With the Israel-Iran war, Russia is learning to become irrelevant

Russia views the rapid escalation of the Iran-Israel conflict with alarm. The Kremlin recognizes that the war’s outcome may reshape its global stature, fundamentally alter the dynamics of the “Iran question”—in which Moscow has long claimed a central role—and impact global strategic stability and non-proliferation efforts.

Tactical parallels of two operations. Russia is closely following the military innovations introduced by this new war. Russian publicists and military bloggers have focused on the Mossad’s operations inside Iran, especially how Israel launched herds of attacking drones from within Iranian territory in the early hours of the June 13 surprise attack. Given their apparent resemblance, Russian military commentators see Israel’s drone strikes against Iran’s air defense systems launched from Iranian territory as echoing Ukraine’s drone attacks on Russia’s strategic nuclear bomber bases only two weeks earlier. In that case, however, they tried to downplay Ukraine’s military ingenuity, claiming that Israel’s national intelligence agency, Mossad, may have assisted the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) or rehearsed its own Iran operation via the Ukrainians.

There are indeed shared technical and tactical features between SBU’s “Spider Web” and the Mossad’s drone operations. According to leaks from both agencies, the operations were long-planned, involved smuggling explosive drones into enemy territory, operating a covert workshop in the enemy’s domain for assembling and deploying them, and conducting a surprise, synchronized strike on key security targets.

Both the Mossad and the SBU publicized their activities shortly after the attacks, including photographic evidence, thereby dominating the media agenda and sowing doubt in the enemy’s mind as to whether the exposed activity was only the tip of an iceberg of yet-to-come further operations. Above all, both operations presented Ukraine and Israel as innovative and daring—modern-day Davids confronting the giant, cumbersome, and outdated Goliaths of Russia and Iran.

However, the technological complexity of the Mossad’s operation seemed lower than that of the SBU. Unlike the Ukrainians—who concealed drones inside trucks that traveled great distances before being launched near five Russian air bases by drone operators in Ukraine—the Mossad reportedly established a drone base in the suburbs of Tehran and used it to strike air defense targets directly. It is still unknown whether the drones were remotely operated from Israel or by field agents inside Iran.

The primary targets of the Ukrainian operation were Russia’s strategic bombers because Russia repeatedly used these planes to bomb Ukraine. But because these aircraft are dual-capable, they are highly valuable assets for Russia’s nuclear force, given the cessation of their production and their role as a core—albeit weaker—component in the Russian nuclear triad. By contrast, Iranian air defense systems are continuing to be produced in series.

The Ukrainian Security Service released lengthy videos of the attack, as well as a list of the five bases they allegedly struck. However, in the case of Israel, it is difficult to know what Mossad’s drones targeted in Iran, and with what success. Moreover, while independent analysts quickly concluded that the Ukrainian strike had only partial tactical effectiveness, they are left with speculation regarding the Israeli strike. The SBU’s initial statement regarding the damage claimed to the Russian bomber force (destruction of 41 bombers, or about a third of the fleet) was far from the battle damage assessment of independent analysts: about 20 aircraft hit, not all destroyed, and not all strategic bombers. During the operation, one of the drone-carrying trucks reportedly caught fire and failed to launch the drones tasked with striking the Ukrainka base in Russia’s Far East—the largest and therefore most important potential target for the Ukrainians. Conclusive evidence of bomber damage was published for only two of the five attacked bases.

The limited information released by Israel’s intelligence agency about its drone strike operation preserves its image—whether true or not—as a complete success and damages the credibility of Iran’s claims about uncovering and neutralizing Israel’s operational infrastructure inside the country. It also does little to allay Iranian paranoia regarding Mossad activity within its borders.

Differing strategic implications. The most significant difference between the two operations is their broader context. The SBU’s covert mission, while achieving the strategic effect of disproving President Donald Trump’s claim that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky “has no cards,” remained an isolated incident, which did not lead to a shift in the war’s dynamics. It failed to destabilize the Russian leadership, which had already become accustomed to previous Ukrainian drone operations deep inside the country, including symbolic strikes on the Kremlin and major embarrassments such as the sinking of the cruiser Moscow and the explosions on the Kerch Bridge connecting Russia’s mainland with Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula.

In contrast, the Mossad’s drone strike is not a standalone event. It is just a small part of Israel’s surprising and hefty “Rising Lion” operation, which showcases integration between the covert intelligence agency’s work and conventional military operations. Mossad’s actions in the early hours of the June 13 attack helped to lay the foundation for the Israeli Air Force’s achievement of air superiority over western Iran and Tehran, allowing it to deliver an uninterrupted series of heavy blows against Iran’s armed forces and political leadership. The covert operation contributed to creating a shock effect throughout Iran’s government and population—an audience that had not experienced intense warfare on its own territory since 1988.

The image of success projected by this synchronized operation also eroded the Trump administration’s apparent resistance to entering the war—an important strategic achievement that Israel had struggled to secure on the eve of the conflict.

Recent disclosures indicate that Israel’s strike capabilities were the product of decades of planning and capability build-up—much longer than the 18 months of preparations announced by the SBU. The Mossad drone raid merely refined and strengthened the robustness of a pre-existing operational plan.

