The Saudi-Pakistani ‘strategic mutual defense’ pact that no one saw coming

Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed a mutual defense pact in September stipulating that “any aggression against either country shall be considered an aggression against both.” The announcement sparked confusion after Pakistan’s Defense Minister Khawaja Mohammad Asif suggested that the pact, which cements a long-standing relationship between the two countries, included a nuclear umbrella. Although Asif later retracted his comment, whether Pakistan has extended a nuclear umbrella to Saudi Arabia remains unclear.

The Pakistan-Saudi Arabia pact signals to Washington the kingdom’s discontent over flailing US security guarantees, and its willingness to use strategic ambiguity, as the need to counterbalance Israel and Iran heightens.

Increasing regional security concerns. Many media outlets depicted Israel’s missile strikes in Qatar earlier in September, which targeted Hamas political leaders, as the trigger for the pact. Israel’s blatant violation of Qatar’s sovereignty, one of the major US allies in the region, deeply rattled the Gulf monarchies, traditionally shielded from regional turbulences.

Despite being officially neutral in the war between Iran and Israel, the Gulf countries, and Qatar in particular, found themselves dragged into the conflict when Iran retaliated for US attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities by attacking the US Al Udeid Air base near Doha, although with little damage and only after giving Washington early notice. Saudi Arabia’s security was also put at risk, albeit unintentionally, in September as two Houthi ballistic missiles aimed at Israel broke apart mid-flight over Saudi territory.

While Israel’s increasing boldness and growing hegemony in the region certainly worry the Gulf monarchies, it is hard to believe that the Pakistan-Saudi pact was a direct product of the attacks on Qatari territory. An agreement of this magnitude would ordinarily take months, or even years, to negotiate. That said, the timing of the pact sends a message to the unleashed Israeli government. But most of all, it results from a mounting perception that the United States had abandoned the region, a fear that first solidified following Washington’s mild reaction to Houthi attacks on Saudi oil facilities in 2019.

The Saudis’ fear of US disengagement from the region has pushed Riyadh to address the question of strategic autonomy and to diversify its partnerships, in part by turning to China, which has replaced Washington as the kingdom’s main trade partner. In 2023, China successfully brokered the 2023 Iranian-Saudi Arabia détente. This agreement proved to be resilient after the October 7 attacks against Israel, changing the frame of the relationship and shielding the kingdom from Iranian and Houthi attacks. But its limitations were also made clear when Tehran retaliated in Qatar last June, demonstrating that Iran will not hesitate to drag neighboring countries into the conflict if it can preserve its regime stability and salvage national pride.

Up until the Israeli and US strikes on Iranian facilities, Saudi Arabia was benefiting from mounting US pressure on Iran and Israel’s weakening of Iran’s proxy network. Now, Saudi Arabia fears that a new regional order—dictated by Israel and enabled by the United States—will be imposed, leaving no room for a strong Saudi position. The Saudis still recognize their reliance on the United States for security, but they are also leveraging ties with China and learning to think and act based on their national interests. The Saudi-Pakistani defense pact is proof of this search for more independence, with Washington reportedly made aware of the agreement only after it was signed. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s main priority is the success of the costly and energy-intensive Vision 2030, which heavily hinges on the kingdom’s integration in the international economy and its reputation for safety and stability, so it can attract tourists and foreign investments.

A pact that solidifies historical ties. The Saudi-Pakistani defense pact codified decades of defense partnerships sustained with financial packages benefitting Pakistan. These ties, however, never stopped Riyadh from acting according to its own interests: Despite Pakistan reportedly sending retired military officers to support Saudi Arabia in building its army, Riyadh refused to sever its ties with New Delhi in the aftermath of the 1965 war between Pakistan to India.

Even so, the course of the Saudi-Pakistani relationship was not seriously disrupted, and in 1967 the two countries formalized their partnership by signing a defense agreement focused on military training and the exchange of military advisers. Later, some of these Pakistani advisers were reportedly flying the first Royal Saudi Air Force fighter jets during a Yemeni incursion into the southern part of the kingdom. And throughout the 1970s, some 15,000 Pakistani troops were reportedly stationed in the kingdom. Then the 1978-1982 Afghan war marked the peak of the Saudi-Pakistani strategic partnership, culminating in the signature of a protocol agreement and King Fahd openly declaring that the kingdom’ security was tied to Pakistan’s during a visit to Islamabad in 1980.

Despite their close relationship, neither country stopped prioritizing its interests: In 1981, the Zia regime in Pakistan refused to support Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war despite Saudi Arabia’s request. More recently, in 2012, Pakistan refrained from participating in an Arab League plan, promoted by Saudi Arabia, that sought an intervention against the Iranian-backed Assad regime in Syria. As for Saudi Arabia, it has refrained in recent years from openly taking sides in the Kashmir conflict, as Saudi Arabia—and the Gulf countries in general—are deepening their economic ties with India, now considered Riyadh’s second largest trade partner.

Pakistan’s neutrality during the Yemen war in 2015 is often used as an example of its unreliability. But, according to a former French ambassador to Saudi Arabia, “the Saudis knew that the Pakistanis would not intervene in Yemen,”[1] given the political implications. Saudi Arabia is aware of the dichotomy between the feeble political stances made for public consumption and the long-standing military cooperation that has outlived most governments: So long as the military is in power in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia is confident that its relationship with Islamabad will remain secure. A notable example of the military’s dominance in the country is the ousting of the Pakistan People’s Party from the government following Saudi pressure, as Islamabad strained ties with the Saudi royal family by seeking closer relations with Iran.

