Pakistan continues to slowly modernize its nuclear arsenal with improved and new delivery systems, and a growing fissile material production industry. Analysis of commercial satellite images of construction at Pakistani army garrisons and air force bases shows what appear to be newer launchers and facilities that might be related to Pakistan’s nuclear forces, although authoritative information about Pakistan’s nuclear units is scarce.

We estimate that Pakistan has produced a nuclear weapons stockpile of approximately 170 warheads, which is unchanged since our last estimate in 2023 (see Table 1). The US Defense Intelligence Agency projected in 1999 that Pakistan would have 60 to 80 warheads by 2020 (US Defense Intelligence Agency (1999, 38), but several new weapon systems have been fielded and developed since then, which leads us to a higher estimate. Our estimate comes with considerable uncertainty because neither Pakistan nor other countries publish much information about the Pakistani nuclear arsenal.

With several new delivery systems in development, four plutonium production reactors, and an expanding uranium enrichment infrastructure, Pakistan’s stockpile has the potential to increase further over the next several years. The size of this increase will depend on several factors, including how many nuclear-capable launchers Pakistan plans to deploy, how its nuclear strategy evolves, and how much the Indian nuclear arsenal grows. We estimate that the country’s stockpile could potentially grow to around 200 warheads by the late 2020s. But unless India significantly expands its arsenal or further builds up its conventional forces, it seems reasonable to expect that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal will not grow significantly, but might level off as its current weapons programs are completed.

Research methodology and confidence

The estimates and analyses in this Nuclear Notebook are derived from a combination of open sources: (1) state-originating data (e.g. government statements, declassified documents, budgetary information, and military parades); (2) non-state-originating data (e.g. media reports, think tank analysis, and industry publications); and (3) commercial satellite imagery. Because each one of these sources provides different and limited information that is subject to varying degrees of uncertainty, we cross-check each data point using multiple sources and supplementing them with private conversations with officials whenever possible.

Analyzing Pakistan’s nuclear forces is particularly fraught with uncertainty, given the lack of official state-originating data. The Pakistani government has never publicly disclosed the size of its arsenal and does not typically comment on its nuclear doctrine. Unlike some other nuclear-armed states, Pakistan does not regularly publish any official documentation explaining the contours of its nuclear posture or doctrine. Whenever such details emerge in the public discourse, they usually originate from retired officials commenting in their personal capacities. The most regular official source on Pakistani nuclear weapons is the Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR), the media wing of the Pakistan Armed Forces, which publishes regular press releases for missile launches and occasionally couples them with launch videos.

Occasionally, other countries offer official statements or analysis about Pakistan’s nuclear forces. For example, the US Air Force’s ballistic and cruise missile threat reports include analyses of Pakistani missile forces. As Pakistan’s regional competitor, Indian officials also occasionally make statements about Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, although such statements must be taken with a grain of salt as they are often politically motivated. Similarly, Indian media sources often either exaggerate or minimize the characteristics of Pakistan’s arsenal, depending on the desired effect and audience. Pakistani media is also prone to frequent embellishment when describing the country’s arsenal. There are very few publications that researchers can turn to for reliable information about Pakistan’s nuclear forces, and every rumor must be carefully investigated.

Given the absence of reliable data, commercial satellite imagery has become a particularly critical resource for analyzing Pakistan’s nuclear forces. Satellite imagery makes it possible to identify air, missile, and navy bases, as well as potential underground facilities. The greatest challenge of analyzing Pakistani nuclear forces with satellite imagery is the lack of reliable data with which to cross-check information revealed by images, particularly with regard to whether certain military bases are associated with nuclear or conventional strike missions, or both.

Overall, the lack of accurate data about Pakistan’s nuclear forces results in a lower degree of confidence in this Nuclear Notebook issue’s estimates relative to those of most other nuclear-armed countries.

Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine

Pakistan has historically maintained a deliberately ambiguous nuclear doctrine, including through refusal to endorse or reject a no-first-use policy. When President Asif Ali Zardari was asked in 2008 if Pakistan would adopt a no-first-use policy, he answered that “I am against nuclear warfare altogether. Most definitely.” Although he didn’t explicitly say yes, the statement was interpreted as a confirmation of such policy—and the military pushed back (NDTV 2011). However, in May 2024, Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Khalid Kidwai—the former head of and now an advisor to Pakistan’s National Command Authority, which oversees nuclear weapons development, doctrine, and employment—speaking at a Center for International Strategic Studies seminar in Islamabad, in an apparent rejection of a no-first-use policy, reportedly said “Pakistan does not have a No First Use policy, and I’ll repeat that for emphasis. Pakistan does not have a No First Use policy,” adding, “There should never ever be a doubt in anyone’s mind, friend or foe, that Pakistan’s operationally ready nuclear capability enables every Pakistani leader the liberty, the dignity and the courage to look straight into the Indian eye and never blink” (Syed 2024). This explicit rejection of a no-first-use policy by a former high-ranking Pakistani military official follows increasing debate over India’s commitment to its no-first-use policy in recent years (Kristensen et al. 2024).

Within its broader philosophy of “credible minimum deterrence,” which seeks to emphasize a defensive and limited but flexible nuclear posture, Pakistan operates under a nuclear doctrine that it calls “full spectrum deterrence.” This posture is aimed mainly at deterring India, which Pakistan identifies as its primary adversary. The belief that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons have been deterring India since the mid-1990s has solidified the value of nuclear weapons in the nation’s security calculus over the years (Kidwai 2020, 2). In May 2023, Kidwai gave a speech at the Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad (ISSI) during which he offered his description of what this doctrine entails. According to Kidwai (2023), “full spectrum deterrence” implies:

• “That Pakistan possesses the full spectrum of nuclear weapons in three categories: strategic, operational and tactical, with full range coverage of the large Indian land mass and its outlying territories; there is no place for India’s strategic weapons to hide.
• That Pakistan possesses an entire range of weapons yield coverage in terms of kilotons (kt), and the numbers strongly secured, to deter the adversary’s declared policy of massive retaliation; Pakistan’s ‘counter-massive retaliation’ can therefore be as severe if not more.
• That Pakistan retains the liberty of choosing from a full spectrum of targets in a ‘target-rich India,’ notwithstanding the indigenous Indian [ballistic missile defense] or the Russian S-400, to include counter value, counter force and battlefield targets.”

