Time to ban chemical weapons from the Middle East?

Now that Syria has joined the Chemical Weapons Convention and Bashar al-Assad's chemical stockpile is being destroyed, it is the Syrian people who will benefit—it is they who have been blatantly targeted with chemical weapons by their own political leadership. Similarly, ordinary people across the Middle East would benefit if a chemical-weapon-free zone were established in the region. Chemical weapons are above all a human rights issue.

When considering a chemical-weapon-free zone, it is crucial to keep the issue's human aspect vividly in mind. No more vivid illustration is possible than the events of August 21, 2013, when the Syrian regime attacked civilians in a heavily populated part of the Ghouta region, near Damascus, with sarin. The attack was carried out in such a way as to maximize suffering. The rockets carrying the chemical agent were fired in the dead of night when residents would be asleep. When they heard the rockets they sought shelter but—according to the report of the UN mission that investigated the incident—the attack had been launched under meteorological conditions that would "[maximize the weapons'] potential impact as … heavy gas can stay close to the ground and penetrate into lower levels of buildings and constructions where many people were seeking shelter." Women and children—entire families—were among those who perished. One survivor has testified that he lost 40 family members. The attack was meant to annihilate civilians.

This incident illustrates the horror of chemical weapons, and few would dispute the proposition that the world be better off with chemical weapons abolished. But would a chemical-weapon-free zone in the Middle East contribute to regional security?

Unquestionably, it would. It would eliminate the possibility of chemical warfare between states and reduce the risk that non-state actors could capture and utilize state-manufactured chemical weapons. Moreover, recent Western-backed agreements regarding Syria's chemical weapons and Iran's nuclear program have created diplomatic momentum that might be leveraged for establishing a chemical-weapon-free zone. And Syria's accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention and the ongoing dismantlement of its chemical arsenal remove a significant impediment to banning chemical weapons from the region. Israel and Egypt are left as the only Middle Eastern countries not to have ratified the convention.

But Israel seems unlikely to ratify the convention, and declare and destroy any chemical facilities it might have, without assurances that Egypt would do the same. Egypt's public stance, meanwhile, has been consistent: It will not ratify the convention and eliminate its chemical weapons unless Israel joins the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Any change in Egypt's position seems unlikely in light of that country's ongoing political turmoil. And Israel is, if anything, less likely now to accede to the NPT than it was before a deal was struck between Iran and the members of the UN Security Council, plus Germany, that may lead to international acceptance of some elements of Tehran's nuclear program.

World powers with the capacity to pressure either Egypt or Israel on these issues—notably the United States—are clearly distracted by other priorities. The United States would much rather use its precious leverage to ensure a democratic transition in Egypt or achieve progress in negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians.

In any event, establishing a chemical-weapon-free zone would do little to resolve many of the prominent security issues that afflict the region, in particular the Syrian conflict, Iran's nuclear program, and the Israeli-Palestinian issue. Syria's conflict would mostly fall outside negotiations because Damascus has now ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention. Iran would not occupy center stage either because it is has ratified the convention and claims not to possess a chemical weapons program.

In a region where diplomatic breakthroughs are so hard to achieve, it is tempting to reach for the seemingly low-hanging fruit of a regional chemical weapons ban, and even to regard progress on this front as a stepping stone for progress on larger issues. But it is hard to identify the incentives that would motivate Israel and Egypt to officially renounce chemical weapons. Both countries would be likely to regard such a step as exposing them to unacceptable security vulnerabilities—and neither country would perceive much benefit in it.

Opportunity sometimes emerges out of tragedy. Following the August chemical attack near Damascus that killed nearly 1,500 people, an opportunity has arisen for Middle Eastern nations to engage in productive dialogue about establishing a chemical-weapon-free zone in the region.

Without the horror of the August attack, and without the Obama administration’s response to it, the Assad regime would never have considered relinquishing its vast, varied arsenal of chemical weapons. Even though the US Congress appeared skeptical of military action in Syria, Obama’s threat to use targeted force put the survival of the Assad regime in question, and this inspired action by Russia, Iran, and Syria itself. In these countries’ collective view, it was better for Syria to renounce chemical weapons than for Assad to fall.

In the Middle East, opportunities born of crisis are nothing new. After the Gulf War ended in 1991, the United States pushed for the creation of a multilateral mechanism for regional dialogue to complement bilateral talks between Israel and its Syrian, Jordanian, and Palestinian neighbors, which were at the heart of the Madrid peace process. Part of this mechanism was a working group devoted to arms control and regional security.

The working group, which forced Israel and participating Arab states to think seriously about establishing a common vision for Middle East security and arms control, had the potential to produce a novel security architecture for the region. Truly revolutionary ideas about regional security, especially in the realm of confidence-building measures, were developing. But before these ideas could be implemented, the talks were put on hold. A major development that undermined the working group was Egypt’s determined effort (made even though a regional arms control process was on track and making significant headway) to place a Middle East WMD-free zone on the agenda of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The underlying rationale for establishing a zone in the Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction is to enhance security and stability in the region and reduce the risk of destructive war. These goals are worthy, but discussions about weapons and arms control cannot be detached from events within and relationships among states. States are not identical entities—not in their aspirations and interests and not in their behavior—and these differences cannot be ignored when pursuing interstate arms control agreements. Weapons of mass destruction must be considered in context.

