Chernobyl, Fukushima, and preparedness for a “next one”

A disaster is an event of unanticipated severity and scale that causes damage too great to allow quick recovery. It poses dangers that do not remain within a manageable range. Otherwise, a disaster would not be a disaster—only a crisis.

The key to handling disasters, therefore, is to anticipate—and prepare for—the worst. Fortunately, as science and technology have advanced, so too has human capacity to anticipate and respond to disasters. Nature continues to produce extreme environmental events. But today, the hazardous activities in which human beings engage are generally designed with emergency preparedness and response in mind.

Producing nuclear power is one such activity, but in more than 60 years of operations at power reactors—16,000 cumulative reactor-years—the nuclear industry has witnessed only two disasters, at Chernobyl and Fukushima. And only Chernobyl resulted in fatalities—30 very soon after the event and about two dozen more in the years since, with additional deaths projected in the long term. What these figures indicate is that the nuclear industry attaches due importance to the safety of reactor operations. It well recognizes that even two disasters in six decades, only one of them involving fatalities, have been sufficient to create negative public perceptions of nuclear power!

There are three primary ways to address this issue. First, the safety of reactor operations can continually be improved. Second, better emergency preparedness and response can be instituted. Third, improvements on both fronts can be communicated to the public. Both the Chernobyl and Fukushima disasters rendered important lessons along all three of these dimensions—but the focus here is improved disaster preparedness since the 1980s.

The improvement has been substantive. Chernobyl led to the creation of an international legal framework for emergency preparedness and response, as well as a set of related regulatory processes and official guidelines. Implementing all this is a question of national responsibility. But implementation proceeds in accordance with international benchmarks that were largely created after Chernobyl, and in some cases revised after Fukushima.

Steps taken. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has been the lead agency in establishing conventions that specify guidelines for handling emergencies. After Chernobyl, the first such instrument to be adopted was the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident. Because Chernobyl had made the transboundary implications of nuclear disasters quite conspicuous, nations brought the Convention into force quickly—by the end of October 1986. The Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency was adopted simultaneously, though it did not enter into force until the next year. Both instruments placed specific obligations on states parties, and on the IAEA, to establish arrangements for nuclear or radiological emergencies. These obligations are strengthened by two later conventions—the Convention on Nuclear Safety and the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management. These four conventions cover quite a wide range of nuclear activities.

Over the years, the IAEA has published a series of safety standards meant to enhance national arrangements for safety, preparedness, and response at nuclear power plants. The agency also works to ensure the compatibility of national, bilateral, regional, and international mechanisms and procedures for disaster response. After Fukushima, the agency's General Safety Requirements were revised to incorporate lessons newly learned. This led to publication of "Preparedness and Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency," a document recommending standards for preparedness and response. Nations can enforce these standards by adopting legislation and regulations; assigning responsibilities to nuclear operators and national and local officials; and establishing regulatory frameworks through which effective implementation can be verified.

But the IAEA is by no means the only agency involved in improving disaster preparedness. In 1986, the Inter-Agency Committee on Radiological and Nuclear Emergencies was created in recognition that cooperation and coordination among agencies is extremely important. Eighteen organizations are part of this mechanism, and they are as diverse as the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization, the World Health Organization, and the International Civil Aviation Organization. The Committee has created a Joint Radiation Emergency Management Plan to harmonize international standards for emergency preparedness and response. The Plan allows for a common understanding of participating organizations' roles, responsibilities, and capabilities—and also provides an overall concept of the group's operations so that quick, coordinated responses are possible.

Steps still to take. After Fukushima, nearly all countries operating nuclear reactors undertook reviews of their emergency response systems—and the Japanese government and the IAEA produced reports highlighting several ways in which emergency preparedness could be improved. One such recommendation is that, during an emergency, public officials must have quick access to informed scientific opinion and expert judgment so they can make good decisions in extreme time pressure. Certain errors committed during the Fukushima emergency—regarding the timing and extent of evacuations, for example—might have been avoided if officials had had better advice.

A second recommendation is that officials be given the resources to correctly classify the severity of an incident as it occurs. That way, the correct set of standard operating procedures can be activated at the earliest possible moment. Classifying an incident as less severe than it really is—or more—can squander precious time and credibility. Third, the provision of accurate information at all levels is crucial. If operators, for example, attempt to conceal an accident (or its extent) from national or international authorities, an appropriate response is only delayed. At Chernobyl, for example, only limited evacuations from the affected area were ordered—and only after 36 hours had passed. To be sure, Chernobyl's immediate fatalities remained very limited compared to many non-nuclear emergencies. But the disaster was felt across the physical, socioeconomic, political, and psychological spectrum of countries in the region. These effects could have been reduced if accurate information had been available. Finally, emergency capabilities must be coordinated across the local, state, and national levels. But this is only possible if operators conduct periodic drills involving all relevant entities and if deficiencies are conscientiously rectified.