According to Kidwai, the “full spectrum” aspect of Pakistan’s deterrence posture encompasses both “horizontal” and “vertical” elements. The horizontal aspect refers to Pakistan’s nascent nuclear “triad” encompassing the Army Strategic Force Command, the Naval Strategic Force Command, and the Air Force Strategic Command. The vertical aspect refers to three tiers of destructive yield—“strategic, operational, and tactical”—as well as a range of coverage “from zero meters to 2750 kilometers,” allowing Pakistan to target the entirety of India (Kidwai 2023).

Kidwai and other former Pakistani officials have explained that this posture—particularly its non-strategic nuclear weapons—is specifically intended as a response to a perceived Indian “cold start” doctrine (Kidwai 2020). The “cold start” doctrine is an alleged plan by India for potentially launching large-scale conventional strikes or incursions into Pakistani territory without triggering Pakistani nuclear retaliation. Pakistan has reacted to this perceived doctrine by adding several short-range, lower-yield nuclear-capable weapon systems specifically designed to counter military threats below the strategic level.

An example of such a lower-yield, close-range nuclear capability is Pakistan’s Nasr (also known as Hatf-9) ballistic missile. In 2015, Kidwai stated that the Nasr was specifically “born out of a compulsion of this thing that I mentioned about some people on the other side toying with the idea of finding space for conventional war, despite Pakistan[’s] nuclear weapons” (Kidwai 2015). According to Kidwai, Pakistan’s understanding of India’s “cold start” strategy was that Delhi envisioned launching quick strikes into Pakistan within two to four days with eight to nine brigades simultaneously: an attack force which would involve roughly 32,000 to 36,000 troops. “I strongly believe that by introducing the variety of tactical nuclear weapons in Pakistan’s inventory, and in the strategic stability debate, we have blocked the avenues for serious military operations by the other side,” Kidwai (2015) explained.

After Kidwai’s (2015) statement, Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary Aizaz Chaudhry publicly acknowledged the existence of Pakistan’s “low-yield, tactical nuclear weapons,” apparently the first time a top government official had done so (India Today 2015). At the time, the tactical missiles had not yet been deployed but their purpose was further explained by Pakistani defense minister Khawaja M. Asif in an interview with Geo News in September 2016: “We are always pressurized [sic] time and again that our tactical (nuclear) weapons, in which we have a superiority, that we have more tactical weapons than we need. It is internationally recognized that we have a superiority and if there is a threat to our security or if anyone steps on our soil and if someone’s designs are a threat to our security, we will not hesitate to use those weapons for our defense” (Scroll 2016). In developing its nonstrategic nuclear strategy, one study has asserted that Pakistan to some extent has emulated NATO’s flexible response strategy without necessarily understanding how it would work (Tasleem and Dalton 2019).

Pakistan’s nuclear posture—particularly its development and deployment of tactical nuclear weapons—has created considerable concern in other countries, including the United States, which fears that it increases the risk of escalation and lowers the threshold for nuclear use in a military conflict with India.

Pakistani officials, for their part, reject concerns about Pakistan’s nuclear modernization. In 2021, then-Prime Minister Imran Khan stated that he was “not sure whether we’re growing [the nuclear arsenal] or not because as far as I know … the only one purpose [of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons] – it’s not an offensive thing.” He added that “Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is simply as a deterrent, to protect ourselves” (Laskar 2021).

Nuclear security, command-and-control, and crisis management

Over the past decade-and-a-half, the US assessment of nuclear weapons security in Pakistan appears to have changed considerably from confidence to concern, particularly because of the introduction of tactical nuclear weapons in the Pakistani arsenal. The concern reportedly even prompted the Pentagon to draw up contingency plans for their rendition in the event of loss of control, even though Pakistani officials have repeatedly challenged the notion that the security of their nuclear weapons is deficient (Goldberg and Ambinder 2011; MacAskill 2007). Samar Mubarik Mund, a former director of the country’s National Defense Complex, explained in 2013 that a Pakistani nuclear warhead is “assembled only at the eleventh hour if [it] needs to be launched. It is stored in three to four different parts at three to four different locations. If a nuclear weapon doesn’t need to be launched, then it is never available in assembled form” (World Bulletin 2013).

Despite Pakistan’s recent upgrades to the security of its military bases and facilities, then-US President Joe Biden in October 2022 commented that Pakistan was “one of the most dangerous nations in the world” due to the lack of “cohesion” in its nuclear security and command and control procedures—a comment that Pakistan quickly and forcefully rebuked (Z. Khan 2022). After years of publicly expressing concerns about the security of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, the Pentagon’s Defense Intelligence Agency in 2018 reported that “Islamabad is taking steps to improve its nuclear security and is aware of the extremist threat to its program” (Stewart 2017). The Defense Intelligence Agency has not since publicly expressed concerns about the security of Pakistan’s arsenal. The 2025 assessment predicted that Pakistan “will continue to pursue its military modernization effort, including the development of battlefield nuclear weapons, to offset India’s conventional military advantage,” but did not mention escalation and security risks from such effort (Kruse 2025).

Nuclear policy and operational decision-making in Pakistan are the responsibility of the National Command Authority (NCA), which is chaired by the prime minister and includes both high-ranking military and civilian officials. Within the National Command Authority, the primary nuclear authority is the Strategic Plans Division (SPD), which has been described by the SPD’s former director for Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs as “a unique organization that is incomparable to any other nuclear-armed state. From operational planning, weapon development, storage, budgets, arms control, diplomacy, and policies related to civilian applications for energy, agriculture, and medicine, etc., all are directed and controlled by SPD.” Additionally, the SPD “is responsible for nuclear policy, strategy and doctrines. It formulates force development strategy for the tri-services strategic forces, operational planning at the joint services level, and controls movements and deployments of all nuclear forces. SPD implements NCA’s employment decisions for nuclear use through its [nuclear command, control, and communications] systems” (F. H. Khan 2019).

