Iran’s dangerous gamble of threatening to withdraw from the NPT

The outlines of Israeli strikes on Iran’s nuclear program since last Friday have been extensively reported and mulled over. While considerable uncertainties remain over the precise extent of the damage at Iran’s key nuclear sites, there’s a bigger question: What are the implications for Iran’s strategic calculus on the future and role of its nuclear program?

The Israeli strikes have had a meaningful impact on rolling back Iran’s nuclear expertise and technical capabilities. But they have probably had the opposite effect on Iran’s threat perception and, therefore, its resolve to advance and potentially weaponize its program.

On Monday, June 17, three days after the first Israeli aerial strikes on Iran, the Iranian parliament introduced a bill that—if passed—could see Iran withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, or NPT. Tehran has repeatedly threatened in the past to withdraw from the treaty, which underpins the global non-proliferation regime. However, the scale of the current Israeli attack has made that threat—and the subsequent weaponization of Iran’s nuclear program—eminently credible. Notably, the Iranian ambassadors to the United Kingdom and France have reiterated Iran’s continued commitment to the NPT.

Iran probably hopes that threatening withdrawal—or even moving toward NPT withdrawal—can help it generate leverage in the current escalation cycle. But that would be an exceptionally dangerous bet to make and could be counter to Tehran’s interest.

Stronger resolve. Israel’s military operation of the last few days has already degraded Iran’s technical capabilities, especially the country’s ability to produce enriched uranium. However, on a strategic level, the scale of Israel’s attacks carried out against multiple targets in Iran, including in the capital of Tehran, may convince Iranians that acquiring a nuclear weapon capability is the only way to deter similar aggression in the future.

The Iran-Iraq war—fought between 1980 and 1988—is often cited as the driver for Tehran’s decision to restart its nuclear program, which had been largely put on ice following the 1979 Islamic Revolution. The violence of the last few days, even if not as extensive as that of the eight-year-long war, may have a similar effect.

Short of moving toward the production of a nuclear weapon, Iran may decide to escalate the current situation by instead withdrawing from the NPT, or at least giving notice of withdrawal. The active debate in Iran on whether to remain a party to the NPT—which has intensified since the start of Israel’s operation—points to withdrawal from the treaty as an increasingly likely possibility.

Considerations for withdrawal. Under Article X of the NPT, a member state has the right to withdraw from the treaty “if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country.”

Tehran could point to the strikes on its nuclear sites—but also the broader assaults on its military assets, security leadership, and critical infrastructure—as meeting the criteria for withdrawal. The fact that the attacks were carried out by Israel (a nuclear-armed state outside of the NPT regime) against Iran (an NPT non-nuclear weapon state), targeting sites that have remained under a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), could provide Iran with further justification for withdrawal.

The only state to have ever withdrawn from the NPT before is North Korea. Pyongyang announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT in 1993, triggering the required three-month notice period before withdrawal—prompting a flurry of diplomatic activity from the West, most notably the United States. On the last day of its notice period, North Korea suspended its withdrawal, as diplomatic negotiations with the United States were making progress, and the parties involved ultimately reached a diplomatic resolution in the form of the Agreed Framework. (But its effective implementation proved challenging. In January 2003, North Korea announced that it could “no longer remain bound to the NPT.” It gave no renewed notice of withdrawal, claiming that it had already done so 10 years prior.)

Implications. Like North Korea, Iran may hope to use the 90-day withdrawal notice period to pressure the United States and European countries into a diplomatic arrangement with terms agreeable to Iran in exchange for offers to roll back the notice of withdrawal.

However, the North Korean precedent suggests that the threat of withdrawal may, in practice, never truly be retracted. It would act as a sword of Damocles, hanging over the heads of the international community. Should Iran keep threatening to withdraw, it will further degrade the trust among its interlocutors over Iran’s willingness to remain bound to the treaty and intention not to move toward weaponization at any point in the future.

Previous Iranian threats to withdraw may have reasonably been interpreted—rightly or wrongly—as Tehran’s efforts to generate additional diplomatic leverage. But after the military exchanges of the last few days, any such threat would—and should—be taken as an indication of a serious Iranian intent to weaponize its nuclear program.

The large-scale Israeli military strikes against Iran, along with repeated threats by President Donald Trump to get the United States involved in the conflict, may have changed Tehran’s strategic calculations such that any Iranian moves toward weaponization would appear exceedingly credible. (These assumptions about the future of Iranian strategic calculations, of course, are only valid so long as the current Iranian regime remains.)

An Iranian withdrawal from the NPT would also most likely result in a complete loss of access by the IAEA inspectors to Iran’s nuclear sites because Tehran would no longer be bound by the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. Foreign intelligence agencies would presumably maintain some access to sites and knowledge about the program. But after this past week’s Israeli intelligence operation, Iran will likely root out spies and saboteurs and strengthen defenses against further penetration, curtailing Israel’s access as a result, at least in the short term. This would leave Israel, the United States, and the broader international community to assume the worst-case scenario about Iran’s intentions and capabilities, regardless of the reality on the ground and under it.

A notice to withdraw would also run the risk of Tehran losing political and economic support from Russia and China. The two countries have not dedicated a massive amount of diplomatic or economic capital over the last few years to pressure Iran to roll back its nuclear activities: China has remained by far the biggest customer for Iranian oil, and Russia has purchased large amounts of Iranian drones and missiles to carry out its war in Ukraine. However, neither Beijing nor Moscow would be keen to see the emergence of a nuclear-armed Iran, and both countries continue to present themselves as upholding the international non-proliferation order.

A way forward. Iran should think twice before taking steps toward NPT withdrawal, whether that be the adoption of domestic legislation or the giving of formal notice of withdrawal as leverage. The threat of NPT withdrawal, under the current circumstances, has lost any diplomatic utility it may have held for Tehran in the past. The United States, Israel, and other foreign countries are much more likely to take any such threats at face value—and respond accordingly—than they may have in the past.

As it is under attack, Iran may now consider it has little to lose from withdrawing from the NPT and possibly even moving toward weaponization. But if Tehran still holds any hope of controlling the escalation, preserving political stability, and maintaining some version—albeit scaled down—of a peaceful nuclear program, it must take an approach of greater, not less, cooperation and transparency on its nuclear activities.

As politically challenging as it may be under the current circumstances, Tehran should urgently work with the IAEA to re-establish transparency of its program, address key international concerns over its enrichment and any weaponization-relevant activities, and make clear and credible commitments to its international non-proliferation obligations. More than ever, Iran needs to demonstrate to the international community that its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes. Withdrawing—or threatening to withdraw—from the NPT would have the exact opposite effect.