In the nuclear order, what role for China?

China’s growing economic and military capabilities may have increased expectations in the United States. But the Chinese Communist Party takes a more modest view of its ability to address geopolitical challenges, including the challenge of nuclear disarmament.

Limits to growth. The Chinese government is responsible for the welfare of nearly a fifth of humanity. According to the World Bank, China ranks 71st among all nations in gross domestic product per capita. Chinese leaders see the enormous size of their population as a significant constraint on the nation's economic capabilities. They wish their counterparts in the United States were more understanding.

Demographic constraints on China’s long-term economic prospects led the Chinese Communist Party to fix military expenditures at approximately 2 percent of GDP: a percentage it has maintained since 1988. Comparatively high rates of annual economic growth have allowed corresponding annual increases in military spending, but as the Chinese economy matures and its growth rate slows, military expenditures are likely to follow suit.

An obligation, not a luxury. China's leaders are aware that their participation in international nuclear arms control negotiations is not predicated on attaining a certain level of economic or military development. They understand that it is required under the terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The most important obligation China incurred by acceding to the NPT in 1992—an obligation it shares with the other four nations (the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, and France) temporarily allowed to retain nuclear weapons—is to "pursue negotiations in good faith" on "a treaty on general and complete disarmament."

By any measure, China is not living up to that commitment. None of the nuclear weapon states are. The successful negotiation of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty—opened for signature in 1996—is the last substantial step toward disarmament undertaken by the nuclear weapon states. China still refuses to ratify the treaty. Chinese arms control experts say their government is waiting for the United States to ratify it first—the United States has signed it, but the Senate hasn't confirmed it—which suggests China's leaders have little interest in playing a more active role in addressing the challenge of nuclear disarmament.

That's unfortunate. China maintains a comparatively small nuclear arsenal that it keeps off alert. The leadership remains committed to the no-first-use policy China announced after its first nuclear test. These policies entitle China to claim a leadership role in international nuclear arms control.

Lead or lose. Chinese leaders may not be aware that their passive approach to nuclear disarmament is a growing diplomatic liability. Defense analysts and policy makers in Washington, Tokyo, and other national capitals suspect China is unwilling to play a more active role in multilateral nuclear disarmament talks because it is preparing to build up its nuclear arsenal, place its nuclear forces on high alert, or alter the nation's no-first-use policy. The Chinese government steadfastly refuses to discuss the size, composition, or operations of its nuclear forces, encouraging these suspicions. Chinese nuclear arms control analysts claim that Chinese silence is a constructive policy because the uncertainty that it creates allows Beijing to deter a nuclear attack without increasing the size or raising the alert level of its nuclear forces. That may be true. But whatever benefit China derives from encouraging doubt about its nuclear capabilities comes at the cost of growing international concern about Beijing's intentions.

Though China's obligation to participate in good-faith disarmament efforts isn't linked to its level of development, there is a connection between China’s increased economic and military capabilities and the growing international concern about the ambitions of China’s leaders. Long-simmering territorial disputes between China and its neighbors are heating up as Beijing applies greater economic leverage and military muscle when pressing sovereign claims. The non-nuclear weapon states on the receiving end of that pressure feel intimidated by China's nuclear capabilities.

More importantly, the anxieties of China's non-nuclear neighbors are a significant factor in Washington's deliberations about its own nuclear forces. US defense officials oppose proposals to declare a no-first-use policy, or de-alert or reduce US nuclear forces, in part because of concerns that these changes would undermine the credibility of Washington's assurances to its Asian allies. China's lack of transparency about the size, composition, and operations of its nuclear forces—however well-intended—makes it more difficult for US proponents of nuclear arms control to overcome official opposition.

Times have changed. Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and the other founders of the People's Republic decided to develop nuclear weapons at a time when they believed the world was in the throes of a revolutionary struggle that could ignite a global war. The Chinese Communist Party no longer views the international situation that way. The report of the 18th Party Congress in 2012 describes an increasingly multipolar, interdependent, and stable world in which China may no longer need nuclear weapons.

In such a world, China's nuclear weapons are in some ways a liability. While the leadership in Beijing says it seeks a more equitable distribution of national authority and influence in this new multipolar world, many US analysts and officials interpret Chinese efforts to achieve that balance as a malicious attempt to displace the United States as a global leader. They argue that China's defense of sovereign claims presages aggressive national ambitions. And they warn that China sees the possession of nuclear weapons as a sine qua non of global leadership.

