Memo to Trump: Cut the Pentagon’s chemical and biological defense program

Editor’s note: This is part of a package of memos to the president.

A MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: DISESTABLISHMENT OF THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT’S CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAM

Mr. President, in the first half of your second term, you will have a unique opportunity to make the federal government more efficient and reduce the size and spending of its executive agencies. One of your targets should be to eliminate the Defense Department’s Chemical and Biological Defense Program. This was once a well-run program that delivered specific results tailored to a mission: protecting American troops and personnel operating in dangerous and contaminated areas. But now the program has expanded to cover areas such as natural disease outbreaks that are already the focus of other government agencies and in ways that do not further the goal of improving military chemical-biological defense. By reducing excessive bureaucracy at the Pentagon and returning this program to Army control, you can improve our country’s ability to counter potential opponents like North Korea and save significant money in the process.

After Congress identified significant capability gaps in chemical-biological defense readiness during the Persian Gulf War, it passed a bill in 1993 that required the Defense Department to create the chemical-biological defense program. The Army was to lead the research, development, testing, evaluation, and acquisition of new chemical-biological defense equipment for all the services, while the newly created position of deputy assistant secretary of defense for chemical and biological defense was to oversee the program’s execution and to integrate its budget into the Defense Department’s budget recommendations. The program was fundamental in improving the services’ readiness for the possibility of chemical-biological warfare during the 2003 conflict with Iraq. However, over the past four years, its efforts have been increasingly watered down and diverted from its original purpose.

Between 1996 and 2002, the Office of the Secretary of Defense had a light touch in overseeing the development of new chemical-biological defense capabilities like protective suits. Following 9/11, however, Pentagon leaders were unhappy with the slow pace of the acquisition process and became more involved. After significantly changing the management process and adding more funds, the chemical-biological-defense-program did improve its ability to address critical military capability gaps. Because of this program, soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines became better prepared to survive and fight in very contaminated situations. However, in 2009, Pentagon leaders, now more involved in the program, began to make decisions that damaged our chemical-biological defense capability. They expanded the chemical-biological program to focus on emerging infectious diseases, to include global biosurveillance and medical countermeasures for natural diseases. They provided no additional funding for this effort, and as a result, efforts at fighting these diseases competed for funding with the program’s objective of fulfilling military requirements.

Over the past four years, the program’s focus on natural disease outbreaks has only increased, as witnessed by the release of the Biodefense Posture Review report. In 2023, the Defense Department announced the addition of $300 million to the program’s annual budget to address “biological threats.” Unfortunately, these funds went to public health and pandemic preparedness efforts that already exist in the Defense Health Agency and Department of Health and Human Services. Simultaneously, Pentagon leadership gave itself an even more direct hand in the development of chemical-biological defense projects, leading to an increase in personnel dedicated to the program and in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, while diminishing the Army’s executive role as well as the input of the various services. While the program still provides a limited number of improved defense capabilities today, the cost and time to deliver these products to the military personnel who need them has grown considerably. The program has become a bad deal for the military and the American people.

A remedy to address the chemical-biological program’s drift from fulfilling military requirements to duplicating efforts of other agencies would be to eliminate the program’s management structure entirely. The program’s budget should be returned to the services for their discretion and allocation. The services should take back from the Office of the Secretary of Defense the responsibility of funding and developing requirements for the production of chemical-biological defense equipment, with the Army continuing to coordinate research, development, testing, and initial acquisition of these important capabilities. The Army should also assume management of the chemical-biological defense science and technology projects. By these actions, your White House would simultaneously reduce excessive management, improve the delivery of defense equipment, and save hundreds of millions of government dollars. Without taking actions to correct the program’s current drift, the military’s readiness to face adversaries who possess chemical or biological weapons will be challenged.