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Pavel Podvig

What to do about tactical nuclear weapons

Washington and Moscow shouldn't try to find a place for tactical nuclear weapons in the overall balance of their relationship. Instead, the two countries should take them for what they are--weapons with absolutely no military value.

The false promise of missile defense

On the surface, missile defense seems enticing--prevent the delivery of nuclear weapons and prevent nuclear war. But in reality, it's useless.

The Moscow summit: A positive first step

Their commitment to bilateral nuclear arms reductions dominated the headlines, but presidents Obama and Medvedev found additional common ground in Moscow that also should improve U.S.-Russian relations.

What if North Korea were the only nuclear weapon state?

Inevitably, some analysts will use Pyongyang's nuclear test to question the feasibility of a nuclear-weapon-free world. But they're missing the point--a world full of nuclear weapons hasn't deterred North Korea either.

Reaction to the Obama-Medvedev joint statement on arms control

It's encouraging that Barack Obama and Dmitry Medvedev want to further limit the size of their nuclear arsenals, but any new treaty they formulate must also include strict verification measures.

Broadening the disarmament agenda through START

By voluntarily subscribing to START reporting processes, France and Britain could keep the pressure on Russia and the United States to reduce their nuclear forces.

Russia's new arms development

Hopes are high for a new U.S.-Russian arms control agreement, but in the meantime, Moscow is continuing to develop new weapons programs that will only complicate such an accord.

Formulating the next U.S.-Russian arms control agreement

To achieve the next step in the disarmament process, Washington and Moscow will need to overcome three major points of disagreement. Here's how they can do it.

Barack Obama's missile defense challenge

A new administration means a new opportunity to forge a U.S.-Russian missile defense cooperative in Europe. Getting there won't be easy, but it's not impossible.

A silver lining to the U.S.-India nuclear deal

Although much maligned among arms control advocates, the U.S.-India nuclear deal might actually provide an opportunity to strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty regime.

U.S.-Russian relations after the conflict in Georgia

To prevent future conflicts such as the recent fighting in Georgia from developing, Washington and Moscow must build an equitable and trusting partnership.

The fallacy of the Megatons to Megawatts program

The program that turns Russian highly enriched uranium into U.S. electricity isn't as significant a boon to nonproliferation as advertised.

The push for a new arms control agreement with Russia is ill-conceived

Presumptive Republican presidential nominee John McCain wants a new arms control agreement with Moscow. Whether he can secure such a pact is another matter.

Don't block U.S.-Russian nuclear cooperation

From the moment Washington and Moscow announced their "123 agreement," the pact has been attacked from all sides. But its opponents are misguided.

The realities of nuclear fuel supply guarantees

In theory, the idea of providing fuel for new nuclear power plants seems like a good way to stem weapons proliferation. But then there are the practicalities.

The U.S. satellite shootdown: An unnecessary action

Washington's decision to use a missile-defense interceptor to destroy a disabled spy satellite in space came at a high political cost but minimal military gain.

The truth about Russia's military "resurgence"

Prideful talk of new missiles, submarines, and bombers actually reveals weak Russian leadership and a stubborn military-industrial complex that's preparing to fight yesterday's wars.

How Russia's nuclear fuel delivery to Iran benefits nonproliferation

By supplying Iran with nuclear reactor fuel, Moscow might have taken an important step in preventing countries interested in nuclear power from enriching uranium indigenously.

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Pavel Podvig (Profile Image)

Pavel Podvig

A physicist trained at the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, Podvig works as a research associate at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation. His expertise is in the Russian nuclear arsenal, U.S.-Russian relations, and nonproliferation. In 1995, he headed the Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces Research Project, editing the project’s eponymous book, which provides an overview of the Soviet and Russian strategic forces and the technical capabilities of Russia's strategic weapon systems. His blog, "Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces," updates this information in real time.

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