The National Command Authority has been convened several times in recent years in the context of heightened tensions and crises between India and Pakistan. For example, the NCA was convened after India and Pakistan engaged in open hostilities in February 2019, when Indian fighters dropped bombs near the Pakistani town of Balakot in response to a suicide bombing conducted by a Pakistan-based militant group. In retaliation, Pakistani aircraft shot down and captured an Indian pilot before returning him a week later and convened the National Command Authority. Following the meeting, a senior Pakistani official gave what appeared to be a thinly veiled nuclear threat: “I hope you know what the [National Command Authority] means and what it constitutes. I said that we will surprise you. Wait for that surprise. … You have chosen a path of war without knowing the consequence for the peace and security of the region” (Abbasi 2019). In his memoir published in January 2023, former US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo mentioned the February 2019 crisis saying that India and Pakistan came “close” to a “nuclear conflagration” (Biswas 2023).

Most recently, Pakistan’s Prime Minister reportedly convened the NCA on May 10, 2025, apparently in response to India’s targeting of Pakistani military bases during Operation Sindoor (Reuters 2025). However, the meeting was later downplayed by Pakistan’s defense minister, who told Pakistani TV, “let’s not talk about it—we should treat it as a very distant possibility, we shouldn’t even discuss it in the immediate context,” before claiming that the meeting actually never happened (ARY News 2025).

2025 India-Pakistan conflict

In May 2025, India and Pakistan engaged in a brief conflict, during which India launched conventional missile strikes against several Pakistani military facilities. The conflict, which lasted days, included an escalatory exchange of fire from both sides following the April 22 terrorist attack in Pahalgam, Indian-administered Kashmir.

In the aftermath of the conflict, the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) and the Military Engineer Services—which conducts construction and maintenance operations for all branches of the Pakistani military—issued a series of public procurement contracts for post-strike repairs at a variety of military bases, indicating which facilities suffered damage due to the conflict (Mishra 2025). The list of bases included PAF Shahbaz, PAF Nur Khan, and PAF Masroor, where squadrons of Pakistan’s F-16, JF-17, and Mirage aircraft are based, respectively. Notably, the list also included facilities at the Sargodha complex, which includes a missile training garrison and is located within and around the Kirana Hills—a site historically associated with Pakistan’s nuclear program, which today includes underground facility entrances for potential weapon and missile handling. Tenders for Sargodha included runway surface repair work, which is notable because Sargodha is also one of Pakistan’s F-16 bases that previously was assessed to have a nuclear role.

During the conflict, videos taken by locals suggested that at least one explosion had taken place at the Kirana Hills site, although it did not appear to have injured anyone or damaged any infrastructure. However, India’s Air Marshal denied targeting the site, saying “The Indian Air Force is neither aware of what is there nor did it target it” (Business Today 2025). Given how both India and Pakistan subsequently downplayed the incident, the explosion might have been unintentional.

One study concluded that although the “mutual possession of nuclear weapons heavily conditioned the response of both sides” and “overt nuclear signaling was lower than in many prior India-Pakistan crises, … the crisis underscores that South Asia is one of the most likely theaters for nuclear war, even if that prospect was not imminent in this instance” (Clary 2025).

Fissile materials, warheads, and missile production

Pakistan has a well-established and diverse fissile material production complex that is expanding. This includes four heavy-water plutonium production reactors at the Khushab Complex, three of which were completed in the past 15 years. According to one estimate, the power of the fourth and newest reactor could be nearly twice as powerful as the other three (Albright et al. 2018). A suspected reprocessing facility at Chasma may have been completed, although the operational status is unclear (Hyatt and Burkhard 2020). Highly enriched uranium production happens at the Kahuta uranium enrichment plant east of Islamabad, and a possible second enrichment plant may have been completed at Gadwal to the north of Islamabad (Albright, Burkhard, and Pabian 2018). But the uncertainty about the capacity and operational status of Pakistan’s uranium resources is significant (International Panel on Fissile Materials 2025).

Little is publicly known about Pakistan’s nuclear warhead production, but experts have suspected for many years that the Pakistan Ordnance Factories near Wah, northwest of Islamabad, serve a role. One of the Wah factories is located near a unique facility with six earth-covered bunkers (igloos) inside a multi-layered safety perimeter with armed guards.

A frequent oversimplification for estimating the number of Pakistani nuclear weapons is to derive the estimate directly from the amount of weapon-grade fissile material produced. As of the beginning of 2024, the International Panel on Fissile Materials estimated that Pakistan had an inventory of approximately 5,300 kilograms of weapon-grade (90 percent enriched) highly enriched uranium (HEU), and about 580 kilograms of weapon-grade plutonium (International Panel on Fissile Materials 2025). Assuming each first-generation implosion-type warhead’s solid core uses 15 to 18 kilograms of weapon-grade HEU or 5 to 6 kilograms of plutonium, this fissile material would theoretically be enough to produce a maximum of approximately 211 to 453 HEU-based single-stage warheads and 96 to 116 plutonium-based single-stage warheads if fully expended, or a hypothetical total of 308-569 warheads. However, it is important to note that calculating stockpile size based solely on fissile material inventory is an incomplete methodology that tends to overestimate the likely number of nuclear warheads. Instead, warhead estimates must take several other factors into account in addition to the amount of weapon-grade fissile material produced, including the warhead design choice and efficiency (Pakistan’s warhead designs may have undergone some iteration and have become more efficient), warhead production rates, number of operational nuclear-capable launchers, number of launchers with dual-capability, and nuclear doctrine. Consequently, as described above, we estimate the actual number of warheads produced is must lower—possibly around 170 warheads.

Nuclear warhead estimates must also assume that not all of Pakistan’s fissile material is used for weapons. Like other nuclear-armed countries, Pakistan most probably keeps some fissile material in reserve. Pakistan also does not have enough nuclear-capable launchers to accommodate several hundred warheads. Moreover, all of Pakistan’s launchers are thought to be dual-capable, which means that some of them, especially the shorter-range systems, may serve non-nuclear missions. Finally, official statements often refer to “warheads” and “weapons” interchangeably, which leads to ambiguity as to whether they are referring to the number of launchers or the warheads being assigned to them.