Israel has two major concerns about any effort to rid the region of WMD. First, Israel’s policy of nuclear ambiguity and low-profile deterrence is an insurance policy against any enemy that would threaten the state existentially. Such threats are not theoretical—entities that reject Israel’s legitimacy as a sovereign state issue existential threats regularly. Yet in the context of establishing a zone free of weapons of mass destruction, Israel’s neighbors seem bent on addressing the nuclear issue above all. Second, the Middle East suffers from a trust deficit regarding states’ willingness to comply with nonproliferation and disarmament treaties. Four countries in the region—Iraq, Iran, Libya, and Syria—have made commitments about weapons of mass destruction only to conduct clandestine activities aimed at developing the very capabilities they had rejected.

Discussions toward establishing a chemical-weapon-free zone could help address Israel’s concerns. For Israel, entering into an agreement on chemical weapons would represent a major concession—but pursuing such an agreement might also clarify whether other states are interested only in stripping Israel of its insurance policy against annihilation. Dialogue would also allow Israel to consider a chemical-weapons proposal that drew no direct link between Syria and Israel in the chemical realm, as the notion of Israel’s joining the Chemical Weapons Convention would do.

Further, talks could build confidence among Middle Eastern states regarding an entire category of nonconventional weapons. They could begin to address the region’s debilitating deficit of trust. And because discussions would be conducted on a regional basis instead of in the context of global treaties, they would provide nations the experience of working together, especially when it comes to verification of commitments. Indeed, nations could cooperate to create a regional organization for implementation of a chemical-weapon-free zone agreement, drawing on the example of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Discussions would also provide a useful test case for states’ ability to deal constructively with hard-core security issues by means of regional dialogue and cooperation.

Discussions about a chemical-weapon-free zone should begin only after destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons capacity has become irreversible. But ideally, chemical weapons could become part of a broader regional dialogue. (That would depend on the United States and perhaps Russia using the Syrian crisis as a platform for putting broader regional arms control efforts back on track.) Ultimately, the notion of a chemical-weapon-free zone should be integrated into a sorely needed Middle East Regional Security Dialogue Forum, something for which my colleague Shimon Stein and I have argued elsewhere. Such a forum, with inclusive membership and a comprehensive agenda, would allow states to discuss a full range of regional security topics, from the soft to the very hard. If discussions toward banning chemical weapons from the region were to help create such a forum, the discussions would represent a major step toward making the Middle East safer and more secure.

Since the 1950s, the Middle East has experienced numerous conflicts and has consistently been among the most unstable regions in the world. This has made it very difficult to establish a regional security system capable of providing stability and consolidating the norms, values, and institutions that are necessary for long-term peace in the region. In the absence of a functioning regional security system, nations in the Middle East have often responded to conflict by amassing weaponry—weapons of a conventional nature, but also nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.

Calls are now emerging to establish a chemical-weapon-free zone in the region. It would not be surprising if Western nations began exerting strong pressure on Middle Eastern countries to participate in such a zone once the destruction of Syria’s chemical arsenal is complete. But from Egypt’s point of view, the important thing is to rid the region of all weapons of mass destruction—nuclear, chemical, and biological. The rights and interests of people across the region will not be served by establishing a chemical-weapon-free zone as long as Israel continues to possess nuclear weapons.

Major flaws. Because the Middle East lacks a regional security system, management of the region’s weapons of mass destruction has come in part through international arms control treaties and regimes. But the treaty regimes suffer from two core problems. One is that the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is at heart an arms control treaty rather than a disarmament convention. The conventions that cover chemical and biological weapons require nations to destroy their chemical and biological stockpiles shortly after they become parties to the agreements, but the NPT makes no such demands of nuclear weapon states. Indeed, the distinction between nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states means that the treaty is discriminatory in the first place. The second major problem with the treaty regime is that Israel is not a party to the NPT—and, remarkably, is not a member of the conventions governing chemical and biological weapons. (Israel has signed, but not ratified, the Chemical Weapons Convention.)

Because the treaty regime has failed so far to rid the Middle East of nuclear weapons, significant effort has been expended on another disarmament approach—establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Since 1974, Egypt has consistently sponsored resolutions in the UN General Assembly calling for the establishment of such a zone. More significantly, the 1995 NPT Review Conference, which extended the treaty indefinitely, called for a zone to be established. That call was reiterated at the 2010 NPT Review Conference, and practical steps toward establishing a zone were identified. But UN-sponsored efforts to convene a conference on this subject in late 2012 were aborted, with the US Department of State announcing that the meeting could not be convened because of "present conditions in the Middle East" and because "states in the region have not reached agreement on acceptable conditions." Five nuclear-weapon-free zones were established around the world between 1967 and 2006, but attempts to establish a zone for the Middle East have come to nothing (though a number of Middle Eastern countries are parties to the Treaty of Pelindaba, which establishes a nuclear-weapon-free zone for Africa.)

Very little effort, meanwhile, has been expended toward establishing biological- or chemical-weapon-free zones in the Middle East. Why? In the case of biological weapons, technical problems such as the lack of an enforcement mechanism in the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention have prevented the issue from gaining much attention. In the case of chemical weapons, an enforcement mechanism does exist—and in fact the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons performs its job very effectively (including in Syria).

Now that Damascus has acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention, Israel and Egypt are the only states in the region not to have done so. It is these two nations whose participation would be most crucial to establishing a chemical-weapon-free zone. Egypt would be happy to ratify the Chemical Weapons Convention—if doing so meant ridding the region of all weapons of mass destruction. But Egyptians see little point in establishing a zone that is free of chemical weapons but not free of nuclear weapons. So the first step forward is for Israel to accede to all the major global arms agreements—most importantly, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.