US no-first-use: The view from Asia

Instituting a no-first-use policy would represent sound judgment by Barack Obama—at least in terms of international politics. This policy shift would to some extent reconcile Obama's quest for eventual nuclear disarmament with the formidable nuclear arsenal that Washington still possesses. It would provide a sense of consistency with Obama's 2009 declaration that the United States would "seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons"—and with Obama's own concerns about nuclear security, demonstrated through the series of Nuclear Security Summits that he initiated.

Pronouncements such as the declaration of a no-first-use policy provide useful indications about the policy thrusts of governments in general and administrations in particular. They help countries better understand each other's defense policies and postures. They serve as confidence-building measures—which, at least according to their advocates, can enhance global peace and stability and reduce both tensions and trust deficits among competing powers. Still, a no-first-use declaration by the United States would be merely a declaration. Would it really do anything substantive to keep the nuclear peace? I tend to doubt it.

Adversaries and allies. Some argue that the only purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter a first strike by another nuclear-armed state. They argue that nuclear weapons' deterrence capacity lies in the ability to launch a second strike, not a first one. I believe otherwise—that nuclear attacks are deterred both by the ability to strike back and by the readiness to strike first. If a nation is perceived by adversaries as having "one arm deliberately tied behind its back," as Arthur Herman of the Hudson Institute has written, those adversaries may actually be encouraged to strike first, targeting nuclear assets in the process. If that's the case, declaring a no-first-use policy would undermine nuclear deterrence.

Then again, preemptive nuclear attack is not the only type of aggression that must be deterred. Take China's territorial claims in the South China Sea as an example. Washington's avowed policy is not to take sides in disputes over territory in the South China Sea, but Beijing perceives the United States as having taken up the cudgel for Southeast Asian nations, specifically the Philippines and Vietnam. Would the United States ever use nuclear weapons first in a conflict with China over the South China Sea? Perhaps not, but a no-first-use policy would remove all doubt in Beijing. Thus China might pursue its territorial claims even more aggressively—notwithstanding the Permanent Court of Arbitration's July ruling that the "nine-dash line" on which Beijing bases its broad claims in the South China Sea has no foundation in international law.

A no-first-use policy might also lead to greater aggressiveness in Pyongyang. Though North Korea has always argued that the US nuclear threat is among the fundamental reasons for its own pursuit of nuclear weapons, it would be naïve to think that Pyongyang would abandon nuclear weapons just because Washington adopted no-first-use. Rather, one can easily imagine a no-first-use declaration emboldening North Korea to pursue its nuclear program even more aggressively. Declaring a no-first-use policy simply sends the wrong message to potential aggressors. The most pragmatic approach is for nuclear weapon states to maintain some ambiguity about whether and why they might use nuclear weapons first—as the United States currently does.

Declaring a no-first-use policy could also undermine the credibility of the nuclear umbrella that the United States extends to its partners, and this could lead allies to produce nuclear weapons of their own. Japan, if it decides to produce nuclear weapons, has both the technology and the fissile material to do so easily. South Korea, with its strong technology base and its large civilian nuclear energy sector, is also eminently capable of developing nuclear weapons. If such scenarios play out—if allies began to doubt US security assurances—no-first-use would contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons and undermine efforts to eliminate them.

As already mentioned, some US allies in Southeast Asia harbor concerns about China's territorial claims in the South China Sea. But the Association of Southeast Asian Nations would likely welcome a US no-first-use policy as a step toward establishing Southeast Asia as the true nuclear-weapon-free zone that was envisioned in the 1995 Treaty of Bangkok. The treaty, unfortunately, has not yet been fully realized because the five recognized nuclear weapon states haven't agreed to its associated protocol. Without the protocol, the Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone remains merely an idea on a piece of paper.

When President Barak Obama's second term ends in four months, how will he be remembered? As the first African-American president, certainly. But his legacy will also include consequential achievements such as overseeing an economic recovery and expanding access to health care. He'll be remembered for his efforts to slow climate change and, in foreign policy, his pivot to Asia. But another major initiative is reportedly under consideration at the White House—the declaration of a nuclear no-first-use policy.

Nuclear disarmament has been a top priority of Obama's presidency. In April 2009, when Obama had been in office less than three months, he delivered his inspiring Prague speech—in which he pledged to launch a new era of nuclear disarmament and declared "America's commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons." Six months later he won the Nobel Peace Prize, partly on account of his utopian vision for, and commitment to, a nuclear-free world.

