Ukrainian attack on Russian bombers shows how cheap drones could upset global security

On Sunday, social media started broadcasting videos of airfields shrouded with columns of smoke and parked airplanes on fire. These were not common airplanes but Russian strategic bombers capable of delivering nuclear weapons virtually anywhere on the globe. Behind these attacks were small drones, like those used to capture scenic social media videos, remotely operated by Ukrainian pilots.

The day after, some Russian media and influential figures called for retaliation with nuclear strikes. On Wednesday, Russian President Vladimir Putin reportedly said in a phone call with President Donald Trump that he planned to retaliate against Ukraine for its surprise attack. According to a reading of the Russian nuclear doctrine, the Ukrainian attacks could technically prompt a nuclear retaliation by Russia.

This military operation is the latest illustration of how cheap, accessible drones are changing modern warfare. It also exposed another reality: Drones will wreak havoc on global stability if nobody controls their proliferation.

A turning point. Last week’s drone operation, which the Ukrainian military called “Operation Spider’s Web” and which was 18 months in the making, looked like it came straight out of a James Bond movie: More than a hundred first-person view drones were secretly shipped inside containers on commercial trucks sent toward locations deep inside Russian territory, nearby highly sensitive military airfields. With just a click from operators based in Ukraine, all containers’ roofs simultaneously opened, and drones navigated to their targets to unleash destruction. The number of aircraft damaged or destroyed is still unclear. (Ukrainian authorities claim 41 aircraft were destroyed.) What is certain, however, is that several of Russia’s most critical and advanced strategic nuclear-capable bombers were damaged.

The drones were likely “Osa” quadcopters, 13-15 inches in length and developed and assembled in Ukraine at a cost of around $600 to $1000 each, according to an early analysis of the attack by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Each drone likely carried an explosive payload of about 3.2 kilograms and detonated on impact with the targeted airplanes. To communicate with the drones, Ukrainian operators are believed to have used Russian mobile telecommunication networks, such as 4G and LTE connections. It is also likely that the drones were supported by artificial intelligence systems to give them autonomy in case the telecommunication with the operators would break, and to assist in precisely targeting identified weak spots on the airplanes.

The June 1 Spider Web operation likely marks the largest attack on a nuclear-armed state’s nuclear assets to date, one that was executed using laptop-sized drones. It also stands as the most significant demonstration of drones’ ability to penetrate deeply into heavily defended territory with significant strategic impact. While this represents an operational success for Ukraine, it is still unclear whether and how the drone attack will impact Russia’s conduct of the war. Some fear this operation could lead to a nuclear escalation.

For decades, major powers have pursued so-called strategic stability, a situation in which nuclear adversaries are deterred from launching direct military attacks against one another due to their mutually destructive nuclear capabilities. States also realized that continuing to develop more weapons in a never-ending arms race was costly and increased the risks of conflicts. This is why they agreed to engage in arms control and arms reduction, while making sure to maintain strategic stability.

But this fragile balance between great powers has always been vulnerable to new and disruptive technologies such as microchips, precision-guided missiles, or cybertechnology. Drones, especially small and cheap ones, represent a unique challenge to this balance, one that often evades the grasp of major powers.

‘Cheap drone’ warfare. Drone technology is not new. It was already used during the Cold War and has been a hallmark of the war in Iraq, with its precision strikes in the middle of the desert. Military powers such as the United States, Russia, and China have long invested in and developed expensive, highly advanced drones for various missions. Enhanced by artificial intelligence and increasing autonomy, modern drones have already promised to transform warfare by enabling operations without risking human pilots and possibly transforming the decision-making of those using them.

Things took another turn in the 2010s.

Enabled by advances in microelectronics and battery technologies, smaller and cheaper drones started to be mass-produced for commercial purposes by companies like DJI and others. It did not take long for the military to adapt these drones for warfare purposes. Combined with cutting-edge telecommunication technology, these smaller drones could form intelligent swarms and offer real-time video feeds to their operators.

This time, the nuclear powers were not the only ones to engage in the arms race. Unlike other delivery systems, such as missiles or jet fighters that have significantly higher entry costs, smaller states and even non-state actors could acquire inexpensive drones and transform them into rudimentary but effective “air force” and delivery systems.

The simplicity of their acquisition, use, and diffusion into the hands of actors of various sizes around the globe is what makes cheap drones such a game-changer for modern warfare—and now also for global security.

These inexpensive drones enable smaller states to conduct effective asymmetric warfare against more powerful opponents. It is in great part thanks to its drone force that Ukraine has stood its ground against the world’s second-largest military since 2022. Reports indicate that small drones may have contributed to up to 70 percent of Russian equipment losses so far in the conflict—and this number is likely to become higher if the war continues, given Ukraine’s rapidly growing drone production capacity.

More crucially, cheap drones can be used to sabotage well-defended strategic assets. In what is often described as terrorist acts, Yemen’s Houthis have used drones to attack commercial and military vessels in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, thereby disrupting about 12 percent of global trade in 2024. Houthis’ drones also destroyed Saudi Arabia’s critical oil infrastructure, disrupting 5 percent of global oil supply in 2019.

But the most striking instance of their strategic reach remains the Ukrainian operation of June 1. This operation also foreshadows a dangerous shift in global stability.

Risk of escalation. Historically, only major nuclear powers had effective means to inflict damage on the nuclear capabilities of other major powers. And for most nuclear-armed states, an attack on their nuclear capabilities, even a conventional one, called for nuclear retaliation. To avoid nuclear escalation, nuclear powers have carefully crafted doctrines, strategies, and agreements between themselves to create predictability and increase strategic stability. But to a certain extent, this system of balance was not designed with the expectation that smaller actors could threaten critical nuclear assets of the nuclear-armed states.

Smaller states with no nuclear capabilities and less familiar with the game of strategic stability, like Ukraine, might not fully realize the direct or indirect risk of nuclear escalation that their drone operations could entail. More alarming, non-state actors could also potentially actively seek to initiate a nuclear escalation between nuclear adversaries with drone-enabled false flag operations.

Discussions around drone regulation in war often center around their ethical uses and their level of AI-powered autonomy, which are certainly crucial issues to tackle. But states must also recognize the highly disruptive impact that cheap and widely accessible drones can have not only on warfare but on global security and stability.

One way forward is to implement strict export control and purchase regulations on small drones, such as those implemented for small firearms. Such policies will inevitably collide with the booming industry and market of small, cheap drones that are increasingly popular for commercial purposes and leisure activities. But states will need to work on some form of control of drone export and weaponization, lest they are willing to risk more nuclear crises.