The amount of fissile material in warheads—and the size of the warhead—can be reduced, and their yield increased, by using tritium to “boost” the fission process. Pakistan’s tritium production capability is poorly understood due to a lack of reliable public information. One study in early 2021 estimated that Pakistan could have produced 690 grams of tritium by the end of 2020, hypothetically sufficient to boost over 100 weapons. The study assessed that warheads produced for delivery by the Babur and Ra’ad cruise missiles and the Nasr and Abdali missiles almost certainly would require a small, lightweight tritium-boosted fission weapon (Jones 2021).^[1]

We estimate that Pakistan currently is producing sufficient fissile material to build 14 to 27 new warheads per year, although we estimate that the actual warhead increase in the stockpile probably averages around 5 to 10 warheads per year.^[2]

Nuclear-capable missiles and their mobile launchers are developed and produced at the National Defence Complex (sometimes called the National Development Complex) located in the Kala Chitta Dahr mountain range west of Islamabad. The complex is divided into two sections. The western section south of Attock appears to be involved in the development, production, and test-launching of missiles and rocket engines. Satellite images indicate that a new second missile test launch facility was under construction as of July 2025. The eastern section north of Fateh Jang is involved in the production and assembly of road-mobile transporter erector launchers (TELs), which are designed to transport and fire missiles. Satellite images regularly show the presence of TEL chassis for a variety of ballistic and cruise missiles, including Shaheen ballistic and Babur cruise missiles (see Figure 1). The Fateh Jang section has expanded significantly with several new launcher assembly buildings over the past 10 years, and the complex continues to expand. Other launcher and missile-related production and maintenance facilities may be located near Tarnawa and Taxila.

Nuclear-capable aircraft and air-delivered weapons

The aircraft most likely to have a nuclear delivery role are Pakistan’s Mirage III and Mirage V fighter squadrons. The Pakistani Air Force’s (PAF) Mirage fighter-bombers are located at two bases.^[3] Masroor Air Base outside Karachi houses the 32nd Wing with three Mirage squadrons: 7th Squadron (“Bandits”), 8th Squadron (“Haiders”), and 22nd Squadron (“Ghazis”). The Masroor base includes a possible alert hangar with underground weapons-storage capability, although the role of this facility is uncertain. A potential nuclear weapons storage site is located 5 kilometers northwest of the base (Kristensen 2009), although the function is uncertain.

The other Mirage base is Rafiqui Air Base near Shorkot, which is home to the 34th Wing with two Mirage squadrons: the 15th Squadron (“Cobras”) and the 27th Squadron (“Zarras”). On February 25, 2021, Pakistan’s then-president, Arif Alvi, visited the base for the ceremony of the 50th Anniversary of Mirages and Colours Award, which displayed at least 11 Mirages (President of Pakistan 2021).

The Mirage V is believed to have been given a strike role with Pakistan’ small arsenal of nuclear gravity bombs, while the Mirage III has been used for test launches of Pakistan’s Ra’ad air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM), as well as the follow-on Ra’ad-II. The Pakistani Air Force has added an aerial refueling capability to the Mirage, a capability that would greatly enhance the nuclear strike mission (AFP 2018). Several of the Mirages displayed at the award ceremony at Rafiqui Air Base in 2021 appeared to be equipped with refueling pods.

The air-launched, dual-capable Ra’ad ALCM is believed to have been test-launched at least seven times, most recently in February 2020. The Pakistani government states that the Ra’ad “can deliver nuclear and conventional warheads with great accuracy” (ISPR 2011a) to a range of 350 kilometers and “complement[s] Pakistan’s deterrence capability” by achieving “strategic standoff capability on land and at sea” (ISPR 2016a). During a military parade in 2017, Pakistan displayed what was said to be Ra’ad-II ALCM, apparently an enhanced version of the original Ra’ad with a new engine air-intake and tail wing configuration (B. Khan 2017). The Pakistani government most recently tested the Ra’ad-II in February 2020 and stated that the missile can reportedly reach targets at a distance of 600 kilometers (ISPR 2020a). Both the Ra’ad-I and Ra’ad-II were displayed at the 2024 Pakistan Day Parade (see Figure 2). All test launches involving either Ra’ad system are thought to have been conducted from Mirage III aircraft, although a Ra-ad shape has also been observed on a JF-17.

There is no available evidence to suggest that either Ra’ad system had been operationally deployed as of July 2025; however, one potential deployment site could eventually be Masroor Air Base outside Karachi, which is home to several Mirage squadrons.

To replace the PAF’s aging Mirage III and V aircraft, Pakistan has acquired more than 100 operational JF-17 aircraft—which are co-produced with China—and plans to acquire around another 188 JF-17s (Aamir 2022; Gady 2020; Quwa 2021; Warnes 2020). These aircraft are being continuously upgraded with new technology “blocks.” Pakistan reportedly inducted the first batch of 12 JF-17 Block III aircraft into the 16th (“Black Panthers”) squadron in March 2023 (Tiwari 2023). In March 2023, during rehearsals for the 2023 Pakistan Day Parade (which was subsequently canceled), images surfaced of a JF-17 Thunder Block II carrying what resembled a Ra’ad-I ALCM, the first time such a configuration was observed (Scramble 2023). This suggests that Pakistan has made significant progress toward equipping its JF-17s with the capability to eventually supplement—and potentially replace—the nuclear strike role of the aging Mirage III/Vs (Johns 2024). However, additional evidence is still needed to confirm the future nuclear status of the JF-17 aircraft.

The nuclear capability of the PAF’s legacy F-16 aircraft is uncertain. Although Pakistan was obligated by its contract with the United States not to modify the aircraft to carry nuclear weapons, multiple credible reports subsequently emerged suggesting that Pakistan intended to do so (Associated Press 1989). In September 2022, the Biden administration agreed to a $450 million deal to help sustain Pakistan’s F-16 aircraft program (US Defense Security Cooperation Agency 2022).

The F-16A/Bs are based with the 38th Wing at Mushaf (formerly Sargodha) Air Base, located 160 kilometers northwest of Lahore in northeastern Pakistan. Organized into the 9th and 11th Squadrons (“Griffins” and “Arrows,” respectively), these aircraft have a range of 1,600 kilometers (extendable when equipped with drop tanks) and most likely are equipped to each carry a single nuclear bomb on the centerline pylon. If the F-16s have a nuclear strike mission, the nuclear gravity bombs attached to them most likely are not stored at the base itself but are potentially kept at the Sargodha Weapons Storage Complex, located 10 kilometers to the south, or at some other underground facility. In a crisis, the bombs could quickly be transferred to the base, or the F-16s could disperse to bases near underground storage facilities and receive the weapons there. Pakistan appears to be reinforcing the munitions bunkers, adding new tunnels, and installing extra security perimeters at the Sargodha complex.