And of course, Saudi Arabia’s deep pockets have always been a major factor in the relationship. In 2023, the kingdom signaled it would provide an $11-billion lifeline to Pakistan, as it faced default. And more recently, Riyadh indicated its willingness to invest in an oil refinery and in mining and solar projects across Pakistan. Saudi Arabia’s importance in Pakistan’s economic stability is evident, and the kingdom uses—and will continue to use—this leverage when necessary. Besides, the bolstering of its investments in Pakistan fits under the kingdom’s aim to diversify its investment base as it aims to diversify its portfolio, reducing its reliance on oil.

Prospects of a “Sunni bomb.” Islamabad takes great pride in being the first Muslim nation to have developed nuclear weapons, trumpeting this achievement as the “Islamic bomb.” Ironically, Saudi Arabia is believed to have been instrumental in financing Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, which is how the notion of nuclear sharing between the two countries first emerged.

After losing the 1971 war against India and watching India’s first nuclear test in 1974, Pakistan sought to develop a nuclear weapons program of its own. Saudi Arabia reportedly gave an annual grant of $1 billion to help develop a “Sunni bomb,” and after the United States imposed sanctions on Pakistan, the kingdom came to the rescue, supplying it with 50,000 barrels of oil per day.

Riyadh’s financial support—combined with the visit of a former Saudi defense minister in 1999 to a uranium enrichment facility and a missile production installation in Pakistan—raised the alarm bells in Washington on Saudi Arabia’s nuclear ambitions. The fear of a Pakistani nuclear umbrella was further exacerbated in 2012, as new rumors of a nuclear arrangement between the two allies surfaced and the Pakistani Ambassador to Saudi Arabia declared, “each Pakistani considers the security of Saudi Arabia as his personal matter.”

Despite these visible developments, the defense and economic partnership between the two Sunni countries does not entirely explain why Pakistan would risk attracting US retaliation on an already feeble economy by providing the Saudis with nuclear assurances or even placing nuclear warheads on Saudi soil.

Pakistan’s nuclear posture revolves entirely around India. The extent to which it is worried about Iran involves a lens that sees an Indian-Iranian rapprochement as a move to encircle Pakistan. Some even posit that Iran’s cooperation with Pakistan is crucial to mitigating militant movements in Pakistan’s province of Baluchistan. Therefore, transferring nuclear bombs to Saudi Arabia would be strategically counterproductive: It would open a second strategic front and make Pakistan a de facto player in the Iranian-Saudi rivalry. This, in turn, would force Pakistan to divert critical resources from its primary focus on India to the Gulf.

Perhaps the only strategic advantage for Pakistan to extend its nuclear deterrent to Saudi Arabia concerns its second-strike capability: By creating strategic depth and remaining in control of warheads that might be (but so far have not been) stationed in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan would strengthen its second-strike capabilities, acquiring a strategic reserve outside the country, shielded during a direct conflict with India.

However, some experts assess that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal—currently estimated at 170 warheads—that covers both Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Through its nuclear weapons program, Pakistan aims to uphold a “minimal deterrent,” not only to counter India’s growing stockpile of nuclear materials, but also to keep India’s conventional capabilities in check. Transferring a portion of its nuclear stockpile to the Saudis would aggravate Pakistan’s strategic dilemma instead of alleviating it.

International backlash. Islamabad would probably face severe international repercussions if it extended its nuclear deterrence to another country—a first for a nuclear-weapon state outside the five countries recognized by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Ever since the 9/11 attacks, Washington has wavered between treating Pakistan as an ally or an adversary. A transfer of nuclear forces to Saudi Arabia would likely settle the balance in favor of the latter, triggering a cascade of sanctions, with the United States using its leverage over the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank to curtail support to Pakistan, throwing it into a major financial and economic crisis.

Seeking the bomb would weaken the kingdom’s legitimacy as it aspires to position itself as a leader of the Arab world. Given the negative possibilities associated with a Saudi bomb, it is plausible that Saudi Arabia is already satisfied with the strategic ambiguity its pact with Pakistan has created, suggesting the possibility of nuclear retaliation over the heads of Iranian and Israeli officials, without going the extra mile of hosting warheads in its territory.

As the value of US security guarantees appears to weaken in the eyes of the Gulf monarchies, the Saudi-Pakistani defense pact aims to prove to Washington that Riyadh is willing to diversify its partnerships and reduce its dependence on the United States for its security. This defense agreement is more likely a symbolic reinforcement of a long-standing partnership than a NATO-like agreement, with unconditional war guarantees and obliged military intervention. The pact also arguably sends a strong political message of solidarity between the two Sunni countries, especially to Iran and Israel.

In an evolving multipolar environment, countries are increasingly hedging through a diversification of partnerships. Israel’s growing hegemony and its lack of accountability are accelerating this behavior in the Middle East at large, as demonstrated by the Saudi-Pakistani defense pact and the first joint Egyptian-Turkish naval exercise in a decade. Washington will have to limit Israeli actions and demonstrate its commitment to the Gulf monarchies’ security concerns if it hopes to prevent further alienation and a deepening of ties with Beijing. President Trump took a first step in that direction this week by signing an Executive Order about guaranteeing the defense and security of Qatar, which uses language similar to NATO’s Article 5—a first in the region.

Notes

[1] Bertrand Besancenot, Former French Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, interview with author (July 8, 2022)