Higher likelihood of miscalculations. India and Pakistan both possess nuclear weapons and are not engaged in any kind of security dialogue. Without bilateral crisis management mechanisms, both sides will find the current crisis unpredictable. The possibility of escalation is real.

Miscalculations will become likelier because of the spread of disinformation and misinformation on the internet. Beyond miscalculations, the chances of accidents cannot be ruled out. In the 2019 Pulwama-Balakot crisis, apart from missing its intended target, India lost one of its attacking aircraft in a dogfight with Pakistan, raising questions over its warfighting capabilities, and the Indian Air Force shot down its own Mi-17 chopper, which resulted in six casualties. A more dangerous accident happened in 2022, when an unarmed Indian cruise missile fell 121 kilometers inside the border of Pakistan’s Punjab province.

Washington is no longer a crisis manager. Another critical factor makes the path of this crisis hard to predict: Washington’s lack of interest in acting as a crisis manager. Since their overt nuclearization, India and Pakistan have relied on the United States to manage their periodic disputes. But from directly mediating to end the Kargil conflict in 1999 to playing a very limited role in the Pulwama-Balakot crisis 20 years later, Washington’s role as a crisis manager has evolved.

US President Donald Trump’s lack of focus on South Asia suggests that his administration would not dedicate time and resources to managing the current crisis. While senior US officials have called for restraint, President Trump said he hoped India and Pakistan “will get it figured out one way or the other.” Trump’s disengaged remarks do not mean that the United States is not worried about a possible nuclear exchange in South Asia. But it puts the onus of escalation and de-escalation squarely on India and Pakistan, without a crisis manager.

Perhaps more important, if and when more force is used and escalatory responses are unleashed, both countries will be less likely to hear Washington’s calls for restraint. If anything, the two adversaries will pander to domestic pressure, making it harder for an already distracted United States to control the crisis.

Better sense must prevail. India’s missile attack enhances the prospect of a major confrontation—one that has nuclear undertones. Restraint will be difficult to exercise, not least due to mounting domestic pressures. This could lead to dangerous miscalculations. With Washington busy working to end the Russia-Ukraine war, India and Pakistan may have to find their own methods of defusing a situation that has the potential to escalate to nuclear dimensions.

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  • It's a shame that Bulletin of Atomic Scientists is giving space to such a biased Pakistani author for sprouting his partisan propaganda against India. India is the victim here. Pakistan sponsored terrorists killed 26 Hindu tourists in cold blood. This was an unprovoked attack against India and Indian people. They were isolated and killed with bullet to head and shown no mercy.

    Pakistan has been shielding terrorists for decades and Osama Bin Laden was also sheltered by Pakistan's army. In such a case, India has a legal case and right to retaliate against Pakistani aggression and terror. Such articles which justify terrorism should never be given any space in such prestigious publications.