The newer F-16C/Ds are based with the 39th Wing at Shahbaz Air Base outside Jacobabad in northern Pakistan. The wing upgraded to F-16C/Ds from Mirages in 2011 and, so far, has one squadron: the 5th Squadron (known as the “Falcons”). The base has undergone significant expansion, with numerous weapons bunkers added since 2004. As for the F-16A/Bs, if the base has a nuclear mission, the weapons attached to F-16C/Ds most probably are stored elsewhere in special storage facilities. Some F-16s are also visible at Minhas (Kamra) Air Base northwest of Islamabad, although these might be related to aircraft industry at the base. The F-16Cs were showcased in the 2022 Pakistan Day Parade.

Despite the reports about F-16s and the recent image of a Ra’ad ALCM loaded onto a JF-17, there are still too many uncertainties associated with these two aircrafts to confidently attribute a dedicated nuclear strike role to either one. As a result, the PAF’s F-16s are omitted from

in this Nuclear Notebook, and the and JF-17s are listed with significant uncertainty.

Land-based ballistic missiles

Pakistan appears to have six currently operational nuclear-capable, solid-fuel, road-mobile ballistic missile systems: the short-range Abdali (Hatf-2), Ghaznavi (Hatf-3), Shaheen-I/A (Hatf-4), and Nasr (Hatf-9), and the medium-range Ghauri (Hatf-5) and Shaheen-II (Hatf-6). Two other nuclear-capable ballistic missile systems are currently under development: the medium-range Shaheen-III and the MIRVed Ababeel. All of Pakistan’s nuclear-capable missiles—except for the Abdali and Ghaznavi—were showcased at the Pakistan Day Parade in March 2024 (HUM News 2024). (See Figure 3.)

The Pakistani road-mobile ballistic missile force has undergone significant development and expansion over the past two decades. This includes possibly eight or nine missile garrisons, including four or five along the Indian border for short-range systems (Babur, Ghaznavi, Shaheen-I, Nasr) and three or four other garrisons further inland for medium-range systems (Shaheen-II and Ghauri).^[3]

The short-range, solid-fuel, single-stage Abdali (Hatf-2) was in development for a long time, and the Pentagon reported in 1997 that the missile appeared to have been discontinued. Flight-testing resumed with seven launches between 2002 and 2013, but then paused until May 3, 2025, when the Pakistan military announced that a test-launch had taken place (Government of Pakistan 2025). The test took place in the middle of an armed border dispute with India (see “2025 India-Pakistan Conflict” section above). The range of the Abdali missile, which has been paraded several times on a four-axle road-mobile transporter erector launcher (TEL), was previously reported by the Pakistani government to be 180 kilometers. But after the most recent test, the government declared the missile’s range to be 450 kilometers (Government of Pakistan 2025). The Pakistani government has on several occasions declared that the Abdali has nuclear capability. After the 2013 test, Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR) stated that Abdali “carries nuclear as well as conventional warheads” and “provides an operational-level capability to Pakistan’s Strategic Forces” (ISPR 2013), It added that the test launch “consolidates Pakistan’s deterrence capability both at the operational and strategic levels.” After the latest test in May 2025, the national leadership “expressed complete confidence in the operational preparedness and technical proficiency of Pakistan’s Strategic Forces to ensure credible minimum deterrence and safeguard national security against any aggression” (Government of Pakistan 2025).

The short-range, solid-fuel, single-stage Ghaznavi (Hatf-3) was test-launched in 2019, 2020, and twice in 2021—its first reported test launches since 2014. In an important milestone for testing the readiness of Pakistan’s nuclear forces, the 2019 Ghaznavi launch was conducted at night. After each test, the Pakistani military stated that the Ghaznavi is “capable of delivering multiple types of warheads up to a range of 290 kilometers” (ISPR 2019c, 2020b, 2021b). Its short range means that the Ghaznavi cannot strike Delhi from Pakistani territory, and Army units equipped with the missile are probably based relatively near the Indian border (Kristensen 2016).

The Shaheen-I (Hatf-4) is a single-stage, solid-fuel, dual-capable, short-range ballistic missile with a maximum range of 650 kilometers that has been in service since 2003. The Shaheen-I is carried on a four-axle, road-mobile TEL like the one used for the Ghaznavi. Since 2012, many Shaheen-I test launches have involved an extended-range version widely referred to as Shaheen-IA. The Pakistani government, which has declared the range of the Shaheen-IA to be 900 kilometers, has used both designations. Pakistan most recently test-launched the Shaheen-I in November 2019 and the Shaheen-IA in March and November 2021 (ISPR 2019d, 2021c, 2021d, 2021f). Potential Shaheen-1 deployment locations include Gujranwala, Okara, and Pano Aqil. The Shaheen-I was displayed at the 2021 Pakistan Day Parade, but was replaced by the Shaheen-IA at the 2022 and 2024 parades and has not been displayed since, suggesting the latter system’s potential introduction into the armed forces (ISPR 2021g, 2022b).

One of the most controversial new nuclear-capable missiles in the Pakistani arsenal is the Nasr (Hatf-9), a short-range, solid-fuel missile originally with a range of only 60 kilometers that has been extended to 70 kilometers (ISPR 2017c). However, its range being too short to attack strategic targets inside India, Nasr appears intended solely for battlefield defensive use against invading Indian troops.^[4] According to the Pakistani government, the Nasr “carries nuclear warheads of appropriate yield with high accuracy, shoot and scoot attributes” and was developed as a “quick response system” to “add deterrence value” to Pakistan’s strategic weapons development program “at shorter ranges to deter evolving threats,” including evidently India’s so-called Cold Start doctrine (ISPR 2011c, 2017a, 2017c). More recent tests of the Nasr system—including two tests in the same week in January 2019—sought to demonstrate the system’s salvo-launch capability, as well as the missiles’ in-flight maneuverability (ISPR 2019b, 2019d, 2019e).

The Nasr’s four-axle, road-mobile TEL is equipped with a quadruple box launcher. The US intelligence community has listed the Nasr as a deployed system since 2013 (National Air and Space Intelligence Center 2013), and with a total of 15 tests reported so far, the weapon system appears to be well developed. Potential deployment locations include Gujranwala, Okara, and Pano Aqil.

