North Korea’s nuclear weapons: What now?

In January, Pyongyang proudly announced that it had successfully conducted a fourth nuclear test. This time, the North Koreans claimed, they had tested a thermonuclear device. Observers are skeptical.

Thermonuclear or not, the test was a reminder of an unpleasant fact: North Korea, in defiance of the international community and despite significant pressure, has developed nuclear devices. It is working hard to acquire deployable nuclear weapons and delivery systems. This represents arguably the most serious challenge to the nonproliferation regime in decades—and the peculiarities of the North Korean situation mean that the challenge can be only mitigated, not neutralized.

Hard and soft. The US position regarding North Korea's nuclear program, and indeed the position of the entire international community, is simple: Nothing but "complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization" will do. Unfortunately, this demand is hopelessly unrealistic. North Korean decision makers have valid reasons for believing they should retain their nuclear weapons no matter what. And the world is utterly lacking in means to undermine that belief.

To start with, North Korea is a small dictatorship, run by a hereditary elite, and surrounded by hostile, richer neighbors. Domestically, the country's leaders face a latent threat of popular rebellion; internationally, they are afraid of a US attack. Their problems are exacerbated by South Korea, whose existence makes possible a "German scenario"—that is, regime collapse followed by absorption of the entire country into a much richer neighbor. Ordinary North Koreans might welcome such an eventuality, as a majority of East Germans once did. But for the ruling elite, it would mean losing power and perhaps paying a price for the gross human rights abuses of the past decades. Thus the North Korean government believes it needs a deterrent that can prevent both a foreign invasion (Iraq style) and foreign support for an internal rebellion (Libya style). Nuclear weapons are the only such deterrent.

So far, attempts to achieve the Holy Grail of denuclearization have followed two lines. The soft line is essentially to purchase North Korea's weapons—to exchange economic benefits for Pyongyang's nuclear program. The hard line involves sanctions—making life more difficult for the North Korean people, generating internal pressure for a change in policy, and thus pushing North Korea toward denuclearization.

Attempts to bribe North Koreans into denuclearization are hopeless. Recent history has taught North Korea's rulers that they should not trust outsiders' sweet promises. North Koreans remember that the only dictator who ever exchanged his nuclear weapons acquisition program for promises of economic aid was Libya's Muammar Qaddafi, who paid for that decision with his life. They also remember that Ukraine agreed in 1994 to the removal of the nuclear warheads it had inherited from the Soviet Union. Ukraine did so in exchange for a Russian, British, and US guarantee of territorial integrity, a guarantee hardly worth the paper it was printed on. North Korean diplomats also know the sorry fate of Iraq's Saddam Hussein—and they keep saying that the only reason he was overthrown and killed was that he lacked nuclear weapons. North Korea's leaders believe that, without nuclear weapons, they will become dangerously vulnerable. For them, losing power doesn't mean writing memoirs in the south of France. It means prison time—or an appointment with a lamppost.

Attempts to achieve denuclearization through sanctions are equally hopeless. Sanctions work in an indirect way, by making life within a country difficult for both common people and the elite. Unhappiness about material difficulties causes people to exert pressure on the government and to demand revisions in the policies that have provoked international sanctions. In democratic or semi-democratic states, such popular pressure can be exerted through elections. In less liberal societies, a revolution or a coup is always possible.

But the sanctions effort against North Korea has been quietly sabotaged by China. Chinese diplomats, though they are unhappy about North Korea's nuclear ambitions and brinksmanship, still have valid reasons to prefer the status quo of a relatively stable but divided Korean Peninsula. Even if China changes its approach—which, in fact, might be happening right now—it is still doubtful that sanctions would change Pyongyang's stance on nuclear weapons. Even if sanctions ruined the North Korean economy, which has recently experienced something of a recovery, sanctions would still be unlikely to deliver the desired political results. Even if sanctions provoked a massive famine, they would be unlikely to deliver those results.

This is because the North Korean people simply have no way to influence government policy. They are docile and terrified. They live in a country where the ratio of prisoners to the general population is roughly the same as it was in Joseph Stalin's Russia. They live in a country whose elections are known the world over for delivering a "100 percent approval rate" to government candidates, and for doing so since 1957.

