The deal reached in Vienna is a tremendous success, but Tehran still faces economic and political problems at home

Why the Russian government has and will continue to have little control over the world uranium market

The Persian media still fall short of reporting accurately on Iranian nuclear program and international negotiations

Bulletin experts explain what the new Godzilla movie does not

Permanently reducing the threat posed by radiological sources will require minimizing and then eliminating their use altogether, transitioning to alternative technologies and practices. 

The truck-jacking incident in Mexico is a reminder that it’s time for the United States and other countries to get serious about securing dangerous radioactive material.

Three roundtable discussions that reflect the Bulletin’s focus on smart discourse and international solutions.

A nuclear expert explains why it's impossible to triple nuclear energy capacity by 2050.

What Canberra has done—and can do—do to keep dangerous radioactive materials out of malicious hands.

There is too much sensationalism in coverage of nuclear security, which threatens to undermine real efforts to make us safer.

The July Moscow summit didn't produce any significant breakthroughs in U.S.-Russian relations. In fact, it really only highlighted that the problems Moscow and Washington are ready to cooperate on are international, not bilateral, in nature (e.g., nuclear nonproliferation, terrorism, drug trafficking). On further strategic arms reductions--the most anticipated topic at the summit--the early results aren't as impressive as advertised.

Iran’s most powerful figure, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, played a vital role in making sure his country’s diplomatic efforts to reach an agreement on its nuclear program were successful. More than a year after the deal was signed in Vienna, though, Khamenei is increasingly distancing himself from it, this week issuing his harshest criticism yet.

One year ago, President Barack Obama made a bold pledge to "secure all vulnerable nuclear materials around the world within four years." His immediate follow-through, however, has been wanting. For instance, his fiscal year 2010 budget request to meet this goal was actually $200 million less than what the Bush administration allocated a year earlier for securing nuclear material abroad. In fact, the administration still hasn't defined what it actually considers vulnerable nuclear material. So, in essence, Obama has lost a full calendar year in his four-year quest.

Ever since the August 1945 atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Japanese people have possessed a strong aversion to the idea of nuclear weapons. Public discussion of developing nuclear weapons has been practically nonexistent, and politicians have been chastised for mentioning the topic: As recently as 1999, Japan's vice defense minister resigned after receiving overwhelming criticism for suggesting that Japan should arm itself with nuclear weapons.

When Unit Four at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant exploded in the middle of the night on April 26, 1986, the resulting radioactive fallout contaminated the territory of three countries--Belarus, Ukraine, and Russia. Belarus in particular bore a heavy burden, as cesium and iodine particles spread across 23 percent of the country. The devastation forced the resettlement of thousands of Belarusian families and left a legacy of persistent medical and psychological problems, leading to a national allergy to all things nuclear.

Though nuclear power produces electricity with little in the way of carbon dioxide emissions, it, like other energy sources, is not without its own set of waste products. And in the case of nuclear power, most of these wastes are radioactive. Some very low level nuclear wastes can be stored and then disposed of in landfill-type settings.

The risks of a nuclear incident—including the detonation of a nuclear bomb or dirty bomb, or a cyberattack on a nuclear power plant—have been discussed ad nauseam. Investment icon Warren Buffett and many international security experts have expounded on the significant risks of a nuclear incident in the coming decades. Many experts, in fact, actually … Continued

A probabilistic approach to risk leaves us unprepared for "infrequent catastrophes." Nuclear plants require a "possibilistic" approach that allows us to design safeguards against the worst-case scenario.