The medium-range, two-stage, solid-fuel Shaheen-II (Hatf-6) appears to be operational after many years of development. Pakistan’s National Defense Complex has assembled Shaheen-II launchers since at least 2004 or 2005 (Kristensen 2007), and a 2020 US intelligence community report stated that Pakistan had deployed “fewer than 50” Shaheen-II launchers (National Air and Space Intelligence Center 2020). After a May 2019 test launch, the Pakistani government reported the range as only 1,500 kilometers, but the US National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) continues to set the Shaheen-II’s range at 2,000 kilometers (ISPR 2019a; National Air and Space Intelligence Center 2020). Its most recent test launch took place in August 2024, which the Pakistani government said was “aimed at training of troops, validating various technical parameters and performance evaluation of different sub-systems incorporated for improved accuracy and enhanced survivability” (ISPR 2024). The Shaheen-II is carried on a six-axle, road-mobile TEL and can carry a single conventional or nuclear warhead. Shaheen-II launcher chassis are occasionally visible at garrisons, including the Dera Ghazi Khan garrison and Sargodha training garrison (see Figure 4).

Pakistan’s newer medium-range, two-stage, solid-fuel Shaheen-III was displayed publicly for the first time at the 2015 Pakistan Day Parade. Following a third test launch in January 2021, the Pakistani government said the missile could deliver either a single nuclear or conventional warhead to a range of 2,750 kilometers, making it the longest-range system that Pakistan has tested (ISPR 2021a). Its latest test launch took place in April 2022, which the Pakistani government said was “aimed at re-validating various design and technical parameters of the weapon system” (ISPR 2022a). The system probably still requires more test launches before it becomes operational. The Shaheen-III is carried on an eight-axle TEL reportedly supplied by China (Panda 2016). Satellite images show the Shaheen-III TEL at the National Development Complex, and the launchers was displayed at the 2024 parade (see Figure 1 and Figure 2 above). In September 2024, the US State Department announced sanctions against a Beijing automation company for assisting Pakistan with the procurement of testing equipment for the Shaheen-III and Ababeel medium-range ballistic missiles (US Department of State 2024a).

The range of the Shaheen-III is sufficient to target all of mainland India from launch positions in most of Pakistan south of Islamabad. But the missile was apparently developed to do more than that. According to Gen. Kidwai, the range of 2,750 kilometers was determined by a need to be able to target the Nicobar and Andaman Islands in the eastern part of the Indian Ocean that are “developed as strategic bases” where “India might think of putting its weapons” (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2015, 10). But for a 2,750-kilometer range Shaheen-III to reach the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, it would need to be launched from positions in the very Eastern parts of Pakistan, close to the Indian border.

Pakistan’s oldest nuclear-capable medium-range ballistic missile, the road-mobile, single-stage, liquid-fuel Ghauri (Hatf-5), was most recently test-launched in October 2023 (Pakistan Ministry of Information and Broadcasting 2023). The Ghauri is based on North Korea’s Nodong medium-range ballistic missile. The Pakistani government states that the Ghauri can carry a single conventional or nuclear warhead to a range of 1,300 kilometers. However, NASIC lists its range slightly lower at 1,250 kilometers and suggested that “fewer than 50” Ghauri launchers have been deployed (National Air and Space Intelligence Center 2020). The extra time needed to fuel the missile before launch makes the Ghauri more vulnerable to attack than Pakistan’s newer solid-fuel missiles. Therefore, it is possible that the longer-range versions of the Shaheen may eventually replace the Ghauri. Potential deployment areas for the Ghauri include the Sargodha Central Ammunition Depot area and the Khuzdar Garrison, which expanded its perimeter in late 2017 to include three additional TEL garages.

On January 24, 2017, Pakistan test-launched a new medium-range ballistic missile called Ababeel that the government says is “capable of carrying multiple warheads, using multiple independent reentry vehicle (MIRV) technology” (ISPR 2017b).^[5] The three-stage, solid-fuel, nuclear-capable missile, which is currently under development at the National Defense Complex, appears to be derived from the Shaheen-III airframe and solid-fuel motor and has a range of 2,200 kilometers (ISPR 2017b; National Air and Space Intelligence Center 2020). After the test-launch, the Pakistani government declared that the Ababeel is “aimed at ensuring survivability of Pakistan’s ballistic missiles in the growing regional Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) environment, … further reinforc[ing] deterrence” (ISPR 2017b). Development of multiple-warhead capability appears to be intended as a countermeasure against India’s planned ballistic missile defense system (Tasleem 2017). In October 2023, the Pakistani government announced that it had conducted another successful test launch of the Ababeel missile, which was “aimed at re-validating various design, technical parameters and performance evaluation of different sub-systems of the weapon system” (Radio Pakistan 2023). The missile was unveiled publicly for the first time at the Pakistan Day Parade in March 2024, carried on an eight-axle TEL. The Ababeel was not through to be deployed as of July 2025.

US officials have recently raised concerns over Pakistan’s alleged pursuit of an intercontinental ballistic missile capability. In December 2024, the US State Department announced sanctions on four entities involved in “Pakistan’s long-range missile development,” including the state-owned National Development Complex, which develops Pakistan’s solid-fuel ballistic missiles (US Department of State 2024b).

Just one day after the announcement, during a speech at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, then-principal deputy national security advisor Jon Finer spoke of Pakistan’s efforts to develop “increasingly sophisticated missile technology.” Finer warned that “If these trend lines continue, Pakistan will have the capability to strike targets well beyond South Asia, including in the United States” (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2024). Senior US officials reportedly confirmed during a January 3 briefing to nongovernmental experts that Pakistan is “several years to a decade” away from a long-range ballistic missile capability (Davenport and Kimball 2025).

More evidence will be necessary to confirm whether Pakistan intends to build an intercontinental-class ballistic missile; however, multiple data points already support the US claims: The Chinese companies that were sanctioned due to their involvement with the Pakistani missile program specialize in producing lightweight composite materials that are typically used in longer-range solid propellant motor cases deployed on intercontinental ballistic missiles (Wright 2025). In addition, between 2021 and 2023, Pakistan constructed a new horizontal test stand for large solid rocket motors at its missile complex near Attock, which could potentially be intended to test launch longer-range missile motors (Eveleth 2023).