In the years since, Obama has devoted considerable effort to nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation. He oversaw negotiations with Russia toward the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and won confirmation for the treaty in the US Senate. He initiated the Nuclear Security Summit process. He led the United States and other powers in intense negotiations that succeeded in dissuading Iran from developing nuclear arms—even if the international community, despite imposing harsh sanctions on Pyongyang, has so far been unable to halt North Korea's nuclear weapons program.

Does Obama feel morally obligated to pursue nuclear disarmament because the United States is the only country to have used nuclear weapons in wartime? Perhaps—in May he became the first sitting US president to visit Hiroshima since the city was destroyed by an atom bomb in 1945. Critics can question President Truman's decision to drop the bomb. What can't be questioned is that Truman acted out of an imperative to save American lives and win the war. In any event, though the United States hasn't used nuclear weapons since 1945, it has still relied on them to deter aggression, defend allies, and preserve strategic interests.

President Dwight Eisenhower, in his memoir Mandate for Change 1953–1956, wrote that China's accession to the armistice ending the Korean War was due in part to hints by Washington that it might use nuclear weapons against military targets in China. Likewise, during the Taiwan Strait crises in the 1950s, Eisenhower and his secretary of state John Foster Dulles publicly warned Beijing that the United States might use tactical nuclear weapons to forestall a Chinese invasion of Taiwan.

President George W. Bush, in his memoir Decision Points, recalled his futile efforts to gain Chinese President Jiang Zemin's cooperation in efforts to stop North Korea's nuclear weapons program. In February 2003, Bush warned Jiang that "if we could not solve the problem diplomatically, I would have to consider a military strike against North Korea." Jiang and North Korean leader Kim Jong-il took Bush's threat of force seriously. Six months later, the first round of six-party talks over Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program got under way in Beijing.

These are examples of the United States showing determination to use its overwhelming military power, perhaps including nuclear arms, to defend its interests and allies. A US nuclear no-first-use pledge, however, would squander an important piece of Washington's power. It would limit strategic options, undermine the credibility of Washington's promises to defend allies (South Korea in particular would be worried), and reduce US ability to deter aggression. All in all, it would be a gross strategic mistake.

To be sure, China has declared a no-first-use policy, and has demanded that other nuclear powers make the same commitment. But Beijing's own no-first-use policy may be under reconsideration. In 2005, General Zhu Chenghu of China's National Defense University made worldwide headlines when he warned that if the United States intervened in a military conflict over Taiwan, China would launch nuclear attacks on US cities. "We are ready to sacrifice all cities east of Xian," Gen. Zhu claimed. "Of course, the Americans must be prepared for hundreds of their cities to be destroyed." When a reporter raised the issue of China's no-first-use policy, Zhu said "the policy may change"—and asserted that it applies in any case only to conflicts between China and non-nuclear states. US officials were incensed over the general's brazen threat to use nuclear weapons first against US cities.

China is by no means a status quo power. Rather, it seeks to change the international order. It is contesting US political and military supremacy in the Asia-Pacific and challenging the post–World War II Pax Americana. For years China has been substantially modernizing and expanding its conventional and nuclear military forces, and has used its overwhelming capabilities to compel smaller neighbors to settle disputes on Beijing's terms. Moreover, China has built up its anti-access and area-denial capabilities—hoping to deter, delay, and defeat US intervention.

It would be extremely unwise for President Obama to proclaim a nuclear no-first-use policy. Chinese leader Xi Jinping would construe it as a sign of US military decline, and he would only be emboldened to pursue China's dream of supplanting the United States as the world's superpower.

President Obama's deliberations over whether to declare a no-first-use policy for US nuclear weapons have polarized opinion across a spectrum of policy and security specialists. Opponents of the shift argue that a no-first-use policy would frighten US allies (especially South Korea and Japan), indicate weakness (at least in the eyes of Russia, China, and North Korea), and degrade Washington's ability to deter potential adversaries. Proponents argue that no-first-use would contribute to the predictability of Washington's nuclear posture—earning credibility for US efforts to make the world a safer place while not affecting allies' confidence in US extended deterrence. Now, in the aftermath of North Korea's fifth nuclear test—Pyongyang's most powerful test so far—chances seem dim that Obama will institute a no-first-use policy. Still, the possible implications in East and Southeast Asia of a US no-first-use policy are well worth examining.