Moscow on the sidelines. Russia’s role in the Iran-Israel crisis appears to be constrained by its deep involvement in Ukraine and its desire to re-engage the Trump administration. These conflicting pressures present both risks and opportunities, with risks currently outweighing potential gains.

Over the past decade, Russia and Iran deepened military coordination—particularly in Syria—and signed a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty just days before Trump returned to office in January. However, while referencing military cooperation, that agreement lacked any mutual security guarantees, highlighting the fragile and transactional nature of their ties. Russia and Iran’s alignment rests primarily on shared opposition to the United States.

Iran’s regional prestige already suffered after last year’s successive Israeli strikes on its military bases and militias. Simultaneously, due to international sanctions, Russia grew increasingly reliant on Gulf states—longtime Iranian rivals—for oil-price coordination and investments. Although Russian commentators often call out Israel for its actions in the Middle East, Israel remains one of the few Western-aligned states maintaining channels of political engagement with the Kremlin.

Most significantly, the budding Putin-Trump détente has affected Russia-Iran relations, even if Putin does not seem to enjoy the relationship with Trump. Putin sought to ease Trump’s pressure for compromise on Ukraine and agreement to a ceasefire by offering a willingness to cooperate with the United States in diplomatically resolving the Iranian nuclear program issue.

Moscow increased its diplomatic engagement with Tehran and Beijing but refrained from addressing Iran’s security needs during the year preceding the Israeli attack. This happened despite Iran’s obvious need to close the gaps in its air defense system, exposed by Israel’s pinpoint strikes of April and October 2024. Still, Russia could not—and likely did not try to—persuade Iran to completely give up uranium enrichment on its territory, as consistently demanded by the United States.

Russia cannot currently provide military assistance to Iran: It has no surplus weapons of relevance due to the war in Ukraine and must consider that any weapons it delivers will likely be destroyed by Israel—as has been demonstrated in the current conflict, and the past decade of Israeli strikes on Iranian and proxy targets in Syria and Lebanon.

Short of military support options, Russia has defaulted to a diplomatic role—issuing strong foreign ministry statements, supporting Iran at the UN and International Atomic Energy Agency, and conducting high-level calls with President Trump, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Turkish President Recep Erdogan, and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian. Still, Putin’s rhetoric is more cautious than that of his diplomats, suggesting he is preserving room for future mediation.

If Iran suffers a military defeat or regime collapse, Russia’s decade-long investment in the country will face a heavy blow and turn out to have been in vain. As with Syria, Iran’s regime collapse would cast doubt on Russia’s reliability as a strategic partner to the Global South countries. Moscow’s ambitious projects with Iran—including civilian nuclear cooperation and the North-South transport corridor—could also be jeopardized.

But Russia could still get some benefits: Oil prices have risen (though modestly so far), global focus has shifted to the Middle East, allowing the Kremlin to intensify its attacks on Ukraine, hoping for military gains there, and if the Iranian regime overcomes this crisis, it will emerge more dependent on Russia for its survival.

Looking ahead, should the conflict evolve into a war of attrition between Israel and Iran, all sides may seek a ceasefire. A Russian proposal at the UN Security Council could then provide the necessary diplomatic framework. Russia’s technical expertise may also become relevant in nuclear site decontamination, radiological monitoring, and fissile material management. Russia has proposed to store and secure Iran’s enriched uranium, but it is not clear whether this service will be needed following the destruction of the nuclear sites.

Implications for strategic stability and non-proliferation. The drone attacks by Ukraine and Israel underscore gaps in the protection of strategic facilities and capabilities in Russia and Iran. In Russia’s case, the attack came as a situational—albeit not a fundamental—surprise. Russians comprehended this vulnerability, given prior Ukrainian limited drone strikes on bomber bases, and began to take rapid and systemic measures to address it. Before the SBU operation, Russian bombers were dispersed and moved farther from Ukraine’s borders. (Russia has reportedly redeployed some of its long-range bombers to its Far East bases after the Ukrainian attack.) In addition, Russia’s air defense system is trying to improve interception and jamming capabilities against such new threats and build more hardened bunkers for its aircraft. These events are likely to prompt other nuclear powers to invest in shielding strategic assets against similar threats.

Russia’s updated public nuclear doctrine already flagged drones as a destabilizing factor. However, the Ukrainian attack also exposed the limitations of treating any drone strike as a potential nuclear trigger: such claims do not deter adversaries. As massive drone attacks are listed as a possible trigger for nuclear strike in the doctrine, Russian officials might demand that future arms control negotiations address such threats—as it has already signaled about the US Golden Dome missile defense project. This would further complicate the prospects for reaching new accords.

From a non-proliferation perspective, Israel’s attack warrants longer-term evaluation. In an era of renewed great-power rivalry, some states may grow more interested in nuclear weapons. But if Israel’s military operation can demonstrably halt or slow Iran’s nuclear progress, it could deter other would-be proliferators. These states may also be forced to build deeper underground, more secretive facilities that are less vulnerable to conventional attacks but more likely to draw early satellite detection due to the massive infrastructure work they would require.