Land-based missile garrisons

The total number and location of Pakistan’s nuclear-capable missile bases and facilities remain unknown. It is particularly challenging to discern between Pakistani military bases intended to serve conventional-only strike roles and those intended to serve dual-capable or nuclear-specific strike roles. Analysis of commercial satellite imagery suggests that Pakistan maintains at least six missile bases that might potentially serve a role in Pakistan’s nuclear forces, although this estimate comes with considerable uncertainty. Some of these bases have been upgraded over the past decade. Below follows a description of each base:

Akro garrison (25.5483 ºN, 68.3343 ºE)

The Akro garrison is located around 18 kilometers north of Hyderabad in the southern part of the Sindh Province, and around 145 kilometers away from the Indian border. The garrison covers an area of approximately 6.9 square kilometers, and it has undergone gradual expansion since 2004. The Akro garrison consists of six missile TEL garages that appear to be designed for 12 launchers. Under the TEL garage complex, there is a unique underground facility, the construction of which can be seen through past satellite imagery. The underground facility has two cross-shaped sections connected by a central corridor that leads to two buildings on either side via covered access ramps.

Analysis of a vehicle training area in the northeast corner of the garrison shows what appear to be five-axle TELs for the Babur cruise missile weapon system.

Gujranwala garrison (32.2410 ºN, 74.0730 ºE)

The Gujranwala garrison is one of the largest military complexes in Pakistan. It covers nearly 30 square kilometers in the northeastern part of the Punjab Province and is located about 60 kilometers from the Indian border. Since 2010, the Gujranwala garrison has added what appears to be a TEL launcher area immediately east of a likely storage site for conventional munitions, which became operational in 2014 or 2015. The TEL area consists of two identical sections, each of which contain several launcher garages as well as possible weapons loading hall with reinforced embankments connected via covered passageway to what appears to be a reinforced weapons storage bunker. There is also a technical area slightly south of the main TEL area for servicing the launchers. The security perimeter seems to be designed for potentially adding a third TEL section.

Several trucks that strongly resemble the Nasr short-range missile system can be seen on satellite imagery. Although it is impossible to be certain, these trucks appear to have a twin box launcher similar to that of which can be seen on Nasr test launch photos. The Nasr’s estimated range is the equivalent of the garrison’s distance from the Indian border.

Khuzdar garrison (27.7222 ºN, 66.6241 ºE)

The Khuzdar garrison is located approximately 220 kilometers west of Sukkur in south-east Balochistan Province, and the furthest known missile garrison from the Indian border. The base is split into two sections: a northern section and a southern section (where the TELs are based). The southern section of the base expanded its perimeter in late-2017 to include three additional TEL garages, bringing the total to six. Also included in this section are two multi-story weapon-handling buildings with covered ramps leading to a possible underground nuclear storage area similar to the one visible at the Akro garrison. Likely nuclear-capable missile launchers, possibly Ghauri or Shaheen-II TELs, have been spotted with commercial satellite imagery at Khuzdar. An eastern section of the base that appeared to be another TEL garage area was under construction over a decade ago; however, that expansion seems to have been canceled.

Pano Aqil garrison (27.8328 ºN, 69.1575 ºE)

The Pano Aqil garrison is located only 85 kilometers from the Indian border, in the northern part of Sindh Province, and is split up in several sections that cover a combined area of nearly 20 square kilometers. The double-fenced TEL area is located 1.8 kilometers northeast of the main garrison and includes eight garages (the last three were completed in 2017), each of which has spaces for six TELs. An additional ninth garage near the others appears to have openings for five vehicles. Altogether, this garrison could potentially support approximately 50 TELs; however, some of these garage spaces are likely to hold support vehicles as well. Several TELs, including for Babur and Shaheen-I missiles, are regularly visible at this garrison through commercial satellite imagery.

Slightly north of the TEL garages within the same double-fenced perimeter is a below-grade facility that appears to be a weapons storage igloo. The igloo is connected via a covered ramp to a multi-story TEL loading hall. The TEL and likely weapons storage areas are nearly identical in design to those visible at Gujranwala.

Dera Gazi Khan garrison (29.9108 ºN, 70.4907 ºE)

The Dera Gazi Khan garrison is located in central Pakistan, roughly 100 kilometers west-southwest of Multan city. The core base, which covers an area of roughly 3 square kilometers, includes several vehicle garages, as well as a central section with two high-bay garages added in 2013. A Shaheen-II chassis (without missile compartment installed) was visible on a Maxar satellite image outside one of the high-bay garages in 2021 (see Figure 4 above). The base is located about 12-kilometers southwest of the Dera Gazi Kahn nuclear materials complex.

Sargodha integration and training garrison (31.9722 ºN, 72.6838 ºE)

The Sargodha integration and training garrison is a large complex located within and around the Kirana Hills, a subcritical nuclear test site used by Pakistan to develop its nuclear program from 1983 to 1990. Directly northwest of a likely conventional munitions storage area, there appear to be 10 dispersed potential TEL garages plus two additional garages with different dimensions that could be used for maintenance. The TEL area does not have the same layout or perimeter as other TEL areas across the country, which potentially could indicate another role such as training and equipment integration. Both Babur and Shaheen-II TELs (without missile compartments) have recently been visible, including visible signs that at least some of the major garages may be for training (see Figure 4 above).

Directly east of the conventional munition storage area is an underground storage area built into the side of the mountain range. At least 10 underground facility entrances are visible through commercial satellite imagery, as well as potential facilities for missile handling.

Ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles

Pakistan’s family of ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles is undergoing significant development with work on several types and modifications. The Babur (Hatf-7) is a subsonic, dual-capable cruise missile with a similar appearance to the US Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missile, the Chinese DH-10 ground-launched cruise missile, and the Russian air-launched AS-15. The Pakistani government describes the Babur as having “stealth capabilities” and “pinpoint accuracy” and “a low-altitude, terrain-hugging missile with high maneuverability” (ISPR (2011b), 2016b, 2018a, 2018b). The Babur is much slimmer than Pakistan’s ballistic missiles, suggesting some success with warhead miniaturization based on a boosted fission design.

The original Babur-1 ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) has been test-launched about a dozen times and is likely operational. Its road-mobile launcher appears to be a unique five-axle TEL with a three-tube box launcher that is different than the quadruple box launcher used for static display. At different times, the Pakistani government has reported the range to be 600 kilometers and 700 kilometers (ISPR 2011b, 2012a, 2012b, 2012c), but the US intelligence community sets the range much lower, at 350 kilometers (National Air and Space Intelligence Center 2020). The Babur three-tube box launcher was displayed at the 2024 Pakistan Day Parade (see Figure 3 above).