Members of the North Korean elite, meanwhile, have good reasons to avoid staging a coup. Even a successful coup would provoke instability, which in turn would make revolution possible. A revolution, followed by unification, would see the entire elite removed from power and perhaps even forced to pay a price for their wrongdoing. The elite perceives no benefit in rocking the boat—no matter how much they miss their favorite Hennessy cognac.

Stop wasting time. Unfortunately, US and UN policy tends to oscillate between the hard line and the soft line. Neither is going to work. Pursuing the impossible goal of denuclearization can even be considered dangerous because it wastes time that could be spent pursuing the far more realistic goal of freezing North Korea's nuclear potential. A freeze would come at a price, of course—North Koreans do nothing for free. North Korea would halt its nuclear program and refrain from testing nuclear weapons or conducting missile launches. But, essentially for deterrence purposes, it would retain the technology and hardware it has amassed already. In exchange, the United States and the international community would make numerous political concessions and perhaps provide substantial aid.

This compromise may sound unfair. But unlike the dream of denuclearization, it is realistic. Unfortunately, the world still chases what's impossible, switching from the hard line to the soft line and back again—while the North Koreans stay busy making more and better nuclear weapons.

In an address to the Workers' Party Congress on May 7, Kim Jong-un told his audience that North Korea was "a responsible nuclear weapon state" that would not use nuclear weapons—"unless its sovereignty is encroached upon by any aggressive hostile forces with nukes." He pledged to "strive for global denuclearization"—but he emphasized the continuation of the "byungjin line," a policy that seeks simultaneous development of North Korea's economy and its nuclear programs. Kim's remarks can be seen as an outright rejection of international calls for Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear weapons.

Over the past seven years, while six-party talks have been derailed, North Korea has strengthened its nuclear arsenal. The North is believed to have amassed nuclear materials steadily, and is now estimated by some sources to possess about 10 nuclear warheads. Pyongyang conducted a fourth nuclear test in January. It possesses a wide variety of delivery vehicles, which range from short-range Scud-type missiles to intermediate-range Nodong and Musudan missiles to—perhaps—submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Pyongyang is close to developing intercontinental ballistic missiles and claims to have made progress miniaturizing and diversifying its nuclear warheads as well.

A nuclear North Korea poses serious security threats to the Korean Peninsula, all of Northeast Asia, and the world. North Korean nuclear weapons significantly alter the military balance on the peninsula and ultimately impede peaceful co-existence there. The regional security impacts are likewise profound—a nuclear domino effect might lead to proliferation elsewhere in Northeast Asia. And the possibility exists that North Korea will export nuclear materials, technology, and even warheads to other regions, threatening the very foundations of world security in this age of global terrorism.

So what's the way out of the North Korean nuclear quagmire? Sanctions have accomplished little. Military confrontation is not an option. Now as ever, negotiations are the only path forward. But it's also the case that negotiations can succeed—if negotiators are practical, flexible, and willing to listen to Pyongyang carefully.

What won't work. Today, international approaches to the North Korean nuclear problem are based on international sanctions and on the logic of crime and punishment. According to this approach, North Korea's crimes—possession of nuclear weapons and violation of UN resolutions—must be punished through forceful, comprehensive sanctions. Such sanctions, the thinking goes, will cause so much discomfort in the North that the regime will be at risk of collapse and Kim Jung-un will be compelled to choose denuclearization. But North Korea is not Iran. It is a very closed society and very accustomed to sanctions. China, meanwhile, is unlikely to enforce sanctions that undermine stability in the North. And Pyongyang's typical behavior pattern has been to exhibit greater defiance as more pressure is exerted. Linking sanctions to regime collapse—an idea common in Seoul, Washington, and Tokyo alike—seems presumptuous and misguided.