A recommendation. If China really sees the world in the terms described by the Party Congress, Beijing could take several steps to consolidate the emergence of such a world. One step would be to play a more active role in international nuclear arms control negotiations. Another, more dramatic step would be a unilateral decision to disarm.

The willingness to disarm would undercut the arguments of skeptics who see China as an aggressor seeking regional or global hegemony. It would give China an enormous boost in international prestige, rebalance international relations, and recast international perceptions of China's sovereign claims. A non-nuclear China could more effectively press other nuclear weapon states to follow its example. And a China without nuclear weapons would finally receive from Washington the no-first-use assurance it has sought in bilateral talks on strategic stability.

China arguably has more to gain from getting rid of its nuclear weapons than it does from keeping them, modernizing them, or putting them on alert. As China's leaders seek to rebalance international relations in what they describe as a new and cooperative era of multipolar interdependence, eliminating China's nuclear weapons is a strategic option that deserves serious consideration.

As a natural consequence of China's growing wealth and power, Beijing is becoming increasingly important in the management of the global nuclear order. But this shift comes at a time when the nuclear order itself is facing serious challenges. For two decades, the Conference on Disarmament has conducted no serious multilateral negotiations on nuclear arms control. The threat of further nuclear proliferation is increasing. And the role of nuclear weapons is becoming more central to the national security strategies of some nuclear-armed powers.

China can play an important role in strengthening the nuclear order by coaxing other nations—particularly North Korea and Pakistan—toward greater cooperativeness. But this would require Beijing to pivot away from its current approach to multilateralism, which is defensive and narrowly nationalistic. Instead, Beijing should adopt a broader approach whose aim is to promote global common interests even as China's own national interests are secured.

A realization. The troubles currently besetting the nuclear order are not all China's fault. Still, Beijing does not appear to fully grasp the consequences to its own security of a weakened nonproliferation regime. All great powers benefit from ensuring that nuclear weapons do not spread—nonproliferation is in their self-interest. But nonproliferation also serves a common interest. It was this realization that led the Soviet Union to actively support the establishment of the global nonproliferation regime and to collaborate with the United States on strengthening that regime. So far, the same realization appears not to have dawned on the Chinese leadership.

It is a truism that all states seek to promote their self-interest. Multilateralism is one way to do it. Great powers have much more capacity than other nations to promote their self-interest, but they generally understand that they can accomplish their goals most effectively through multilateral efforts that align their self-interest with the common interest. Even when "the common interest" stacks the deck in favor of great powers, it can still gain wide support if other nations' concerns are given some play as well. This is why the United States took a multilateral route, through the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, toward preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. The treaty is blatantly discriminatory in its distribution of benefits. Nevertheless, Washington was able to convince others that the threat of indiscriminate nuclear proliferation was more important than the treaty's unjust nature. To be sure, the United States chose a long path toward achieving its goals, but embracing multilateralism was probably easiest in the long run.

This is the sort of logic that China will need to internalize. China's power has grown but, paradoxically, power hasn't yet been matched in Beijing by sufficient self-realization about the importance of normative leadership. China still approaches the global nuclear order with a narrow and defensive nationalism—that is, China uses power to defend its self-interest rather than to serve the interests of all members of the international community while also serving its own interests. As long as China's policies remain wedded to narrow self-interest, Beijing will be viewed with suspicion in the global nuclear order and China will find it difficult to enjoy the full measure of its power.

Concrete steps. China can avoid such an outcome by playing a much more active role in three arenas. First, it can work to strengthen the tottering nonproliferation order. Second, it can promote compromise at the Conference on Disarmament. Third, it can join fully in the search for approaches to new international security risks such as those involving space and cyber threats.

A good place for Beijing to begin is by withdrawing its protective shield from North Korea—a country whose recalcitrance threatens the nonproliferation regime as well as China's own long-term security. Once before, China made the mistake of helping a proliferator—Pakistan—acquire nuclear weapons. The result was that India restarted a nuclear weapons program that had been shuttered. The consequences for China were ultimately negative.

China is repeating this mistake when it enables North Korea to thumb its nose at international efforts to eliminate its nuclear weapons program. Though South Korea and Japan have been the focus of Pyongyang's ire, and much worse, they have not responded so far by building their own nuclear arsenals. But they have drawn closer to the United States, tightening an alliance that irritates Beijing. If the United States should grow too weak to honor its security commitments in the region, Seoul and Tokyo would see increased incentives in developing alternative means of ensuring their security, possibly including nuclear weapons.

It is probably too late to get North Korea back into the nonproliferation tent, but China could still assuage concerns in the region by putting greater weight behind international efforts to moderate Pyongyang's behavior. If China strengthened the international consensus on North Korea instead of protecting Pyongyang, it could bolster both the nonproliferation regime and China's own security.

