Too late for missile nonproliferation?

The genie of missile technology is so far out of the bottle that getting it back in is simply unworkable, if not completely impossible. More than two dozen states have already acquired the scientific, technological, and industrial capacity to produce ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, or both. Much of the technology in question is more than 70 years old. Much missile-relevant technology, knowledge, and materials have by now become dual-use—meaning that their civilian and commercial applications are legitimate and widespread. Efforts to restrain the spread of missiles are undermined by the passage of time.

This is true in particular for export controls—a wide variety of arrangements meant to curb the flow of both finished missiles and relevant technologies and materials to nations that do not already possess them. Ever-expanding global trade is eroding, day by day, the effectiveness of export and technology controls. Easy, affordable cross-border travel is doing likewise. So are stunning advances in the storage and dissemination of data, visible in such everyday applications as the internet.

Adding to the strain, some states heretofore viewed as "good guys" on the nonproliferation scene are developing a keen interest in conventionally-tipped missiles—both ballistic missiles with relatively short ranges and cruise missiles with relatively long ranges. South Korea and Turkey are two such states. Others may join the list soon.

Why are these nations pursuing these technologies? Conventional wisdom used to maintain that ballistic missiles, unless coupled with nuclear warheads, were so inaccurate that they couldn't provide a tactically useful alternative to air power. Any state without ambitions to acquire nuclear weapons, yet with ample financial resources and the political standing needed to access advanced elements of air power, would therefore prefer combat aircraft. But not anymore. Why the shift?

In Seoul and Ankara, part of the explanation is exasperation with rivals next door—with persistent missile development in North Korea, Iran, and Russia, and with those nations' diversifying, ever-expanding missile arsenals. But equally if not more important is progress in a number of technologies that enable missile development. These include data processing and computing, miniaturization of electronics, navigation, and advanced materials. Strides in these areas are giving rise to a new generation of cruise missiles and tactical (shorter-range) ballistic missiles with greater accuracy, reliability, and affordability than their forebears of the infamous Scud generation. Shorter-range ballistic missiles, with their accuracy measured in meters, have become effective tools for taking out high-value, well-defended targets deep inside an adversary's territory. Once such a missile is fired, impact on the target is virtually guaranteed. The same can hardly be said of strike aircraft.

So if technological advances are transforming ballistic and cruise missiles into useful, affordable assets in conventional warfare, and if a strong demand-side pull results, are the days of export and technology controls over? Is it time to stop worrying about such controls altogether?

No; giving up on controls would not be wise.

Export and technology controls continue to make life difficult for existing and would-be proliferators. They increase costs, lengthen development times, and erect political and psychological barriers. But today's controls, which were devised more than three decades ago under the scope of the Missile Technology Control Regime, are in need of refocusing and readjustment. The regime's blanket restrictions are not keeping up with new developments in the field, and their impact is spread too thin. A more effective approach would be to concentrate controls on the items and sectors most critical to missile proliferation.

For example, controls could focus on longer-range missiles. The longer a missile's range, the less it depends on dual-use, widely available know-how and materials. So developing longer-range missiles presents proliferators with a number of technical and technological challenges—such as the imperative to equip missiles with a second or even a third stage. Likewise, proliferators must learn to cope with the extreme stress and heat caused by re-entry into Earth's atmosphere. These challenges saddle proliferators with increased risks and skyrocketing costs. They also demand access to a variety of specialized items and technologies—exotic materials involved in atmospheric re-entry, ingredients for propellants, and know-how for multi-staging and separation control. Export and technology controls can achieve their greatest impact if they concentrate on longer-range missiles, which already present proliferators with the greatest challenges.

Yet export controls must not be the only means to deal with missile proliferation. Another useful approach would be to limit—and ideally eliminate—all missile tests. Refining a missile's design and ensuring its reliability require multiple tests. For proliferators, therefore, the need for comprehensive flight testing constitutes an Achilles' heel; if they cannot test, their missile development and deployment will be delayed, and perhaps prevented altogether. This is especially the case for longer-range missiles. And curbing tests of long-range ballistic missiles provides a further advantage: Such missiles are the most likely candidates to carry nuclear warheads. Nascent and even established proliferators must try to confirm the reliability of their missiles. Otherwise, a malfunctioning missile launched during wartime would equate to a wasted nuclear warhead. A malfunctioning missile carrying a nuclear warhead would also create open-ended safety risks by virtue of its fissile material.

