How Trump can play a strong hand at the Beijing Summit

This week, Donald Trump and Xi Jinping will meet in Beijing for the first leader-leader summit since Joe Biden and Xi met in San Francisco in 2023. Amid the war with Iran and a tenuous Sino-American trade truce, the pressure is on both presidents to deliver strategic stability for arguably the most important bilateral relationship of this century.

Ahead of the meeting, President Xi looks to have the upper hand. President Trump’s actions may have already been helpful to China in several significant ways. Trump’s geopolitical unpredictability may be enhancing China’s regional and global standing, casting the latter as a more stable and reliable strategic partner. And given that the US Supreme Court ruled in February that most of President Trump’s tariffs are illegal, China also may have the stronger hand in tariff negotiations. But there is a chance that strategic stability issues—and nuclear weapons in particular—could be a prominent agenda item.

This week’s summit follows a dizzying array of new strategic developments. In February, the final bilateral strategic arms limitation treaty between the US and Russia, New START, expired. Simultaneously, the United States accused China of conducting low-yield nuclear tests in 2020, and President Trump called for ”nuclear experts” to get to work on a new trilateral arms control agreement with both Beijing and Moscow. In response, China flatly denied testing allegations and dismissed the possibility of joining any arms control treaty so long as its nuclear arsenal remains significantly smaller than those of the United States and Russia.

Despite the difficulty of this moment, the intractability of these issues, and the unpredictability of current great-power relations, paths still exist for meaningful engagement. Here are cards President Trump could and should play in Beijing this week to improve US national security and global stability.

Elevate the political importance of strategic stability. At the summit’s outset, President Trump must set the strategic stakes.

The US president should clearly and directly communicate that, as the two most powerful military and economic forces in the world, the United States and China share reciprocal vulnerabilities worsened by nuclear weapons. This plain language is in line with President Trump’s long-held views of nuclear weapons as the greatest threat to humanity, and reflected in a recent Department of Defense report on Chinese military power. It is a plain statement of reality.

A sober assessment of strategic dynamics is neither a US capitulation nor an appeasement of Chinese behavior. It would not undermine long-standing security commitments to US partners and allies or hamstring deterrence capabilities. A joint political acknowledgement from both nations of the danger of nuclear weapons would go a long way toward laying the foundation for the future of strategic stability.

While this administration constrains its negotiating position in future arms control negotiations by repeatedly calling for a multilateral agreement, the post-New START environment creates diplomatic maneuverability for Trump in Beijing. The United States is no longer treaty-bound to observe the deployed strategic warhead limits of New START. President Trump should explain that, because it faces simultaneous deterrence challenges posed by both Russia and China, the United States may have to exceed those former New START limits by beginning to upload multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) into its own silo-based intercontinental ballistic missile forces.

This direct approach could push Xi to reveal his preferences for limiting the number of US-deployed warheads, or to explain why he believes China must continue to build up its nuclear warhead numbers before coming to the negotiating table. If the Chinese delegation shows interest in substantive engagement, as opposed to boilerplate admonishments, the door may open for real work toward a joint agreement on what a path toward quantitative and qualitative arms controls might entail. If so, China should show its commitment by joining the discussions between the US and Russia on the future of strategic stability.

If the United States explains why China’s nuclear buildup could directly result in an increase in the US strategic deterrent, China could be more inclined to engage in a dialogue or at least understand why Washington believes that China must be engaged in strategic stability discussions.

Advance risk reduction initiatives. President Trump should reiterate established precedent as the basis for future engagement.

Trump should up the ante on nuclear risk reduction by flipping the narrative on nuclear missile test notifications. Despite decades of US engagement, China does not have any formalized agreement with the United States that would bring China into a Missile Launch Notification agreement similar to the 1988 US-Russia Ballistic Launch Notification Agreement.

Still, in September 2024, China provided prior warning to the United States and other Pacific states of a ballistic missile test that overflew the Pacific Ocean toward the continental United States. Despite this encouraging signal, Chinese experts and practitioners explain that they would most certainly not agree to a pre-launch notification treaty because the 2024 test’s trajectory was operationally unique.

Trump can directly convey that, given this pre-launch notification precedent and associated explanatory rhetoric, China must continue to provide such notifications as a way of reducing the potential for accidental escalation. The arguments: In the absence of a pre-launch notification, Washington is compelled to assume any future ballistic missile launch from China along similar trajectories would pose a direct and immediate strategic threat to the United States. The Trump administration should add that the United States continues to see the value in these launch notifications, will continue to share its own, and looks forward to more substantive engagements with Beijing on this topic of critical crisis prevention.

Another risk-reduction mechanism that China is clearly aware of—and has indeed used in other relationships—is a “hotline” or communication channel. For example, last July, China and the Philippines established a crisis hotline directly between their presidential offices. This high-level communication channel was created in response to the mutual recognition of the severe risk of escalation that could result from misunderstandings and (or) miscalculation in the disputed South China Sea arena. China has several such hotlines for situations that could lead to conflict or escalation, including a line with South Korea to discuss critical supply chains.

Despite maintaining various leader-to-leader hotlines, including with the United States, there remains the problem of having someone to pick up the phone. During the 2023 spy balloon incident, then-Secretary of Defense Austin called his Chinese counterpart numerous times without any answer. To address this issue, Trump should formally invite President Xi to join the National Nuclear Risk Reduction Center. Established as part of the Bureau of Arms Control, Deterrence, and Stability (now merged into the Bureau of Arms Control and Nonproliferation), the center began as—and still includes—a direct bilateral hotline between the Soviet Union/Russia and the United States. It has since then been expanded to ensure connectivity with over 55 nations.

Operating in seven languages, 24/7 and 365 days a year, the center communicates official notifications under 14 separate arms control and security agreements or arrangements. The center has professionalized, standardized, and multi-tracked its communication lines so that it can continue with absolute credibility to prevent any misunderstanding or miscommunication even during hot wars, earthquakes, power outages, or deep political disputes among partner nations. Crucially, the center’s communications do not rely on someone picking up a phone for messages to get through.

The Trump administration should point out that China recognizes its relationship with the United States is at least as unstable as its relationship with those numerous regional countries with which it has hotlines. The United States and China already have a military communication hotline, but joining the National Nuclear Risk Reduction Center will further improve communications and reduce escalation risks between China and the United States.

Address mutual vulnerability. By acknowledging China as part of the so-called “three body problem” and a strategic “pacing threat,” and in requiring China’s participation in future arms control efforts, the US policy toward China is already a clear, if tacit, acknowledgement of mutual vulnerability. The meeting in Beijing provides an opportunity for the leaders of China and the United States to recognize the inherent risks of misunderstanding and unintentional escalation that come from shared insecurities, and to start taking steps to reduce those risks.

For too long, the US-Chinese strategic relationship has been a too-simplistic game of Go Fish, as each side misread national positions and failed to develop strategies toward long-term stability. By acknowledging mutual vulnerability while upping the ante on negotiations, the United States and China are both in stronger positions to find win-win outcomes and advance strategic stability at the Beijing Summit.

Nuclear security experts are nearly unanimous: Today’s complex strategic landscape requires new tools to maintain stability and deter nuclear war. President Trump and his team can now demonstrate that they are serious about national security and global stability—and willing to listen to experts—by debuting new approaches that can break the diplomatic deadlock on these issues. By stacking the US hand with new approaches and bold, thoughtful political commitment, there is still a window for real progress—but only if the Trump administration is brave enough to play the available cards.