Biosecurity community divided over best ways to mitigate risks

The field of biosecurity encompasses a wide range of threats that require coordinated efforts across disciplines and geographic borders. The COVID-19 pandemic underscored the immense risks posed by biological agents and the urgency of preparing for future biological threats. While there is broad agreement on the need to address these challenges, significant disagreements remain on the best approaches to prevent and mitigate biosecurity risks.

To better understand the full spectrum of views within the field, my colleague Tessa Alexanian and I conducted interviews with leading experts in the biosecurity community who were granted anonymity so they could be candid in their remarks. These conversations involved 15 experts, ranging from policymakers to researchers across both public and private sectors. They revealed a common understanding of the necessity for comprehensive, interdisciplinary strategies to tackle biosecurity risks, but they also highlighted key points of contention on critical issues, including the role of artificial intelligence in exacerbating biological threats, the handling of information hazards, and the effectiveness of medical countermeasures in catastrophic scenarios.

Disagreement: medical countermeasures. One topic that repeatedly emerged as an area of disagreement was the value of medical countermeasures, such as vaccines and therapeutics, to fight pandemics. While many experts emphasized the importance of medical countermeasures, others expressed concerns about their limitations, especially in high-risk scenarios where rapid response is essential.

Medical countermeasures have undoubtedly been a cornerstone of pandemic preparedness and response. As Richard Hatchett, the CEO of the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations, explained in a 2021 opinion piece for the UN Chronicle: “Vaccines are at the heart of how modern societies counter infectious disease threats. They are our most potent tool against pandemic risks and will be critical to any future response.”

The development and deployment of COVID-19 vaccines at unprecedented speed, which significantly helped curtail the pandemic, reinforced this belief. Still, millions died waiting for vaccines to reach them. The coalition’s ambitious 100-day mission to produce vaccines for future outbreaks aims to accelerate this process, but some experts argue it may still be too slow for certain scenarios. As one expert told me, going “from the emergence of a novel pathogen to a validated vaccine in 100 days . . . is both extremely ambitious and extremely inadequate.”

In some catastrophic scenarios, such as a pandemic caused by high-transmissibility or high-mortality pathogens, other interventions—such as containment measures—may be more immediately effective than medical countermeasures. As one expert remarked, in these scenarios, “a successful 100-day medical countermeasure mission would not be nearly fast enough to prevent widespread suffering and incalculable loss.” Another expert cautioned that “we shouldn’t overly rely on successful interventions of the past.”

Most experts agree that medical countermeasures are crucial for pandemic preparedness, but relying solely on them could leave critical gaps in readiness for future threats.

Disagreement: artificial intelligence. Another topic of disagreement that came up frequently in my interviews was the impact of artificial intelligence (AI) on biosecurity. While AI promises to revolutionize medicine and pandemic preparedness, it could also lower barriers to bioweapon development.

As one expert put it, “Knowledge barriers are going to be reduced faster than I thought. This includes the ‘meta’ knowledge barriers, which are the ones I worry the most about. These are the answers to questions like: What do I have to know to create harm?”

Another expert was concerned about AI biothreats in two categories: “One is enabling the lone actor or terrorist group like the internet did, but only on steroids… . The other area is the more sophisticated advanced bioweapons actors—at this point, mostly state actors. They can use bioengineering tools to enhance pathogens in a much more sophisticated way than in the past.”

Other experts expressed skepticism about the implications of AI tools for biosecurity. One expert explained: “Every new technology gets overhyped, and then people realize it’s not as good as we thought it was. We’re in the hype part of that cycle now.” However, the same expert also cautioned that, given current development trajectories, these models could become more powerful and potentially dangerous in the future. Other experts added that, while they are less concerned about large language models, they have greater security worries about other model types specifically trained on biological data.

While AI technologies have biosecurity implications, they can also be a powerful ally. As one expert observed, “The tools used to design biological threats can also be used to detect them.” Furthermore, AI can help with faster and more efficient pandemic response—for example, by leveraging their power to develop novel medical countermeasures.

Overall, most experts agreed that, given the potential for AI to serve both defensive and offensive purposes, robust oversight is required. As one expert said, “We have to work with the AI companies that are developing these large language models to put in some guardrails, which is hard because of the dual-use nature of biotechnology.”

Disagreement: information sharing. Another issue that has sparked considerable debate in the biosecurity community is the handling of information hazards—risks that arise from sharing state-of-the-art information. For years, experts have grappled with how to balance transparency against the potential dangers of disseminating sensitive knowledge.

