China and the United States need a framework for nuclear arms control. It isn’t New START

Editor’s note: This article belongs to a two-part series about addressing the nuclear arms control trilemma. Read the second article in the series.

The extended New START arms control agreement between the United States and Russia will expire in February. The treaty limits the number of strategic nuclear weapons that both countries can launch immediately, and it establishes arrangements for data exchange and verification. The treaty has helped reduce the risk of nuclear confrontation and build trust.

During President Donald Trump’s first term, the US government requested China’s participation in trilateral nuclear arms control discussions between the United States, Russia, and China to determine the future of New START. This may give people hope that China’s participation would encourage the Trump administration now to take New START or a new follow-up document more seriously. However, while the effort to save New START is commendable, this approach seems unlikely to succeed.

US empty promises. During President Trump’s first term, the US government announced that it would invite China to participate in consultations on New START. The government also stated that China should participate in future nuclear disarmament negotiations between the United States and Russia. But extending the hand to China may not have been the Trump administration’s true intention.

At a press conference in August 2020, journalists repeatedly asked the US Special Presidential Envoy for Arms Control, Ambassador Marshall Billingslea, about the conceptual framework for China’s participation in nuclear disarmament negotiations. Billingslea avoided addressing specific details, and despite China’s absence, US organizers placed the Chinese flag on the negotiation table—even though they were unable to provide the expected negotiation framework. One interpretation is that the Trump administration was probably not serious about engaging in nuclear disarmament negotiations with China. If it were, US officials would have outlined the issues they hoped to discuss ahead of the negotiations. The US government’s invitation to China was therefore interpreted as merely intended to embarrass China.

If China rejects a US-led arms control initiative, the US administration will use this as an excuse to oppose it, too. Conversely, if China actively promotes an arms control initiative, it will not encourage the United States to accept it because it would not be on Washington’s terms.

Consider the issue of no-first-use of nuclear weapons: During his 2019 presidential campaign, Joe Biden stated that he would consider declaring that the sole purpose of US nuclear weapons is to deter and retaliate against nuclear attacks, which essentially means adopting a no-first-use policy. But after winning the election, Biden did not follow up on his promise, despite China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs repeatedly proposing negotiations on the issue. Biden’s four-year tenure delivered no progress on the policy of the sole purpose of nuclear weapons.

Another example is the United Nations’ Arms Trade Treaty. During his first term, President Trump announced that the United States would withdraw from the treaty. Subsequently, China did join the treaty, but the US government did not consider returning to it.

These two examples illustrate how China’s involvement in arms control would not necessarily prompt the United States to adopt a proactive negotiating stance on the issues. In that context, it is simply unrealistic to expect China to facilitate the renewal of New START or help negotiate a successor agreement between the United States and Russia without Washington being ready to engage in any serious arms control talks with Beijing.

Arms control or disarmament? New START limits the number of nuclear warheads on operationally deployed strategic delivery systems in the United States and Russia to 1,550. According to the latest statistics, the United States currently possesses 1,770 operationally deployed nuclear warheads, while Russia has 1,718. In contrast, China currently possesses only 24 deployed nuclear weapons. If the New START counting rules were applied, China’s nuclear arsenal would be two orders of magnitude smaller than those of the United States and Russia and one order of magnitude smaller than those of the United Kingdom (120) and France (280). Therefore, if China were to be included in New START or a successor treaty, it would be unfair and unreasonable. Such a treaty would solidify the United States’ and Russia’s significant nuclear weapons advantage over China.

By this logic, and that of the New START counting rules, the prospect of the United States, Russia, and China negotiating a new treaty is completely unimaginable. Reducing the number of deployed nuclear weapons in the United States and Russia to China’s level might seem like a good outcome for a new treaty. However, the United States and Russia are not prepared for such radical nuclear disarmament, with both countries well-engaged in their respective decades-long modernization. On the other hand, increasing China’s deployed nuclear weapons to a level comparable to that of the United States and Russia would no longer constitute nuclear disarmament. New START’s counting rules are difficult to apply to the different situations of the United States, Russia, and China simultaneously. Therefore, promoting multilateral nuclear disarmament under this framework is not feasible—and Ambassador Billingslea knew this when he remained silent on a possible conceptual framework during the press conference.

Missile defense. Given the already significant gap in the number of nuclear weapons between China and the United States, the Trump administration has now proposed to establish the Golden Dome missile defense system, which could worsen China’s concerns over its nuclear retaliatory capability. The US government has publicly stated that it will deploy interceptors of various types (including in outer space) to counter adversaries. Assuming it can come to fruition despite the many challenges, this new missile defense capability will inevitably create new obstacles to nuclear disarmament.

The development of Golden Dome could undermine China’s nuclear retaliation capabilities, which have always been a serious security concern for China. Since withdrawing from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002, the United States has always explained that its homeland missile defense system was not targeted at China. Now, for the first time, the Trump administration says its Golden Dome missile defense system seeks to counter both peer and near-peer adversaries, namely Russia and China. This announcement has put an end to past debates over the intent and capability of US missile defense systems and opened a new one. The Golden Dome announcement has intensified China’s concerns about the threat the US missile defense poses to strategic stability. If missile defense capabilities in the United States are not subject to limitations, China, therefore, cannot accept restrictions on the number of its deployed nuclear weapons.

The Golden Dome program revives the concept of space-based interceptors. If these systems are included in the Golden Dome program, they could strike missiles in flight and would have greater capabilities for attacking satellites in low Earth orbit. If implemented, the Golden Dome program would allow the United States to deploy space-based anti-satellite capabilities on a large scale under the disguise of missile defense, therefore turning outer space into a potential new confrontational front. China has consistently opposed the weaponization of outer space and repeatedly proposed negotiations on preventing an arms race in outer space at the UN General Assembly and the Conference on Disarmament. Now, the Trump administration is openly planning to deploy weapons in outer space, which is completely at odds with China’s arms control stance. This is yet another diplomatic obstacle to arms control efforts involving China and the United States.

Restoring arms control diplomacy. Despite the many challenges just outlined, China, the United States, and other countries have a mutual interest in advancing arms control diplomacy. This is conducive to stabilizing security relations between China and the United States as well as other nuclear-weapon states, thereby reducing the risks of nuclear conflict and confrontation.

To build trust, the United States and China should focus their diplomatic efforts on addressing less difficult issues first, before considering more difficult ones. In February, President Trump expressed his interest in pursuing nuclear arms control negotiations with Russia and China. “Let’s cut our military budget in half,” Trump said. Reducing military costs is also one of the objectives of arms control, and it is a venue worth exploring in any US-China diplomatic talks. Of course, specific issues such as which countries should participate, which areas of military spending should be reduced, and by how much, all warrant further detailed discussion.

But several points are worth noting in President Trump’s proposal to cut military spending. First, this initiative is at least nominally President Trump’s brainchild, making it easier for the current US administration and Congress to accept. Discussions on military spending may also not need to involve the complex counting rules of New START. Therefore, the five nuclear-weapon states, and even some other countries, shall be allowed to participate. Finally, discussion over reducing military spending could potentially cover not only nuclear weapons systems but also systems like the Golden Dome that impact strategic stability. Spending reductions in costly programs that are creating new threats would seem a fair and reasonable discussion point.

Another idea worth considering: The leaders of the five treaty-acknowledged nuclear-weapon states could issue a joint declaration stating that they will strive to curb military spending. On this basis, technical experts from these countries could further explore steps forward. This focus may not be entirely consistent with our previous experience of arms control, but it may represent a new path worth trying in a multipolar world.