Some pundits in Seoul argue that South Korea should counter Pyongyang's nuclear threats by developing an indigenous nuclear arms program. But as soon as South Korea declared a nuclear weapons campaign, it would face strong headwinds. The country's nuclear power industry—run entirely for commercial purposes—would be ruined. So would Seoul's traditional alliance with Washington. South Korea would likely be slapped with international sanctions, sending the economy into a tailspin. Moreover, a series of nuclear dominos could fall in Northeast Asia—starting with South Korea, spreading to Japan, and perhaps even reaching Taiwan. But it's unrealistic in the first place to believe Seoul could use a nuclear program as leverage against North Korea (and China). For one thing, Seoul does not even have operational control of its own forces during wartime (in the event of hostilities on the Peninsula, South Korean forces would come under the control of a US commander). For another, a South Korean nuclear weapons program would give Japanese conservatives an excuse to expand the Japanese military. South Korean nuclear weapons are simply the wrong response to North Korean nuclear weapons.

A pre-emptive attack on the North, or military action of any kind, is also out of the question. Even putting aside the violations of international norms that an attack would entail, the military option would fail because of North Korea's formidable defensive capabilities. And any pre-emptive attack could easily escalate into a full-fledged war and jeopardize the lives and property of South Koreans. The United States is well aware of these risks, and of the fundamental limitations on military force on the Korean Peninsula. The United States can destroy North Korea—but it cannot win a war over it.

Dialogue and the search for a negotiated settlement are the only viable options. Dialogue hasn't worked in the past—but that's no reason to dismiss it. What's needed is a new and inventive approach to seeking a negotiated settlement. Such an approach requires a willingness to listen, a practical attitude, and a good deal of flexibility.

What might work. If the parties negotiating with North Korea wish to find solutions acceptable to all sides, they must speak their minds—but also hear out Pyongyang. Being deaf to the North's concerns is a path that only leads to the exits. Talking and listening to Pyongyang requires putting oneself in the North's shoes and encouraging the North to do likewise. And dialogue will only be hindered if the North is portrayed as an untrustworthy rogue state or if unilateral preconditions are insisted upon.

Negotiations with Pyongyang must also be practical and realistic. Goals must be adjusted according to circumstances. Specifically, since the North cannot be forced, completely and quickly, to dismantle its nuclear weapons, the short-term goal should be a moratorium on Pyongyang's nuclear programs. A moratorium would prevent the North from making further technical progress and from producing additional nuclear materials. Indeed, Pyongyang has repeatedly said it would cease nuclear activities if certain terms were met, so a viable exit strategy might already exist in the step-by-step approach, proposed by Stanford scholar Siegfried Hecker, of freezing, rolling back, and verifiably dismantling the North's arsenal.

Finally, flexibility is required. All possible cards must be on the table in negotiations with North Korea. These "cards" could include temporarily halting joint military drills between South Korea and the United States; negotiating a peace treaty to replace the armistice that brought the Korean War to a close; formally accepting North Korea's right to peaceful uses of atomic energy and to a space program; and normalizing diplomatic relations between North Korea and the United States. These possibilities must not be excluded just because Pyongyang demands them. Moreover, conducting dialogue on these issues would provide a way to probe Pyongyang's intentions and demand accountability for any North Korean breach of faith.

At this critical juncture, Realpolitik is desperately required. And those who negotiate with North Korea should bear in mind that time isn't necessarily on their side.

With North Korea having conducted its fourth nuclear test in January, the Korean Peninsula seems more distant than ever from denuclearization. Given this reality, what's the most effective way to approach the nuclear problem?

The obstacles to progress are enormous. Pyongyang's inclinations are strongly realist, and the country's leadership sees nuclear deterrence as the ultimate guarantee of security. It will likely continue to see things that way for some time. The North perceives Washington's attitude as essentially realist as well—so Pyongyang is likely betting that US policy toward North Korea will eventually change direction. This is especially true considering that Washington experiences regime change every four or eight years.

