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How genetic editing became a national security threat

Genetic editing techniques like Crispr have made it possible to rapidly and irreversibly alter plants, animals, and even humans, posing a range of threats from accidental releases to biological attacks.

Twenty-first century perspectives on the far-from-toothless Biological Weapons Convention

In 1960 Matthew Meselson, a newly-minted assistant professor of Biochemistry and Molecular Biology at Harvard University, spent the summer at the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in Washington, DC, a US government funded independent organization that worked on non-proliferation issues (Klotz and Sylvester 2009). Paul Doty, a long-time advisor to the government on nuclear-weapons disarmament … Continued

Getting scientists involved in arms control

Earlier this month Macedonian Amb. Georgi Avramchev addressed the "Second International Forum on Biosecurity" in Budapest and stressed the importance of including scientists and scientific organizations in the proceedings of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC). Delegations at BWC meetings have always included scientific experts, but Avramchev confirmed what many in attendance knew to be true, that scientists had not always been given the time or opportunity to contribute their expertise adequately.
A COVID-19 patient.

Could AI help bioterrorists unleash a new pandemic? A new study suggests not yet

From the White House to Silicon Valley, many officials have raised concerns that new AI technology could help bioterrorists plan attacks that could unleash new pandemics. A new report suggests that current cutting edge systems wouldn't provide much of an advantage over internet access to would-be terrorists.
White House press briefing on coronavirus

Reporting on science in today’s hyperpolitical environment

The publication of the Nicholas Wade article of May 2021 was consistent with the Bulletin’s philosophy and mission. But the article was not released in a political vacuum. Understanding its political impact requires a brief recounting of the turmoil of 2020, which included a new, lethal, and poorly understood disease and a hotly contested presidential election.

Make the bioweapons treaty work

States should be very wary of signaling lukewarm support for the bioweapons treaty.

Biodevelopment and the Biological Weapons Convention

It's not uncommon for some biosecurity colleagues to dismiss the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) as a regime with an inadequate mandate. Peter Singer and Abdullah Daar, for example, suggest as much in a recent Bulletin article.

Making the dual-use problem a “piece of cake”

Some academic conferences are encouraging because progress is being made in a field. Others are daunting because of the amount of work that clearly still needs to be done. The conference I attended in the beginning of June, on "Dual Uses of Biomedicine: Whose responsibility?" left me feeling both encouraged and daunted.
A US national labs researcher studying viruses.

How to tell biodefense from an offensive bioweapons program

Studying pathogens in far-flung locales where the next outbreak could be looming, can be mischaracterized as suspicious bioweapons research. But despite the risk posed by disinformation campaigns like the Russian effort to suggest that US-Ukrainian public and animal health research is offensive in nature, pandemics and other bio-threats underscore the importance biodefense programs.

How civil society could be the key to a new BWC

People say my office is a mess. While I don't necessarily disagree with them, I would argue that there is order in the chaos. For example, one pile of papers is labelled "Interesting (All Topics)." I usually reread them during the summer. But making my way through this pile this summer has been difficult because I have spent so much time following the Ashes cricket series and the World Athletics Championships.

Raising life scientists’ awareness

In April 1980, the Bulletin published an article by former intelligence analyst Henry T. Nash titled "The Bureaucratization of Homicide." (The article was subsequently reprinted in E. P. Thompson's Protest and Survive.) In the article, Nash reflected on his experiences as a nuclear targeting planner in the U.S.

Congressional staffers created antibiotic-resistant bacteria. And that’s a good thing

Congressional staffers descended on the Bay Area over the summer to try and make antibiotic-resistant bacteria at a community biology lab. No, it wasn't an attempt to seed a dangerous outbreak, it was all part of a workshop on biosecurity for policymakers.

Modest but meaningful steps to prevent proliferation in Turkmenistan

This five-year plan to address security gaps in Turkmenistan starts with a better-trained border patrol and adoption of European Union export controls.

The British Parliament wants details on BWC progress

It isn't a good time to be a Member of Parliament (MP) in London. With the roasting the domestic media gave to some MPs for their inflated expense claims during a recession, many people must surely feel that little of value goes on in the Westminster Parliament. Nevertheless, it's important to give credit where credit is due.
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Making viruses in the lab deadlier and more able to spread: an accident waiting to happen

Research at the University of Wisconsin-Madison poses the unnecessary risk that bio-engineered viruses could turn into a pandemic threat

What worries risk experts most? (Hint: It’s not what keeps Clinton and Trump up at night)

Risk experts identify the five biggest threats to the world—but the presidential candidates are focused on smaller issues.
2020 elections in South Korea

Interview: Duyeon Kim on South Korea’s elections in the midst of a coronavirus pandemic

Bulletin columnist Duyeon Kim offers her views on the variety of intersecting political crosscurrents that connect and affect the upcoming South Korean election, the coronavirus pandemic, and the status of relations between North and South Korea.

International experts create framework for safer pathogen research

A new report was released by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists’ Independent Task Force on Research with Pandemic Risks to examine ethical obligations to make research with pandemic risks more safe, secure, and responsible.

New report to offer a responsible path forward for research with pandemic risks 

A new report from the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists’ independent Task Force on Research with Pandemic Risks will discuss the benefits and risks of a subset of research that could plausibly source a large outbreak, or even a pandemic, and offer recommendations to make research with pandemic risks more safe, secure, and responsible.

Keeping the Biological Weapons Convention relevant

This month’s Biological Weapons Convention review conference is a chance to reinvigorate the aging treaty.