The good news is that a basis for instituting a test ban already exists: a UN-sponsored mechanism known as the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation. This voluntary, non-binding agreement—adopted in 2002, with signatories now totaling more than 135—involves annual reporting of ballistic missile testing and provisions for pre-launch notification. The code's effectiveness could be reinforced and augmented in a variety of ways—for example, by expanding the code's membership, strengthening compliance mechanisms, and adding cruise missiles, hypersonic vehicles, and even missile defense to the code's purview. The code could also be revised to incorporate measures regarding transparency, confidence building, and crisis management—measures that some states have already implemented via bilateral agreements.

Finally, horizontal missile proliferation (that is, missiles spreading to a larger number of states) might be restrained through missile defense, which is rapidly maturing. To be sure, missile defense systems are extremely costly and are only available to a handful of wealthy, technologically advanced states. And missile defense umbrellas that these states extend will not reassure everyone. So perhaps an international code of conduct could be developed to provide assurances that non-missile states coming under a missile threat would automatically receive missile defense assistance from willing and able members of the international community. Such a code of conduct might be largely symbolic, and the fulfillment of its promises might depend very much on context. But a code would help establish international norms against deploying and using missiles—and would provide some peace of mind to nations that choose not to engage in missile development.

In January, North Korea conducted its fourth nuclear test—detonating its "first hydrogen bomb," or so Pyongyang claimed. Since then, the North has conducted a series of missile tests, the latest a June 22 launch into high altitude of an intermediate-range ballistic missile (the Hwasong-10 or, as it's known to the outside world, the Musudan). This test, after five launch failures in a row, was "successful." North Korea's missile program is advancing steadily—and Pyongyang is miniaturizing nuclear warheads successfully enough to mount them on various ballistic missiles with Musudan-type engines. This skill can be applied to the country's first intercontinental ballistic missile, the KN-08, currently under development.

Immediately after the June 22 test, the UN Security Council strongly condemned North Korea's ballistic missile launches. It was the fifth such condemnation this year. The Security Council noted that "these repeated acts are in grave violation of obligations under the relevant resolutions" and that "these activities contribute to the development of the country's nuclear weapons delivery systems and increase tension." Since 2006 the Security Council has adopted five major resolutions imposing or strengthening sanctions on North Korea because of its nuclear weapons program. The United Nations has also issued numerous condemnations of North Korea's missile, "rocket," or "satellite" launches.

The international community's harsh, persistent criticism of North Korea's missile and rocket launches highlights the basic reality that missiles are integral parts of nuclear weapons. But oddly, only North Korea's missile tests are subject to such harsh condemnation. Tests conducted by other countries, even Iran, do not draw so much attention. To be sure, North Korea's nuclear weapons program makes Pyongyang's missile development seem more threatening. But missiles are a critical component of all countries' nuclear weapons—so missile proliferation deserves as much concern, and the same efforts at prevention, as nuclear proliferation deserves.

Major nuclear powers such as the United States, Russia, and China constantly conduct missile tests to expand their offensive capabilities. In so doing they provoke a sense of insecurity among other states. Arguably, the major powers' advanced and precisely guided missiles only provide an incentive for other nations to develop nuclear weapons; nuclear weapons, meanwhile, drive the development of advanced missiles. The two together maximize a nation's potential to effect destruction, thereby—many believe—making deterrence more credible. Then again, missiles armed with conventional warheads can be regarded as a substitute for nuclear weapons. South Korea, for example, has invested great resources in developing ballistic and cruise missiles with ever longer ranges, apparently in an effort to counter or compete with North Korea's nuclear weapons program. In any event, the missile proliferation agenda shouldn't confine itself narrowly to controversial cases such as North Korea's missile program or China's missile trade with the Middle East.