China could also do more to promote compromise and consensus at the Conference on Disarmament. In particular, it could attempt to convince Pakistan to let negotiations proceed.  The deadlock in the conference is mainly due to disagreements about whether the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty should apply only to future production of fissile material or whether existing stocks should also be accounted for. China appears to favor the former option—but Beijing in any event is well positioned to find middle ground between the opposing parties, if it chooses to do so. This would not only move forward the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty but also unlock the broader potential of the moribund conference.

Finally, China could help move forward the stalled debate on emerging threats such as those involving space and cyber—especially the former. China, as a new space power, can understand the anxieties of developing states concerned about arms control agreements that might shut them out of using outer space and also about becoming collateral damage as space competition heats up. China's early moves have not been well considered—its 2007 antisatellite test was ill advised for many reasons. Still, space is an arena that cries out for international leadership. China can make an important contribution.

Today's disorder in the nuclear arena provides China an opportunity to demonstrate multilateral normative leadership even as it promotes its own security. But taking this opportunity will require Beijing to absorb a simple truth: China cannot become more secure by making other nations less so.

China's phenomenal economic growth over the last three decades, along with the country's rising international status, has generated high expectations regarding Beijing's contributions to the global and regional agendas for nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation. At times, these high expectations have led to dissatisfaction with China's current disarmament and nonproliferation portfolio. Indeed, China has come under a lot of criticism in the international press—over Beijing's nuclear cooperation with Pakistan (The Diplomat), Chinese individuals' secret sales of prohibited items to Iran (Newsweek), and Beijing's reluctance to punish North Korea's nuclear provocations (The New York Times). To its critics, China has been both a consistent proliferator and a free rider on (or even a block to) global nonproliferation efforts.

But these criticisms are misleading and simply not objective. The truth is that, since the late 1980s, China has undergone a dramatic transformation in nonproliferation policy and implementation. To be sure, China was skeptical decades ago about the benefits of nonproliferation. But today Beijing is a proactive player in nearly all the major nonproliferation treaties and regimes. Beijing may have failed so far to win membership in the Missile Technology Control Regime, but it has nonetheless observed the regime's guidelines and control lists. China demonstrated increasing interest in nonproliferation when, in 1997, it suspended transfers of nuclear reactors and missile technologies to Iran. Beijing has investigated Chinese entities and individuals suspected of assisting other countries' nuclear programs. Moreover, to close loopholes that have permitted Chinese individuals and privately owned companies to engage in illicit trade activities, Beijing has created new legal and administrative mechanisms that tighten export controls and sanction any exports of restricted goods.

China is also an active participant in multilateral efforts to cope with proliferation challenges. China has taken a leading role in the six-party talks over North Korea's nuclear program. Beijing played a uniquely constructive part in the marathon negotiations that led to the Iran nuclear deal. China has endorsed UN resolutions regarding both the Iranian and North Korean nuclear programs. China was critical to the indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and in negotiations toward the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. China has been a key country in upholding the norms of both the treaty and the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

Despite all this, room for improvement exists in China's implementation of its expanding commitments. China remains in the midst of a great social and economic transformation. It faces enormous challenges in implementing government policy in general—not just where nonproliferation is concerned. Full implementation of national nonproliferation goals will require strengthened legal frameworks, institutional structures, and personnel procedures. Moreover, effective export controls require technical training and expertise at a huge number of state-owned and private companies. It takes time and work to put all this into place. China has taken steps to address these challenges by, for example, conducting joint training courses with other countries.

But additional opportunities exist for Beijing to strengthen its role in nonproliferation. For example, it could play a more proactive role regarding nuclear and missile proliferation challenges on the Korean Peninsula—an issue with profound implications for Northeast Asian stability and for China's own security.

Before the late 1990s, when China was the only nuclear weapon state in Asia, Beijing pursued nonproliferation goals in its own way: by issuing no nuclear threats, basing no nuclear weapons on other countries' soil, extending no nuclear umbrella to other countries, and relying on nuclear weapons only to deter nuclear attacks. Today, given the changed geopolitical landscape around China's periphery, and also given China's growing international influence, Beijing has come to appreciate nuclear nonproliferation more than in years past. Preventing states from going nuclear clearly serves China's current national interests, and nonproliferation should continue to occupy a high place in Beijing's policy agenda. In years to come, with strengthened capacity and greater clout, China will have a larger say in setting regional and global norms and is likely to be an active, responsible stakeholder in nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation.