A table for five: What to expect from each player at Ukraine peace talks

Donald Trump has famously said that he would end the war in Ukraine in 24 hours. However, ending this war at such lightning speed will not be possible, even if President Trump tries to force a capitulation on the Ukrainians. The Ukrainians would not go quietly, nor should Trump seek their total capitulation because, if they did capitulate, he would come out on the losing side.

In the zero-sum tradition of Russian diplomacy, President Vladimir Putin has been keen to mete out a devastating defeat to Ukraine and with it a defeat of its NATO partners and the United States in particular. Putin speaks of his goal as avoiding NATO’s strategic defeat of Russia—an existential threat that he has embraced to the hilt, even though NATO has denied any intention of attacking Russia itself.

Trump may seek a deal, but he most certainly won’t want a deal that leaves him appearing to be a loser. Putin, in turn, wants a continuing partner in Trump because he has several goals he needs to accomplish—such as getting out from under the crushing sanctions that the United States and its allies have imposed on Russia. Putin cannot afford to force Trump into a losing position, which means he cannot crush the Ukrainians. They too must come out of the war achieving a good measure of their objectives.

The negotiating dynamics are changing, and the tricky business of crafting a win-win-win solution is upon us.

Ukraine, the United States, NATO, and Russia each must come away from the negotiations with something of value—regarding security, economics, and the oh-so-important political coin, saving face.

Before talking about what the solution might look like, let us be clear about who will be the major players—at the negotiating table and behind the scenes. Many countries and actors have offered their ideas, ranging from China’s President Xi Jinping to the large gathering of countries meeting for a summit in Switzerland this summer that focused on peace in Ukraine. While many world leaders and groupings may play a role, five actors will be central at the table of negotiations: Ukraine, Russia, NATO, the European Union, and the United States under a second Trump administration.

Ukraine. The embattled country is now on its back foot militarily, although it has defended itself well. In the first weeks of the war, the Ukrainians denied Putin his main strategic goal of destroying Ukraine as an independent state and transforming it into a vassal of Russia. During the almost three years of conflict, Ukraine has kept Russia off balance. For example, it has sustained its access to the western Black Sea for grain and commercial shipments and largely driven Russia out of Sevastopol, the Black Sea Fleet headquarters and main naval base on Crimea. Ironically, a major reason that the Kremlin gave for seizing Crimea in 2014 was to ensure Russian access to the naval base at Sevastopol.

Ukraine also seized Russian territory in the Kursk oblast in a daring attempt to secure negotiating leverage with Moscow. This action has paid some dividends, facilitating prisoner exchanges with Russia. Ukraine’s technological prowess, particularly in missile innovation, has earned the admiration of its partners in NATO and beyond, serving as the basis for an extensive “lessons learned” exercise in NATO militaries. The Ukrainians are excellent missileers and have taken the fight to Russian territory with their own missiles—well before they received permission to use NATO-supplied missiles against long-range targets on Russian territory. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has staked out a firm negotiating position, insisting that not a single Russian boot can remain on the sovereign territory of Ukraine, including Crimea and the Donbas provinces occupied by Russia.

Russia. The aggressor insists on quite the opposite position: Russia must keep all of Donbas, even territory that it has not so far occupied, as well as Crimea. For the Kremlin, Ukraine must drop its aspirations for NATO membership. (Interestingly, it says nothing of Ukraine’s possible EU membership.) Russia is in a dominant military position now, pressing its offensive on the eastern front, gaining villages day by day. Nevertheless, it is losing a lot of young men: As of early November, Russian combat losses amounted to 696,410 troops, in a country where the demographic outlook is very poor. Moscow is now looking elsewhere—North Korea—for personnel to fight.

Still, Russia will not be defeated easily on the battlefield. In fact, the Russian officials insist they cannot be defeated. The harsh economic sanctions have not produced a collapse of the Russian economy, although they have hampered growth and spurred inflation. Again, Putin wants to deal a crushing defeat to Ukraine, NATO, and the United States, which he claims have a stated goal of “strategic defeat of Russia”—the country’s dismemberment and regime change. President Joe Biden has stated that the destruction of Russia is not the goal of the United States, but Putin keeps repeating the claim anyway, most recently during his speech at the Valdai Discussion Club on November 7.

As the table is being set for negotiations, the main point to consider is that the two countries at war are on opposite sides of the negotiating spectrum and have shown, so far, no sign of willingness to compromise.

NATO. The military alliance has assisted Ukraine in its fight against Russian aggression since the very beginning of the war, with the lead player being the United States under President Biden. If Trump makes good on his promise to scale back and even halt US military aid to Ukraine, NATO has taken steps to continue its assistance—although this will be difficult because the United States has been the biggest military aid donor so far. As of late October, the United States had provided more than $64.1 billion in military assistance to Ukraine.

NATO is prepared institutionally to continue to support Ukraine without the United States. It transformed the “Ramstein process” for organizing assistance, led by the United States, into a process centered in a new NATO Command at Wiesbaden in Germany. In addition, NATO member states have pledged to spend more for their own defense—23 out of 32 allies are now spending 2 percent of their GDP on defense, and European members are transforming their defense industries to be able to produce more weapons and military equipment.^[1] European NATO members will be able to continue to support Ukraine in its fight against Russia—for as long as they remain united around the task.

At the alliance’s 75^th anniversary meeting in Washington, D.C., in July, NATO’s heads of state and government declared that Ukraine is on an irreversible path to NATO membership, and Mark Rutte stated it again during his first visit to Ukraine in October as NATO’s new secretary general. But these declarations have not been enough for Zelensky, who insists Ukraine needs an outright invitation to join NATO—and needs it now.

European Union. The European bloc also has taken seriously its responsibility to assist Ukraine. European countries have focused their effort on supporting its war-devastated economy and government functions and on beginning preparations for reconstruction, which promises to be a monumental and long-running task. The European Union has also taken steps to ensure that the assistance provided is “Trump-proof,” meaning that its members can continue to deliver despite any actions Washington might take. This was signified by a €35 billion ($36.7 billion) loan financed by the interest generated from the frozen Russian assets and meant to support Ukraine’s government and economic functions going forward (not to purchase military equipment). The EU loan is part of a €50 billion ($52.4 billion) loan total provided by the Group of Seven industrialized countries (G7).

The European Union began accession talks with Ukraine in June—a complex and extended process wherein Ukraine must work through many “chapters” to ensure the country’s national processes and procedures are up to EU standards. This assessment touches every corner of Ukraine’s government, from support for democracy and the rule of law to the fight against corruption. One of the most difficult and important chapters for both Ukraine and the European Union will be agricultural policy. Ukraine is a massive producer of grain and edible oil, as well as significant amounts of meat and dairy products. EU member states that are themselves formidable agricultural players will want to ensure that Ukraine’s accession will not overwhelm the EU’s common agricultural policy and the subsidies that go with it. For this reason alone, the EU accession process promises to be long and arduous.

Putin, so far, has taken scant public notice of Ukraine’s possible EU accession. This is surprising, first because it was Ukraine’s effort to sign an association agreement with the union that first raised Putin’s ire and led to the seizure of Crimea and destabilization of the Donbas in 2014—the first invasion of Ukraine. Second, the basic EU foundational agreement contains a security guarantee that is not regarded to be as significant as NATO’s Article 5, but still calls for EU states to come to the assistance of a member that is under attack. Strangely, Putin is allergic to Article 5 of the NATO Washington Treaty but not to Article 42(7) of the Treaty on European Union. It seems that he has somehow come to terms with Ukraine’s future in the European Union.

The United States under Trump. Given prior experience during his first term in office, Trump is likely to go head-on with his promise to quickly negotiate an end to the war. He likes to lay out big goals so he can pride himself on being the kind of dealmaker who can accomplish them, and quickly. That was his objective when, in 2018, he launched negotiations with Kim Jong-un to shut down North Korea’s nuclear and missile program: Trump dove in with a big offer—you get rid of your nukes, and I’ll build you beach resorts and hotels. But the Trump administration didn’t factor in the fragility of Kim’s regime and demanded a quick answer. And when Kim couldn’t deliver, the negotiations ended abruptly.

Trump’s second administration will have to think ahead about the dynamics of a Ukraine negotiation. Putin has vowed to impose a crushing defeat on Ukraine, NATO, and the United States. But Trump will not want to appear as the big loser of this war. Trump has every opportunity to alter the dynamics because Putin has strong motives to nurture the relationship: He wants to be back on the world stage, arm-in-arm with the US president, because it would improve his position both domestically and internationally. Putin also wants relief from crushing sanctions that damage the Russian economy.

Trump could—and should—demand concessions from Putin. If cleverly crafted, concessions won’t be impossible for the Russian president to accept. Three come to mind.^[2]

First, even if Ukraine’s territorial reality changes, the United States should propose language for a cease-fire agreement similar to that used to describe West Germany’s status after World War II. The territorial integrity of Germany was upheld, and the separation of the Federal Republic of Germany from its eastern provinces was not considered permanent.^[3] This precedent is a good one to recollect now as Germany commemorates the 35^th anniversary of its reunification. Although partition can last long, it should never be accepted as permanent. Territorial integrity and sovereignty, enshrined in the UN Charter, are the guiding principles.

Second, rather than accepting that Ukraine’s NATO “irreversible” membership be put off indefinitely, the United States should propose that NATO accession will be worked out over an indefinite period. Simultaneously, the United States and its NATO allies should invite Ukraine to begin accession talks, conducting them in parallel with the accession talks with the European Union. Nobody can predict when these talks will end because the requirements of both the European Union and NATO will be complicated for Ukraine to fulfill. Nevertheless, it will be on the path to EU and NATO membership as both institutions have pledged.

If Ukraine needs some assurance against the goalposts moving, then a target date can be set for finalizing its accession—say, 20 years from now.^[4] However, this target date should be considered the outward limit of the negotiating period, not a deadline. Full membership of Ukraine in both NATO and the European Union should be achieved as quickly as possible.

Launching NATO accession talks in parallel to the EU accession process would bring each negotiation into the shadow of the other. These processes are always slow and deliberate, so Putin can be assured that there will be no sudden surprises.

Third, the United States can say, as a condition for coming to the table, that Russia must be ready to rejoin talks on nuclear arms control and strategic stability. Putin has suspended these talks until the United States and its NATO allies give up on assistance to Ukraine. NATO and the United States must insist on continuing to aid Ukraine as a peace process is implemented and its reconstruction begins. But it’s high time to get back to talking bilaterally about maintaining nuclear stability and controls on nuclear weapons.

Win-win-win solution. Although Putin may not like dropping his conditionality over US aid to Ukraine, he has an equal interest in doing “something nice” for Trump. Resuming nuclear talks could be one such thing, costing Putin little domestic capital while returning him to the world stage, side by side with the US president.

As for Trump, a peace agreement in Ukraine and a new nuclear agreement with Russia would cement his reputation as the ultimate dealmaker—indeed, as the ultimate peacemaker. By pocketing two big deals, Trump would achieve goals that have eluded the Biden administration.

These are only three ideas of what might be asked of Putin during negotiations that could lead to a win-win situation.

However, Putin will certainly come to the negotiating table with his own objectives. Most important, Ukrainian President Zelensky, whose countrymen have been fighting so valiantly for their freedom and independence since February 2022, will have the most necessary asks at the negotiating table. The future of Ukraine is at stake, and Ukraine will need to see a positive future coming out of the negotiations. For all the parties involved, that means shifting away from a winner-take-all zero-sum game toward the search for a truly balanced outcome—a win-win-win solution.

A successful outcome is possible, but President Trump will want to make sure that he does not come out as the loser during negotiations with Putin over Ukraine. Putin will be ready to make some concessions, carefully crafted to save face—his, Trump’s, and Zelensky’s, too. Nobody needs to emerge from this war having suffered a crushing defeat.

Notes

[1] One of the great ironies of Trump’s insistence that he will pull back on assisting Ukraine is that the orders for weapons and equipment for Ukraine have been going largely to the big US defense companies. Therefore, Trump will be unlikely to completely cut off assistance because it is too lucrative for US companies.

[2] These are drawn from arguments I made in “Trump Needs Concessions from Putin – They May Be Forthcoming.”, November 14, 2024. https://www.ft.com/content/cc8fb374-17ae-4fd9-b7cb83f3f54e83d0

[3] For a thorough treatment of this issue, see Peter E. Quint, “The Imperfect Union; Constitutional Structures for German Unification” (Princeton University Press; 1991).

[4] This is consistent with some ideas expressed in Trump circles. https://kyivindependent.com/trump-ukraine-plan-wsj/