It bears saying at the outset that the security repercussions of a no-first-use policy would be greater in East Asia than in Southeast Asia. Such a policy's impact in East Asia would entail the perceptions, attitudes, and reactions of Russia, China, and North Korea—three nuclear-armed states—as well as Japan and South Korea—two countries technologically capable of producing nuclear weapons.

Russia and China, the major nuclear powers in the region, would likely welcome a US no-first-use policy. It would serve their interests well (or at least they would have nothing to lose from it). But despite what some have argued, Moscow and Beijing would not interpret a US policy shift as a signal of weakness. They fully understand the damage that the US military is capable of inflicting on enemies without the first use of nuclear weapons. Neither Russia nor China would underestimate US military power just because of a no-first-use policy, and therefore they wouldn't be tempted to behave more assertively or to undermine US interests in East Asia. In short, a US no-first-use policy would result in no additional tensions or security threats among the United States, Russia, and China.

North Korea, on the other hand, could pose a problem. When Pyongyang conducts repeated nuclear tests in defiance of UN Security Council resolutions and international sanctions, it clearly demonstrates that it does not care about its neighbors' security concerns. And if Washington now declares that it will never launch a nuclear first strike, Pyongyang might feel emboldened to press ahead even harder with its own nuclear weapons program. The grave danger in that case would be a snowball effect—that Pyongyang's intensified nuclear ambitions would heighten insecurity among North Korea's neighbors and cause them to take countermeasures, such as depending even more on the United States for protection. This would likely invite additional tensions in these nations' relationships with North Korea, and perhaps with China and Russia, causing them in turn to devote even more resources to their militaries. Unfortunately, Pyongyang regards fear in South Korea and Japan as desirable; fear provides the North more negotiating power. So to the extent that a US no-first-use policy produced insecurity in Seoul and Tokyo, North Korea would be the biggest beneficiary, and could become a major player in East Asian security.

Japan and South Korea would seem to be the East Asian countries most affected by a US no-first-use policy. Their security relies to a large extent on US military protection—including the nuclear umbrella, which provides deterrence first against North Korea and second against China and Russia. But the notion that Tokyo and Seoul have weak militaries is simply incorrect. To the contrary, their militaries are among the best equipped and most advanced forces in Asia. During a conventional armed conflict or war, either Japan or South Korea could deal effectively with any potential enemy in East Asia, and perhaps Japan and South Korea's lack of nuclear weapons is all that prevents them from being considered among the most powerful countries in the world—politically, economically, and, yes, militarily. So Washington's extended nuclear deterrence relieves Japan and South Korea from worry about nuclear threats. They can handle other threats on their own.

Still, with an ambitious and nuclear-armed North Korea next door, Tokyo and Seoul might see a US no-first-use policy as a valid cause for concern. But there would be no legitimate reason for them to develop their own nuclear weapons—as long as US extended deterrence remained in place, no-first-use would do nothing to increase the chances of a North Korean nuclear attack. Rather, Tokyo and Seoul's security concerns would increase if a US no-first-use policy upset the region's nuclear balance and caused the region's nuclear powers to behave antagonistically toward each other. But there's little evidence to suggest that outcome.

Looking south. If Obama institutes a no-first-use policy, the effects in Southeast Asia will be minimal. The region has been established as a nuclear-weapon-free zone since 1995. Countries in the region adhere to the major international nonproliferation treaties. They supported the Nuclear Security Summit process (even if not all of them attended the summits).

In the bilateral relations of Southeast Asian nations with the United States, China, Russia, North Korea, South Korea, and Japan, no serious security issues exist—except perhaps, in China's case, the flashpoint of the South China Sea. None of the six countries has ever announced that it has targeted Southeast Asian nations with nuclear weapons and none of them today constitutes a nuclear threat to Southeast Asia. No Southeast Asian nation receives US extended deterrence—not even the Philippines and Thailand, Washington's major non-NATO allies in the region.

Simply put, a US no-first-use policy would introduce no security problems in the region, and Southeast Asian countries would welcome this policy shift. But Southeast Asian countries would encourage Washington to accede to the Protocol of the Treaty of Bangkok, thereby pledging to honor the Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone.

In East and Southeast Asia, the negative security impacts of a US no-first-use policy would be easily outweighed by the security benefits. Obama won't likely institute no-first-use, but here's hoping that he does.