The new U.S.-Russian arms control agreement is a modest step toward warhead reduction, but it's a significant step forward for Washington and Moscow's relationship.
Washington and Moscow shouldn't try to find a place for tactical nuclear weapons in the overall balance of their relationship. Instead, the two countries should take them for what they are--weapons with absolutely no military value.
On the surface, missile defense seems enticing--prevent the delivery of nuclear weapons and prevent nuclear war. But in reality, it's useless.
Their commitment to bilateral nuclear arms reductions dominated the headlines, but presidents Obama and Medvedev found additional common ground in Moscow that also should improve U.S.-Russian relations.
Inevitably, some analysts will use Pyongyang's nuclear test to question the feasibility of a nuclear-weapon-free world. But they're missing the point--a world full of nuclear weapons hasn't deterred North Korea either.
It's encouraging that Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev want to further limit the size of their nuclear arsenals, but any new treaty they formulate must also include strict verification measures.
By voluntarily subscribing to START reporting processes, France and Britain could keep the pressure on Russia and the United States to reduce their nuclear forces.
Hopes are high for a new U.S.-Russian arms control agreement, but in the meantime, Moscow is continuing to develop new weapons programs that will only complicate such an accord.
To achieve the next step in the disarmament process, Washington and Moscow will need to overcome three major points of disagreement. Here's how they can do it.
A new administration means a new opportunity to forge a U.S.-Russian missile defense cooperative in Europe. Getting there won't be easy, but it's not impossible.
Although much maligned among arms control advocates, the U.S.-India nuclear deal might actually provide an opportunity to strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty regime.
To prevent future conflicts such as the recent fighting in Georgia from developing, Washington and Moscow must build an equitable and trusting partnership.
The program that turns Russian highly enriched uranium into U.S. electricity isn't as significant a boon to nonproliferation as advertised.
Presumptive Republican presidential nominee John McCain wants a new arms control agreement with Moscow. Whether he can secure such a pact is another matter.
From the moment Washington and Moscow announced their "123 agreement," the pact has been attacked from all sides. But its opponents are misguided.
In theory, the idea of providing fuel for new nuclear power plants seems like a good way to stem weapons proliferation. But then there are the practicalities.
Washington's decision to use a missile-defense interceptor to destroy a disabled spy satellite in space came at a high political cost but minimal military gain.
Prideful talk of new missiles, submarines, and bombers actually reveals weak Russian leadership and a stubborn military-industrial complex that's preparing to fight yesterday's wars.