After New START: Why new formats of strategic arms control need a common view

The international political and legal turbulence of our time—unprecedented in the memory of the post-Cold War generation—has thrown established notions of world order and respectable norms of foreign policy into chaos. The frightening escalation and expansion of conflicts, coupled with the accelerated development of new weapons and disruptive technologies, call into question previously accepted views on nuclear weapons, the norms and mechanisms for preventing their use and proliferation, and conditions and principles of strategic stability.

Here, we do not claim to provide a comprehensive analysis of the new era or offer strategies to strengthen universal security. We aim, rather, to express some personal views on technical, military, and doctrinal innovations that should be considered to maintain and legally enhance strategic stability in negotiations between interested states. The end of New START offers an opportunity to start over. But that first requires agreeing on a common vision of strategic stability.

Changing times. The term “strategic stability” has only one definition enshrined in international legal terms. During Mikhail Gorbachev’s visit to the United States in 1990, a joint US-Soviet statement was issued by which “the two sides agreed to reduce their strategic offensive arms in a way consistent with enhancing strategic stability … to place emphasis on removing incentives for a nuclear first strike, on reducing the concentration of warheads on strategic delivery vehicles, on giving priority to highly survivable systems and … considering the relationship between strategic offensive and defensive arms”.^[1]

At that time, the main scenario of the start of nuclear war was perceived as a massive nuclear first strike aimed foremost at the opponent’s nuclear forces. This perceived risk led to the idea of strategic stability aimed to ensure the impossibility of an effective first nuclear attack as a rational start of nuclear war.

However, as the situation evolved, new circumstances emerged that shifted the focus of nuclear strategy from large to small forms. While the previous common definition of strategic stability retained its key importance as a necessary condition for preventing nuclear risks, it ceased to be sufficient for this purpose. The universal meaning of strategic stability remains unchanged, but the methods of maintaining stability require amendments. Eventually, these changes must be incorporated into formal arms control agreements.

The momentum gained by the process of large-scale nuclear disarmament after the Cold War ended was due not only to the cessation of confrontation between the Eastern and Western blocs. It was also encouraged by perceptions of a huge surplus of nuclear weapons in the new international security environment. Their stabilizing reductions remained central to negotiations and treaty implementation for a long time. However, new factors gradually began to influence the strategic equations, including the reduction of the threat of general war, deep reductions in nuclear weapons, a sharp decline in assessment of the level of unacceptable damage (sufficient for effective deterrence), introduction and refinement of precision-guided weapons, the paradox of “credible deterrence,” horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, and doctrines of forceful counterproliferation.

The planning of armed operations is shifting toward the selective use of nuclear weapons in regional and even global conflicts. In parallel, the nature of future combat operations implies the use of advanced conventional strike weapons, which create additional steps on the escalation ladder of conflict. Recently, there has been a trend toward mass-producing relatively inexpensive precision-guided systems in the form of long-range one-way drones, as can be seen in the Ukrainian conflict.

The vertical and horizontal spread of ballistic and cruise missile systems, followed by drones, prompted improvements to missile defenses. This ultimately blurred the line between strategic and theater missile defense.

The increased priority placed on using outer space for military purposes (that is, the militarization of space) stems from a combination of the revolution of low-cost commercial launch services in the 2010s and advancements in onboard orbital reconnaissance and communications. However, the development of anti-satellite capabilities and the plans for developing orbital interceptors for missile defense have given rise to another problem: the weaponization of space and its transformation into a potential theater of war.

Is a common view possible? Since the 2010s, two positions on the future development of arms control have been evolving in the United States and Russia. They indirectly reflect the recognition of two new threats of unleashing nuclear war, besides a first nuclear strike: the relatively larger possibility of regional limited nuclear war, and the prospect of great powers’ conflict with the use of advanced long-range precision-guided conventional (or dual-purpose) systems. Such strikes may quickly provoke the use of tactical nuclear weapons with the ensuing possible escalation to all-out nuclear war. As an alternative scenario, conventional strikes may directly escalate to a massive nuclear exchange, particularly if attacks target strategic forces or early-warning and command-control sites—as has already happened against Russian bombers and radars in the Ukrainian conflict. The use of strategic systems (heavy and medium bombers) in conventional conflicts makes such attacks more possible.

The US proposal for strategic stability, which was formally presented to Russia at consultations on strategic stability in 2021,^[2] addresses the risk of a regional limited nuclear exchange and boils down to controlling all types of nuclear weapons, foremost tactical systems.^[3] This approach is inherently affected by the perception of Russian superiority in non-strategic nuclear weapons.