Some argue for openness, asserting that withholding information stifles problem solving and discourages collaboration. As one expert observed, “Secrecy results in suboptimal problem solving, under- or over-estimating risks, fewer people working on these issues, and skepticism about whether worries about global catastrophic biological risks are justified.” Others worry that secrecy may foster unhealthy hierarchies in which newer professionals feel compelled to defer to established experts without fully understanding the reasoning behind certain perspectives.

On the other hand, history has shown that sharing dual-use information can have unintended consequences. One expert explains: “In the early 1940s, one of the most closely guarded secrets was not just the design of the atomic bomb but the very fact that such a weapon was possible. Similarly, in biosecurity, sometimes the most dangerous information is simply that it is possible to cause harm.”

Some experts also suggest that emphasizing certain risks could fuel threats rather than mitigate them. For example, Al Qaeda’s bioweapons efforts reportedly began after the United States publicly highlighted biosecurity risks. “We only became aware of them when the enemy drew our attention to them by repeatedly expressing concerns that they can be produced simply with easily available materials,” wrote Al Qaeda militant Ayman al-Zawahiri in a message to a colleague in 1999.

The landscape of information hazards has evolved since then. While many scientists believed that the benefits of sharing sensitive information have historically outweighed the risks, one expert told me that “in today’s world, as DNA synthesis becomes more accessible, that’s no longer the case.” While experts largely agree on the need for cautious information sharing, there remains substantial disagreement about where to set boundaries.

Agreement: pandemic preparedness. Biosecurity experts share a fundamental consensus that improving pandemic preparedness is essential and far superior to a reactive approach. While they may debate the most effective strategies, they universally agree that, as one expert put it, “prevention is better than the cure when it comes to pandemics.” The devastating human and economic costs of COVID-19 underscore this point—the pandemic claimed millions of lives, and its impact on the US economy has been estimated to exceed that of the Great Recession. Much of this devastation and immense human suffering might have been prevented with stronger preparedness measures, from robust personal protective equipment to advanced biosurveillance systems.

Humanity has repeatedly faced devastating pandemics, and the threat from emerging infectious diseases has only grown, particularly as environmental changes drive pathogens from animal reservoirs into human populations. A study published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences estimates a 38 percent likelihood of encountering another pandemic on the scale of COVID-19 within the next few decades, with this probability set to increase as global conditions evolve. In addition, the likelihood of deliberately caused pandemics may grow if novel technologies      reduce the barriers to misuse of biotechnologies.

Agreement: collaboration across fields. Another belief experts share is that an interdisciplinary approach to biosecurity is crucial. “Discussions about information hazards need to be multidisciplinary,” one expert emphasized. “You can’t have it just be the researchers talking amongst themselves about it. They need to bring in the biosecurity experts, they need to bring in the ethicists, they need to bring in the public policy people to understand… the magnitude of the risk, how imminent it is, what’s the scope, and what can we do about it.”

Another expert highlighted the importance of system design in preparedness efforts, noting that “technology is only as effective as the system that integrates it. An integrated data system that pools information from diverse sources can enhance our ability to detect and respond to threats early on.”

A third expert pointed out some potential blind spots in current surveillance, saying: “Pathogen surveillance programs won’t, by default, be geared toward looking for AI-generated sequences that don’t resemble natural ones or asking whether a biological agent has been generated or manipulated in a lab. Fixing this will require us to work collaboratively with other players.”

No easy answers. A key insight from conducting these expert interviews was that biosecurity challenges are too complex for definitive answers. While talking to the experts, most with decades of experience, and all of whom I deeply respected and considered to be thoughtful individuals, I sometimes received opposite responses to the same question.

This diversity of expert opinion isn’t a weakness but rather reflects the genuine complexity of biosecurity solutions. In this rapidly evolving field, disagreements about medical countermeasures, artificial intelligence, and information sharing are necessary tensions that can drive innovation and deeper understanding. However, navigating these complexities requires all of us who work in this field to form our own nuanced, evolving views. As one expert cautioned, “Many people tend to suspend their own critical reasoning when a viewpoint is confidently presented by someone they perceive as an authoritative figure.”

While differences of opinion can dominate discussions, it is crucial to recognize the common ground shared by most in the field. The future of biosecurity depends not on resolving every disagreement but on finding solutions that value diverse perspectives while enabling decisive action to make the world safer from biological threats.