Choosing, preparing. Energy is the essence of human progress. For countries seeking an energy-rich future, nuclear power is one of many options. Nations will make their own sovereign choices, based on their own calculations, about nuclear power. Countries that opt for nuclear power well understand that a great deal of legal and regulatory infrastructure is required if they are to operate nuclear sectors safely and sustainably. One element of this infrastructure is emergency preparedness and response. It is incumbent on nations to continually improve their capacity for disaster management. Fortunately, international mechanisms for, and national efforts at, disaster preparedness are making this task progressively easier.

Nuclear energy accounts for about 11 percent of world electricity production, and this share is likely to increase over the medium term as the world seeks to limit carbon dioxide in the atmosphere and thereby mitigate climate change. But since the Fukushima accident, global expansion of nuclear energy has slowed—just as it did after the Chernobyl disaster. Accidents at power reactors, even when their severity is limited, can create in the public an unjustified phobia about nuclear energy.

The Chernobyl disaster of 1986 was caused by factors including a flawed reactor design, insufficient training of plant operators, and a lack of nuclear safety culture. About 30 people died soon after the explosion as a consequence of acute radiation syndrome, and the death toll has since risen to 56 or so. Any premature death is regrettable. But Chernobyl mobilized scientists and engineers to improve electronic control of reactor operations. It led to improved instruction in nuclear safety culture. The probability of another accident similar to Chernobyl now appears very low.

The world's second major nuclear accident, 25 years after the first, was the Fukushima disaster of five years ago. In this case the cause was external events—a high-magnitude earthquake and tsunami. No deaths related to radiation were reported, though quite a few deaths can be attributed to anxiety or other psychological effects. Of the 160,000 people who were displaced from the accident area, about 60,000 have returned to their homes and others are returning slowly.

The global nuclear community is still learning the lessons of Fukushima. But it is already using those lessons to prevent future accidents. When new power plants are designed, severe external hazards are now being taken into account. Substitutes are being developed for components that failed at Fukushima. Mobile systems have been developed to provide electricity or cooling water to power plants when their own systems fail. Many countries have subjected their nuclear power installations to stress tests, and many have reviewed their legal and safety frameworks. Under the leadership of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), international safety standards have been strengthened. Networks of regulators, operators, and vendors have been established at the international, regional, and sub-regional levels to enhance the global nuclear safety regime. International conferences have been organized with a focus on understanding the origins and harmful effects of the Fukushima accident. As a result, nuclear power plants around the world are receiving improved guidance for strengthening their safety measures.

So both the Chernobyl and Fukushima accidents have provided lessons that are improving nuclear safety. And the international nuclear community is making consistent, effective efforts to avert loss of human life (even though it is impossible to exclude that possibility in the event of a severe nuclear accident). Yet space exists for further improvement. International cooperation among nuclear power plant operators should be enhanced. More nations should participate in the international peer reviews of nuclear installations that the IAEA's board of governors recommended in a 2011 action plan. These missions are a good step toward enhancing safety culture and winning public acceptance of nuclear energy—and toward improving emergency preparedness and response.

Global harmonization. Indeed, where preparedness and response for nuclear and radiological accidents are concerned, the IAEA has already developed specific safety standards. But there is still a need to harmonize approaches to emergency preparedness and response around the world. Each country, whether it uses nuclear power or not, should continuously develop and maintain its response capabilities at all levels, taking into account the harm that nuclear or radiological accidents can cause to individuals and the environment in other countries, whether neighboring or far away.

In many developing countries, such as my own Cameroon, the greatest cause for concern is emergencies involving radioactive sources. These emergencies could include sabotage at nuclear installations, theft or loss of radioactive sources, and accidents during the transport of radioactive materials. But then, whenever nuclear or radiological accidents occur, standards for emergency preparedness are reviewed to ensure that any such events in the future remain controlled. The international nuclear community is quite aware of the need to continuously improve the management of nuclear accidents and mitigate negative consequences for human beings and the environment.

The IAEA, to improve member states' preparedness for nuclear and radiological accidents, recently launched a new web-based tool, the Emergency Preparedness and Response Information Management System—a "self-assessment tool" that Elena Buglova, head of the IAEA’s Incident and Emergency Centre, believes "will make an important contribution to preparedness levels of member states." It is also worth recalling that the agency, according to the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, has specific responsibilities "with regard to assisting states in developing their own preparedness arrangements for nuclear and radiological emergencies."

It is also vital for effective emergency response that technical information about nuclear power plants and accidents be shared widely. Operators, regulators, vendors—all the stakeholders in nuclear industries—can only make appropriate contributions to the management of accidents if they have access to the same information. Effective emergency preparedness requires a global outlook.