Meanwhile, the Russian position addresses the threat of great powers’ conflict through conventional precision-strike and dual-purpose weapons. Not surprisingly, it seeks to address the perceived advantage of the United States and NATO over Russia in long-range, precision-guided conventional weapons and missile defenses. This proposal is known as the “security equation” in Russian diplomacy.^[4]

However, the US option is fraught with implementation difficulties and uncertainties. In addition to those operationally deployed, there must be categories for combat-ready warheads in storage, undergoing maintenance or modernization, or prepared for dismantlement. Different types of warheads, both strategic and non-strategic, are usually stored in the same central storage facilities where routine maintenance work is carried out continuously. In addition to these facilities, the agreement must cover forward bases (including foreign ones), where warheads are prepared for immediate transfer to delivery vehicles, nuclear weapons manufacturing plants, and scientific and experimental laboratories. It must also cover storage sites for nuclear pits of dismantled warheads. Expanding the list of facilities subject to inspection would complicate the maintenance and security of warheads.

The Russian idea would not be easy to implement either. It implies an agreement on a set of conventional weapon systems with a strategic effect. However, the parties have not yet limited all deployed strategic nuclear weapons under the New START.^[5] Another problem concerns the control of long-range one-way drones. The same goes for the models of land-based, medium-range, conventional-tipped missiles such as the US Dark Eagle and Tomahawk, as well as the Russian Kalibr and Oreshnik. Still more difficult is a verifiable limitation of conventional cruise and hypersonic missiles deployed on submarines and surface combatants. More problems are also related to addressing the proliferation of conventional long-range, precision-guided missiles among third countries not participating in US-Russian limitations.

Both parties’ positions evidently stem from perceptions of their national security interests. After identifying the key factors affecting strategic stability, Russia and the United States should develop a new, wider understanding of strategic arms and outline the scope of a potential agreement—or a set of agreements—for controlling such weapons.

This would not be easy even under the most favorable political conditions. Adjusting arms control to the new nuclear world order will complicate not just the progress of future negotiations but also the preservation of existing arms control, which should remain the crucial dimension of international security, despite the other priorities of major powers.

New starting point and practical approach. The complexification of arms control has already started, and it directly affects the legacy of New START, the last strategic arms treaty. After its expiration in February, senior officials of the US State Department justified the reluctance to extend its limits by the lack of restrictions on China’s growing nuclear arsenal.^[6]

After the demise of New START, a legal vacuum has emerged in strategic relations between Russia and the United States for the first time in 35 years. The loss of the central link in the disarmament system may accelerate the collapse of the entire nuclear arms control structure that has been built since the early 1960s. The pressure to lift the ban on nuclear testing will increase sharply, which could lead to the breakdown of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the collapse of other related agreements.

The idea of a five-party format for limiting nuclear forces was first conceived in February 2008 at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. After this, a series of meetings was convened in London, Paris, Washington, and Beijing. (This forum is referred to as the P5 process because it includes the five permanent members of the UN Security Council: China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.) However, after negotiations, the parties adopted documents that absolved them of the obligation to impose limitations on their own nuclear arms, encompassing merely the most generic expressions of goodwill.

To understand the reasons for that failure, it should be remembered that each nuclear state has invested significant economic, technical, and intellectual resources to build its capabilities. In other words, they would only agree to limit and reduce their nuclear forces in exchange for adequate limitations and reductions in the nuclear weapons of their adversaries, against whom their nuclear deterrence policy is oriented. This is exactly the motive of the USSR/Russia and the United States during half-a-century of successful negotiations on strategic arms.

Russia’s counterparts in nuclear deterrence relations are the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. For the United States, they are Russia, China, and North Korea. For the United Kingdom and France, it is Russia. For China, they are the United States and India. For India, they are China and Pakistan. For Pakistan, it is India. North Korea’s enemies are the United States and its Far East allies. Israel’s opponents are Iran and its surrounding Arab adversaries.

In addition, another condition is necessary for productive negotiations: approximate equality, or parity, in the weapons being discussed. It is desirable not so much for deterrence, but for equality in the starting positions and expected results. Otherwise, the weaker power will not accept legalization of its inferiority, and the stronger power will not sacrifice its superiority for the sake of a treaty.

That is why multilateral negotiations on nuclear arms limitation, including the P5 project, have failed: The United States, the United Kingdom, and France do not have mutual nuclear deterrence relationships; they are allies and are not interested in reducing each other’s arms. Russia does not have a nuclear deterrence relationship with China; so here as well, there is no basis for such a dialogue.

Russia’s strategic relations with the United Kingdom and France are characterized by mutual nuclear deterrence. However, their capabilities are highly asymmetrical and far from equal. It is unlikely that the two European powers will legalize their lagging behind in a possible agreement with Russia, and Russia will not sacrifice its superiority for the sake of an agreement.