Unfortunately, institutional and legal arrangements for reining in the missile trade are inadequate and in danger of losing their relevance. The Missile Technology Control Regime was established in 1987 as a voluntary mechanism to limit the spread of ballistic missiles and other unmanned delivery systems that could be used for attacks using weapons of mass destruction. The regime's 35 members include most of the world's key missile manufacturers, and members are expected to restrict their exports of missiles (and related technologies) capable of delivering a 500-kilogram payload at least 300 kilometers, or of delivering any type of WMD. While the regime is credited with having slowed or halted several missile programs, it has some weaknesses. The regime involves no commitment to restrain existing missile arsenals or to achieve missile disarmament. It entails "no international monitoring or verification measures to detect and forestall interstate transfers" of missile technology and production. Its export controls on dual-use goods are strict and rigid. This stands in the way of civilian technology cooperation and undermines the economic interests of suppliers and recipients alike. And as the regime is non-binding, its implementation tends to be arbitrary—the United States and South Korea, for example, reached a deal in 2012 extending the maximum allowable range of Seoul's ballistic missiles from 300 kilometers to 800, and their maximum payload from 500 kilograms to as much as 1.5 metric tons, far exceeding limits specified under the regime. Arbitrary enforcement undermines the regime's legitimacy—and the regime's salience seems to be fading, with missile proliferation nowadays receiving scant attention compared to security concerns such as nuclear security and terrorism.

As the regime is rendered impotent, the result will be less effective control of dual-use technologies applicable to missiles—modern missiles, after all, contain various advanced technologies that also appear in space applications and elsewhere. Effective control over these technologies won't likely be exerted by complementary regulatory structures such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group or the Wassenaar Arrangement. The government of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe did little to remedy the problem when in April 2014 it set aside the "Three Principles," a ban on exports of weapons, military hardware, and technology in place since 1967. As I have discussed elsewhere, Japan was already a major supplier of advanced civilian dual-use technologies with possible military applications even when the Three Principles remained in force. Japan's participation in the global arms business as a supplier of advanced military technologies and components will only exacerbate the missile proliferation problem.

Nuclear weapons consist of nuclear warheads and delivery systems. The two are inseparable. This fundamental fact, whether intentionally or unintentionally, is often left out of the discourse on nuclear disarmament. Nuclear nonproliferation efforts that neglect missile proliferation are bound to be unproductive—indeed, missile proliferation is the hidden, driving force behind nuclear proliferation. If the world is ever to be free of nuclear weapons, it is time to start addressing missile nonproliferation and nuclear disarmament as two inseparable elements of the same agenda.

It is a supreme irony that even if the spread of missile technology can be constrained, proliferation of missiles will likely remain unconstrained. Today, more than 30 countries possess missiles with ranges of 150 kilometers or greater. In 2016 alone, nations including China, India, Iran, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, and the United States have conducted a spate of missiles tests meant either to develop new missiles or improve existing ones. Most if not all of these tests have showcased missiles based primarily on indigenous technology—underlining the reality that technology denial alone will not prevent missile development.

A few factors help explain these proliferation trends. First, in the words of a UN panel of government experts, "there is still no universal norm, treaty, or agreement governing the development, testing, production, acquisition, possession, transfer, deployment, or use of missiles." To be sure, concern over missiles is a matter of broad consensus, particularly for missiles capable of carrying nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. But little agreement exists about how to address the WMD missile challenge. At best, the UN Security Council has produced country-specific resolutions regarding instances of missile proliferation that threaten international peace and security, for example where Iran and North Korea are concerned.

Second, a general diffusion of information and technology from the original suppliers means that almost any country that decides to acquire WMD-capable missiles will, regardless of its economic strength and technological capability, manage to do so—despite the best efforts of the international community. Sanctions, or constraints on technology transfers, might slow a missile program. But they are unlikely to stop it if the country is determined.

Third, even if the majority of proliferating countries must beg, borrow, or steal technology and materials in the initial stages of their WMD-capable missile programs, they will eventually establish indigenous capabilities—thus insulating themselves against sanction regimes that seek to block the export of weapon-related dual-use technology.