Pakistan appears to be upgrading the original Babur-1 missiles into Babur-1A missiles by upgrading their avionics and navigation systems to enable target engagement both on land and at sea. Following the system’s most recent training launch in February 2021, which was observed by the Army Strategic Forces Command, the Pakistani military stated that the Babur-1A’s range was 450 kilometers (ISPR 2021e).

Pakistan is also developing an enhanced version of the Babur known as the Babur-2 or Babur-1B GLCM.^[6] The weapon has been test-launched in December 2016, April 2018, and December 2021 (ISPR 2016b, 2018a, 2018b, 2021d, 2021g). Indian news media reported that the Babur-2/Babur-1B had failed two other prior tests, in April 2018 and March 2020; however, this was not confirmed by Pakistan (Gupta 2020). With a physical appearance and capabilities like those of the Babur, the Babur-2/Babur-1B apparently has an extended range of 700 kilometers, and “is capable of carrying various types of warheads” (ISPR 2016b, 2018a, 2018b). The fact that both the Babur-1 and the “enhanced” Babur-2/Babur-1B have been noted as possessing a range of 700 kilometers indicates that the range of the initial Babur-1 system was likely shorter. NASIC has not released information on an enhanced system. After the first test in 2016, the Pakistani government noted that the system is “an important force multiplier for Pakistan’s strategic defense” (ISPR 2016b).

Babur TELs have been fitting out at the National Development Complex for several years and have been seen at the Akro garrison northeast of Karachi. The garrison includes a large enclosure with six garages that potentially have room for 12 TELs and a unique underground facility that is probably used to store the missiles.

Pakistan is also developing a sea-launched version of the Babur known as Babur-3. The weapon is still in development and has been test-launched twice: On January 9, 2017, from “an underwater, mobile platform” in the Indian Ocean (ISPR 2017a); and on March 29, 2018, from “an underwater dynamic platform” (ISPR 2018a). The Babur-3 is said to be a sea-based variant of the Babur-2 GLCM, and to have a range of 450 kilometers (ISPR 2017a). Development of the Babur-3 appears to be moving slowly; the Pakistani government has not announced any additional test launches since 2018, and the missile has not yet made an appearance at the annual Pakistan Day Parade.

The Pakistani government says the Babur-3 is “capable of delivering various types of payloads … [that] … will provide Pakistan with a Credible Second Strike Capability, augmenting deterrence,” and described it as “a step toward reinforcing [the] policy of credible minimum deterrence” (ISPR 2017a). The Babur-3 will most likely be deployed on the Pakistan Navy’s three Agosta-90B diesel—electric submarines (F. H. Khan 2015; Panda and Narang 2017). In April 2015, the Pakistani government approved the purchase from China of eight right air-independent propulsion-powered submarines, which will be called the Hangor-class (B. Khan 2019). The deal stipulated that four of these submarines would be constructed at the Wuchang Shipbuilding Industry Group (WSIG) in China, with the remaining four to be built at Karachi Shipyard & Engineering Works in Pakistan (Sutton 2020). Two of the China-built submarines, the Hangor and the Shushuk, were launched in April 2024 and March 2025, respectively (Ozberk 2025; Radio Pakistan 2024). Pakistan laid the keels of the first two submarines under construction at Karachi Shipyard, Hulls number 5 and 6, in December 2022 and February 2024, respectively (Navy 2022, Ozberk 2024). The Hangor was originally expected to be delivered by 2023, but has been delayed and will likely be delivered in the second half of 2025. The four submarines assembled in Karachi are scheduled to be completed by 2028 (Sutton 2020). It is possible that these new submarines could eventually be assigned a nuclear role with the Babur-3 submarine-launched cruise missile.

Once operational, the Babur-3 will provide Pakistan with a triad of nuclear strike platforms from ground, air, and sea. The Pakistani government said the Babur-3 was motivated by a need to match India’s nuclear triad and the “nuclearization of [the] Indian Ocean Region” (ISPR 2018a). The Pakistani government also noted that Babur-3’s stealth technologies would be useful in the “emerging regional Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) environment” (ISPR 2017a).

The future submarine-based nuclear capability is managed by Headquarters Naval Strategic Forces Command (NSFC), which the government said in 2012 would be the “custodian of the nation’s 2nd strike capability” to “strengthen Pakistan’s policy of Credible Minimum Deterrence and ensure regional stability” (ISPR 2012a). Kidwai in 2015 publicly acknowledged the need for a sea-based second-strike capability and said it “will come into play in the next few years” (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2015, 16). Kidwai may have been referring to the new Hangor-class submarines.

Pakistan is also developing a variant of the Babur cruise missile, known as the Harbah, which can be carried by surface vessels. In March 2022, Pakistan featured the new missile during the 11^th Doha International Maritime Defence Exhibition and Conference. The Pakistan Navy spokesperson described the Harbah as an “all-weather” subsonic cruise missile with anti-ship and land-attack capabilities and a range of approximately 290 kilometers (Vavasseur 2022). According to the spokesperson, the Harbah has been inducted into the Pakistan Navy and deployed on Azmat-class surface ships (Vavasseur 2022). It remains unclear whether the Harbah will be dual-capable.

Research for this publication was carried out with generous contributions from the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the New-Land Foundation, Ploughshares, the Prospect Hill Foundation, the Jubitz Family Foundation, and individual donors.

Notes

[1]  These assumptions of estimated fissile material quantities for different weapon designs are adapted from Table A.1 in International Panel on Fissile Materials (2015).

[2]  These estimates are based on reprocessing and uranium enrichment plant capacities in International Panel on Fissile Materials (2022), as well as more recent estimates by the same group.

[3]  For a detailed analysis of possible Pakistani air bases, nuclear facilities, and missile brigade locations, see Kristensen (2016).

[4]  For an excellent analysis of this doctrine and Pakistan’s potential use of battlefield nuclear weapons, see Nayyar and Mian (2010).

[5]  The correct expansion of MIRV is multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle.

[6]  The Babur-2 and the Babur-1B may be the same missile. Both names are referenced as “enhanced” versions of the Babur.