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New START

Russian President Vladimir Putin and US President Donald Trump meet on the sidelines of a G20 meeting in Hamburg on July 7, 2017. Credit: Kremlin Presidential Executive Office.

New START: A timeline of inaction and disingenuous proposals

By Shannon Bugos | Multimedia, Nuclear Weapons

Science diplomacy: The essential interdisciplinary approach

By Rose Gottemoeller | Nuclear Risk, Nuclear Weapons

Joe Biden and Kamala Harris at a fundraiser in August 2020.

Here’s what to expect from Biden on top nuclear weapons issues

By Sara Z. Kutchesfahani | Columnists, Nuclear Risk

A small Chinese flag placed in front of an empty chair.

“What about China?” and the threat to US–Russian nuclear arms control

By David M. Allison, Stephen Herzog | Nuclear Weapons

A small Chinese flag placed in front of an empty chair.

Three arms control negotiators walk into a café…

By Sara Z. Kutchesfahani | Nuclear Weapons

A small Chinese flag placed in front of an empty chair.

“What about China?” and the threat to US–Russian nuclear arms control

By David M. Allison, Stephen Herzog | Nuclear Weapons

Presidents Obama and Medvedev sign New START in 2010.

Extend arms control for a safer future

By Science and Security Board | Analysis, Nuclear Risk, Nuclear Weapons

Then-US President Barack Obama and then-Russian President Dmitry Medvedev issue a joint statement announcing their pursuit of a New START treaty in London in April 2009. (White House photo by Pete Souza.)

The New START verification regime: How good is it?

By Rose Gottemoeller | Analysis, Nuclear Weapons

The US military tests a missile in the ocean.

Pandemic spending will force US defense budget cuts—some of which should come from nuclear weapons programs

By Lawrence J. Korb | Analysis, Nuclear Weapons

Then-US President Barack Obama and then-Russian President Dmitry Medvedev issue a joint statement announcing their pursuit of a New START treaty in London in April 2009. (White House photo by Pete Souza.)

Prevent the outbreak of another global security threat. Extend New START.

By Daryl G. Kimball | Analysis, Biosecurity, Nuclear Weapons

Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump at a 2017 G20 meeting in Hamburg.

Why US-Russian arms control can succeed even in a climate of confrontation

By Mikhail Troitskiy

Nuclear launch console.

Hot-button campaign issue: 2020 Democrats disagree on nuclear launch authority

By John Krzyzaniak | Analysis, Nuclear Weapons

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