Two paths. Missile proliferation is difficult to address partly because proliferators, motivations and capabilities for proliferation, and missiles themselves are all quite diverse. Today's missiles vary from man-portable, shoulder-fired, anti-armor missiles with ranges in the hundreds of meters—to missiles weighing some 100,000 kilograms at launch, capable of carrying multiple nuclear warheads, and with ranges exceeding 10,000 kilometers. Almost all nations possess missiles, though their holdings vary considerably in quantitative and qualitative terms. In recent years, even terrorist groups and armed non-state actors have acquired and used man-portable missiles with ranges under 150 kilometers, allowing them to threaten targets such as civilian aircraft.

Against this backdrop, two general approaches to missile proliferation have emerged. The approaches are not mutually exclusive and indeed often overlap. The first is a series of political and diplomatic initiatives at the bilateral, regional, and global levels, including the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, and three successive UN panels of government experts.

The INF Treaty, signed by the United States and the Soviet Union in 1987, successfully eliminated ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. But the treaty is now in danger of unraveling as Moscow threatens to withdraw from it, partly because of Washington's withdrawal from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. The Missile Technology Control Regime has had its own limitations. The regime, established in 1987 primarily to curtail the spread of missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, has failed to garner universal appeal because of two key shortcomings. First, its scope was initially restricted to ballistic missiles (and, later, other unmanned delivery systems) capable of delivering WMD or carrying a 500-kilogram payload a distance of 300 kilometers. Conventionally armed cruise missiles were ignored. Second, the regime focuses on horizontal proliferation (the spread of missiles to newer states) rather than on vertical proliferation (qualitative and quantitative improvements in missiles by existing missile-possessing states).

Regime members, partly in response to the regime's shortcomings, initiated the Hague Code of Conduct, which came into effect in 2002. Unlike the regime, the code does not seek to prevent states from acquiring or possessing WMD-capable ballistic missiles. It merely seeks to promote responsible behavior, through confidence-building and transparency measures, regarding ballistic missiles (though not cruise missiles). While 138 nations have signed on to the code, several key states that possess WMD-capable missiles have not done so—among them China, North Korea, Iran, Israel, and Pakistan.

The second primary approach to missile proliferation involves military and technological initiatives—such as the 2003 invasion of Iraq (intended in part to destroy Iraq's nuclear and missile programs) and the development of missile defenses.

The Iraq invasion, of course, was meant not just to disarm Iraq but to dissuade other nations, particularly Iran and North Korea, from pursuing missile and nuclear capabilities. But Iran, far from abandoning its contentious programs, embarked on an effort to build missiles capable of delivering a one–metric ton warhead more than 2,000 kilometers away. North Korea, meanwhile, began a series of WMD-capable missile tests that has continued despite increasingly severe international sanctions. The unintended consequences of the 2003 Iraq War, still reverberating more than a decade later, make it highly unlikely that such an approach will be repeated in the near future.

Missile defense programs, meanwhile—which seek to develop the capacity to detect, intercept, and destroy ballistic missiles before they strike their targets—are maturing at a rapid pace and now threaten to undermine strategic stability among the United States, Russia, and China. The latter two countries have embarked on their own missile defense projects, even as they object to the US program. Additional nations, including India, Israel, Japan, and South Korea, will likely deploy or improve missile defense systems in the foreseeable future as a response to missile proliferation. While the effectiveness of these systems remains unproven in many cases, they are sometimes perceived as a partial panacea for the missile threat.

Political and diplomatic initiatives against missile proliferation have been somewhat limited in their effectiveness; the same can be said of military action and missile defense. Yet both approaches are likely to persist. Political and diplomatic initiatives remain crucial to building the norms and instruments that might constrain proliferation, and are also key to encouraging responsible behavior among states that already possess strategic missiles. And the chance remains that these initiatives might one day gain universal adherence.

Military action and missile defense will likely have limited appeal going forward—especially the latter, which is available only to nations that can develop missile defense capabilities on their own or gain protection from another country that possesses such capabilities. But even if missile defense represents a way to respond to missile proliferation, it isn't likely to curb proliferation. To the contrary, all indications are that missile defense will produce yet more vertical missile proliferation—as nations try to defeat missile defense systems with overwhelming numbers of missiles or other countermeasures.