Iran’s positions at the NPT Review Conference are rational. Ignoring them would weaken the treaty

In a working paper submitted to the ongoing Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran mentioned the US-Israeli attacks on its safeguarded nuclear facilities, calling for not only the unequivocal condemnation of such attacks but also legal accountability of the violators.

Iran submitted other working papers outlining its positions on the provision of negative security assurances, nuclear disarmament, establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, and the inalienable right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. These documents show that Tehran’s priorities within the NPT Review Process have, by and large, remained consistent. This consistency is justified, not least because each one of these issues is integral to the success of the treaty’s review process.

Attacks on safeguarded nuclear facilities. After bombing Iran’s safeguarded nuclear facilities in Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan in June 2025, the United States and Israel again struck these and other sites in March and April of 2026, including near the Bushehr nuclear power plant. Although the plant itself was not damaged and the perpetrator of the attack has not been confirmed, it is widely interpreted as an escalatory and illegal action. The fact that Israel—a non-NPT nuclear-armed state, in concert with the United States, an NPT nuclear-weapon state—brazenly attacked nuclear facilities of an NPT non-nuclear-weapon state significantly undermines the credibility of the treaty. Tehran might conclude that its NPT membership could not protect its nuclear installations from attacks by both a non-NPT malign actor and a nuclear-weapon state.

In addition, Iran could rightly refer to the treaty’s preamble, which underscores the need to ease tensions and improve international security. Tehran could also remind the world that Israel’s military actions against its nuclear sites are an anathema to the final documents of the 2000 and 2010 review conferences. The 2010 final document, in particular, was clear: “Attacks or threats of attack on nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purposes jeopardize nuclear safety, have dangerous political, economic and environmental implications and raise serious concerns regarding the application of international law on the use of force in such cases, which could warrant appropriate action in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.”

More importantly, the targeted nuclear facilities in Isfahan, Natanz, Fordow, and Bushehr are all under the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which are central to the success of the NPT. IAEA safeguards are the only mechanism through which the agency can verify that states parties comply with the NPT. Military strikes on such facilities, especially by non-NPT nuclear-armed states, severely erode the legitimacy of the treaty’s Article III on safeguards.

Iran concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA in 1974, and it also implemented the Additional Protocol voluntarily between 2003 and 2006. Iran also applied and remained compliant with the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) until 2021, long after the first Trump administration unilaterally withdrew from the agreement in 2018 with no justification.

Negative security assurances and a nuclear-weapon-free zone. As an NPT state party being the target of nuclear-laden threats, Iran has rightly stressed the need for codifying and legalizing negative security assurances—the commitment that a nuclear-weapon state will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear-weapon state. It has long been argued that, pending complete, universal disarmament, non-nuclear-weapon states should be given legally-binding negative security assurances.

The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the largest coalition of states within the NPT, also supports the provision of unconditional, irrevocable, and universal negative security assurances. However, the United States has balked at removing conditions and caveats while issuing such assurances. With nuclear risks increasing—including due to miscalculations—these incentives to remain nuclear-use-free must be unequivocal. To assuage concerns, the language must become firmer and stricter; words like “irrevocable” and “unconditional” must be made an integral part of all conversations on security assurances during the NPT review process.

Iran has also remained a leading advocate for a Nuclear-Weapon Free Zone in the Middle East. Through its working papers, statements, and other engagements, Tehran lamented the disregard for the 1995 resolution, which reaffirmed the need for establishing internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones, and the 2010 final document. However, it is encouraging to note that NAM has supported calls for the establishment of these zones, including one in the Middle East. NAM has also expressed its wholehearted support for the first two sessions of the conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Although these are welcome developments, the inability to bring Israel into the fold of the NPT will continue to militate against the possibility of establishing such a zone in the Middle East. Consequently, the non-adherence to the 1995 resolution will deal a severe blow to the already bruised treaty.

Inalienable right to use nuclear technology. As an NPT state party, Iran is well within its rights to use nuclear energy and other nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. This “inalienable right,” as mentioned in the treaty’s Article IV, does not preclude uranium enrichment or the reprocessing of plutonium for non-military reasons.

Alluding to its rights under the treaty, Iran has not only refused to dismantle its nuclear program or halt uranium enrichment, as the United States has asked repeatedly. Iran has remained firm on its indisputable, inalienable right to enrich, but has expressed willingness to negotiate on the level of enrichment. In a working paper on the issue, Iran has stressed the need for refraining from pursuing any action that impedes the development of a full nuclear fuel cycle for peaceful purposes.

Although this has been Tehran’s stance for a long time, it will become a bigger sticking point as the United States doubles down on seeking to stop Iran’s uranium enrichment. The resulting deadlock will only exacerbate differences between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon states, with the latter losing confidence in the treaty’s capacity to ensure uninterrupted, non-discriminatory access to nuclear technology.

Iran’s core positions are not repugnant to the NPT, a treaty Tehran has not withdrawn from and continues to abide by. Tehran should be engaged with on these issues, not bombed and threatened with annihilation.