A similar situation exists between China and the United States, which also have a relationship of mutual nuclear deterrence, but do not yet have parity. At the same time, Russia would find it unacceptable to cap its strategic forces under a common ceiling with China. Otherwise, China’s strategic buildup would force Russia to reduce its deterrent forces. Likewise, China would not agree to such an option because it apparently intends to acquire full-fledged equal nuclear deterrence capabilities against the United States and does not intend to depend on Russian nuclear security guarantees.

Alternative formats. A different approach is needed to involve third countries in any practical arms limitation process. One option would be to establish equal ceilings on some individual components of strategic forces where approximate parity already exists. This may apply to Russia and the combined forces of the United Kingdom and France. This would not legalize Russia’s overall nuclear superiority over the two countries but might partially eliminate mutual nuclear concerns. Clearly, London and Paris must first agree to participate jointly and take a common position in such negotiations.

The United States and China could take a bilateral approach, agreeing to equal restrictions on the long-range systems that most concern both countries. There is a precedent for this: The 1972 SALT I Interim Agreement established asymmetric restrictions on some components of the nuclear triad, not all strategic forces of the Soviet Union and the United States.^[7] Depending on how China’s strategic forces develop and how the United States implements its “dual deterrence” policy, it may become easier to start Sino-US negotiations. Perhaps the United States will transition to concrete options for mutual and equal arms limitations that interest China, not for the abstract good, but for strengthening its national security.

Relying on the revised P5 framework would be conducive to limiting the nuclear forces of India, Pakistan, and eventually Israel and North Korea in an appropriate regional settlement. The limitation of exotic systems and technologies is only possible if based on new nuclear arms agreements that account for the multipolarity of strategic relations. Without these agreements, there will be no incentive or frame of reference for determining if new deployed systems are destabilizing and, therefore, what methods may be used for their limitations.

In an ideal world, one could propose a roadmap for further steps to strengthen strategic stability by means of arms control. However, orderly, steady progress is practically impossible in the real world. Any road map will be disrupted and muddled by politics and politicians, who are at best interested in PR effects of their deals rather than practical results. Still, it is important to maintain the vision of some logical roadmap and move forward as much as possible along the intended path. For now, it is crucial to avoid stretching the pause too much after the end of New START and to resume strategic arms control—as well as to save the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons—as fundamental elements of the entire system of arms control and strategic stability.

Acknowledgments. This article was prepared with the support of a grant from the Ministry of Science and Higher Education of the Russian Federation for major scientific projects in priority areas of scientific and technological development No. 075-15-2024-551 “Global and Regional Centers of Power in the Emerging World Order.”

Notes

[1] “Soviet-United States Joint Statement on Future Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms and Further Enhancing Strategic Stability”. July 1, 1990. The American Presidency Project. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/soviet-united-states-joint-statement-future-negotiations-nuclear-and-space-arms-and

[2] There is no indication that this position has changed substantively since 2021. Moreover, this was the case even before Biden, when addressing all types of nuclear weapons was already a condition set by Congress during the Obama administration, just after signing New START, and it remained so during the first Trump administration.

[3] According to Bonnie Jenkins, who served as Under Secretary of State in President Joe Biden’s administration, the United States pursued three priorities: maintaining existing restrictions on strategic offensive arms, including new intercontinental nuclear delivery systems within the scope of a new agreement, and controlling all types of nuclear warheads. See: Jenkins, B. 2021. “Under Secretary Bonnie Jenkins’ Remarks: Nuclear Arms Control: A New Era? Remarks.” US Department of State. September 6. https://2021-2025.state.gov/under-secretary-bonnie-jenkins-remarks-nuclear-arms-control-a-new-era/

[4] “Security equation” is the Russian concept for further arms control talks with the United States that implies considering all mutually agreed factors affecting strategic stability, no matter nuclear or non-nuclear ones. Basically, it means expansion of the scope of follow-on arms control agreements, or interdependent agreements, to take into consideration missile defense, conventional precision-guided long-range weapons, space weapons, cyberwarfare, and, to some extent, conventional forces balances. See, e.g., Ryabkov, S., 2021. “Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov’s opening remarks at a briefing at the Rossiya Segodnya International Information Agency on arms control and strategic stability, February 11, 2021.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, February 11. https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1415641/

[5] This issue is debatable. However, we believe that nuclear cruise missiles and gravity bombs deployed near heavy bomber air bases—and not counted under the New START rules—should be considered operationally deployed. Similarly, non-strategic nuclear weapons at forward bases, such as US tactical aircraft bases in Europe, as well as nonstrategic weapons aboard surface combatants and submarines, can be defined in this way. It would be illogical to proceed with the control of conventional strategic-level weapons without resolving at least these issues regarding nuclear weapons.

[6] Rubio, M. 2026. “The Next Era of Nuclear Arms Control.” US State Department. February 6. https://statedept.substack.com/p/the-next-era-of-nuclear-arms-control

[7] Garthof, R. 1994. Détente and Confrontation. America-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan. Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution. pp. 180–190.