Change of course. Nuclear energy deserves a high-priority position in the global strategy for establishing sustainable energy systems. According to the International Energy Agency and the Nuclear Energy Agency, global nuclear capacity must double by 2050, and nuclear energy must supply 17 percent of overall electricity production, if global warming is to be limited to 2 degrees above pre-industrial levels. Many politicians today promise to exclude nuclear energy from their countries' electricity mix. But it's almost certain that they'll change course very soon—embracing nuclear power because it is among the most reliable and sustainable options for electricity supply.

April 26 marks the 30th anniversary of the Chernobyl disaster, and those old enough to remember the event can recall the explosion, the evacuation, and the dread. But they rarely remember an immense milestone in the response to the disaster: the completion in November 1986 of a concrete encasement of Chernobyl's reactor number four. Workers drawn from all across the Soviet Union built this "sarcophagus" under extreme radiological conditions, on the ruins of the destroyed reactor. They used unimaginable amounts of concrete—and a great deal of imagination. This concrete mausoleum has held up, with some assistance, for 30 years now. (A larger containment structure that will fit over the existing sarcophagus is now being built.)

Over the years, as the ranks of those who responded to Chernobyl have thinned, new generations of nuclear professionals have been trained to prevent another disaster. Their training has emphasized "safety culture." This, along with "inherently safe designs," was going to guarantee an accident-free nuclear future. For a while, it seemed as if the world was on the verge of forgetting forever what responding to a nuclear emergency really required. Then, in March 2011, multiple reactors at one of the world's largest nuclear power plants melted down as a consequence of a massive earthquake, a tsunami, and a sustained power outage.

As a student of the Soviet nuclear power program and the Chernobyl disaster, it was painful for me to watch the blame game that played out immediately after Fukushima. Almost to the letter, the Chernobyl "script" was followed. First, the plant's operators were blamed. Then the reactor design was at fault. Finally, it was the turn of the national nuclear regulatory structure. "Culture," of course, received a great deal of blame as well.

But while Chernobyl could ultimately be dismissed as a Soviet-made disaster that "could never happen here"—wherever "here" happened to be—Fukushima has not allowed such steadfast denial. Indeed, Fukushima has proved the death knell for a nuclear safety philosophy that focused exclusively on preventing accidents. Disaster preparedness and response were given scant attention in the years between Chernobyl and Fukushima, but now they have been added to the vocabulary of the world's nuclear industries. Curiously, however, this shift is only partial. Disaster prevention retains the greatest emphasis; preparedness is sometimes treated adequately; but resources (and imagination) devoted to actual response strategies remain limited.

The "lessons learned" from Fukushima—and new reports on these lessons continue to be published—focus predominantly on technical and legal fixes, organizational reform, and liability concerns. In the United States, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission responded to Fukushima by overhauling its rules and guidelines for accident prevention, preparedness, and response. The US nuclear industry, meanwhile, implemented "FLEX," a program designed to provide nuclear reactors in distress with hardware such as extra pumps and generators, both on site and stored at regional centers. In Europe, power reactors were subjected to "stress tests" after Fukushima, and these tests sparked conversation among nations hosting nuclear power reactors about harmonizing, if only loosely, national regulations concerning natural (and other) hazards to nuclear power plants.

Steps such as these go in the right direction. But emphasizing prevention and preparedness over response ignores a simple fact: Nuclear disasters tend to exceed people's worst expectations. There is a good reason that the nuclear industry refers to disasters as "beyond design-basis accidents"—only a limited number of scenarios can be anticipated and prepared for. Disasters, therefore, require the development of creative, skill-based, and team-based response strategies (along with strenuous efforts to avoid disasters entirely).

Training for emergency responders in general tends to emphasize flexibility and imagination, with a premium placed on performing quick assessments and triage in unprecedented situations. But in nuclear emergency response training, the situation is different. The nuclear industry seems deeply troubled by using human imagination to address situations that go "beyond the checklist." In Europe and the United States, at least—I can't speak for the entire world—the nuclear industry seems hung up on the idea of control. There is a plan for every conceivable situation. Should plans fail, there are more plans. Staff are trained to follow procedures and execute instructions. If they don't, that's always bad.

Such an approach, as documented by the anthropologist Constance Perin, fundamentally fails to acknowledge the messiness of operating imperfect, real-world technologies (and all technologies are imperfect). Worse yet, it incapacitates an aspect of creativity that, though it's more often associated with jazz, can be tremendously important in nuclear emergencies: improvisation. In music, improvisation calls to mind wild, random, and perhaps solitary acts. But if emphasized in training for nuclear emergencies, the metaphor of improvisation can help prepare responders to pursue skill-based, team-oriented, and highly organized actions under challenging conditions.

In any disaster, improvisation occurs. It happened at Chernobyl, even if creative imagination was thoroughly expunged from all written reports. Improvisation happened at Fukushima, and in fact a lot more improvisation will be necessary if the Fukushima disaster is ever to "end." It is tempting to remember creative action only when it fails. Making this mistake locks in a mindset of control and controllability. Any such mindset will be exploded—yet again—by the next nuclear emergency.