The North may in fact believe that Washington, once it accepts the nuclear reality on the Korean Peninsula, will ease sanctions. This calculus may make sense. The United States never approved of Israel's possession of nuclear weapons, but it has had to live with the hard reality of a nuclear Israel—and protect Tel Aviv from the establishment of a Middle East nuclear-weapon free zone. Nor does Washington approve of a nuclear India, and indeed it imposed sanctions on New Delhi following India's 1998 nuclear test. But those sanctions were lifted within days of the 9/11 terror attacks. In 2008 the United States even waived its ban on civilian nuclear cooperation with India—a ban it had imposed through the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which it helped create in 1975 precisely to punish India for its "peaceful" nuclear test in 1974. As for Pakistan, the United States designated that country a major non-NATO ally in 2004 in order to gain Islamabad's cooperation in the fight against terrorism—despite Pakistan's development of nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, President Obama is pursuing normalized relations with Cuba after decades of hostility between Washington and Havana. All this may encourage Pyongyang to believe that Washington will not wait additional decades to normalize relations with North Korea.

Meanwhile, China and North Korea have been allies for decades. But China has been cooperating more closely with the United States on sanctions against North Korea, so Pyongyang likely feels betrayed by Beijing. Then again, considering the rising distrust that characterizes Washington and Beijing's relationship, the North may be betting that China will hedge against any future possibility of US reconciliation with the North.

North Korea has certainly noted China's insistence that sanctions against Pyongyang must not generate instability on the Peninsula, risk war, or create humanitarian problems. China is simply unwilling, whether Pyongyang has nuclear weapons or not, to see North Korea collapse. This stance would seem to ensure North Korea's survival. In fact, Beijing may be more concerned about Washington's "rebalancing" in Asia than it is about Pyongyang's nuclear program. Beijing and Washington may cooperate on North Korea to some degree, but they don't trust each other, and both sides will hedge their bets. This could well play into North Korea's hands, and compromise the effectiveness of US-China collaboration.

Consequently, the Korean Peninsula won't likely be free of nuclear weapons any time soon. So any successful approach to the Korean nuclear issue must be incremental, pragmatic, and cooperative in nature; and must provide assurances to all sides. North Korea will only be enticed by denuclearization proposals that espouse a win-win philosophy.

What might be workable, on an interim basis, is to demand of North Korea a "three noes" policy: no further development of nuclear weapons (including nuclear tests); no transfers of nuclear weapons outside North Korean territory; and no using (or threatening to use) nuclear weapons. Essentially, Pyongyang would be asked to accept a "nuclear freeze" regime—which would include a unilateral arms control ceiling and an appropriate verification system. In return, North Korea would receive a package of benefits including a multilateral security assurance arrangement; initiation of a diplomatic process toward normalization of North Korea's relations with the United States and other nations; and removal of economic, trade, and investment sanctions—if Pyongyang adheres to the "three noes."

Clearly, such a process wouldn't achieve denuclearization at once. But North Korea is adamant about not relinquishing its nuclear capabilities, so any path toward disarmament must be phased. Establishing denuclearization as a short-term objective would only invite total failure. It's better just to get the ball rolling with diplomacy.

Essentially, the goal of the "three noes" would be to establish a productive atmosphere of cooperative nuclear restraint. In some ways, this formula resembles the approach underlying the Iran nuclear deal. In negotiations toward that deal, the international community could not prevail on Iran to accept complete, verifiable, and irreversible dismantlement of its nuclear programs. But Iran did commit itself to eliminating the lion's share of its uranium enrichment capacity—though it nonetheless retains certain nuclear fuel cycle competencies. The point is that both sides compromised: Iran obtained sanctions relief by curtailing its dubious nuclear operations, while the international community greatly reduced the risk that Iran will become a nuclear weapon state, even if complete dismantlement wasn't achievable.

If this model were followed on the Korean Peninsula—if nuclear tensions were contained through cooperative, incremental measures aimed at nuclear threat reduction—the international community (North Korea included) could reinvigorate a diplomatic process toward a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. Once the initial stages of the approach succeeded, Pyongyang's leadership might transform its outlook toward the importance of nuclear arms in national security. Eventually the North might be ready to take concrete steps toward eliminating its entire nuclear arsenal.

Denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula is a distant prospect. Such a prospect draws no closer as long as the world rejects pragmatic engagement with the North.