Memo to Trump: Strengthen deterrence with more autonomy for weapons systems

Editor’s note: This is part of a package of memos to the president.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JONATHAN PANTER, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

PURPOSE: BUILD AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS TO STRENGTHEN DETERRENCE.

Widespread alarmism about autonomous weapons has undermined U.S. military competitiveness. Autonomous weapons are not inherently unethical and will not spark accidental wars. Instead, they will strengthen deterrence, especially against China. The Trump administration should revise Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 3000.09 (Autonomy in Weapons Systems), to support the president’s policy of peace through strength.

The problem

The Chinese Communist Party appears hell-bent on deploying autonomous weapons, with few restrictions on their use. A future war between the United States and China will be fought using thousands of such systems. All branches of the US military have acknowledged this sea-change in warfare and are working on their own unmanned—but not necessarily autonomous—systems.

The difference between the two nations is the Chinese are working on full autonomy, while Americans are not. The United States has tied its own hands, preferring weapons systems with the capacity for remote human control. Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 3000.09 hard-wires this restraint into the bureaucracy.

Avoiding these promising technologies weakens deterrence. In future wars, the electromagnetic spectrum—which the military uses for navigation and communications—will be hacked, jammed, or degraded. Weapons systems will need to operate under the assumption of minimal (or zero) human input. Warfare will occur at machine speed, and whoever is slower will lose. If the United States builds systems that assume human control for difficult decisions, China’s systems will be faster.

There is a stigma surrounding fully autonomous weapons. Many see them as “killer robots,” unthinking, murderous machines that can start wars on their own and kill innocents. This alarmism has little empirical evidence behind it.

• First, the decision to go to war is separate from the means of fighting war. The United States can prepare for tactical or operational autonomy in battle, without delegating escalation decisions to machines.
• Second, the idea of machines killing innocents is overstated. In Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States used drones to kill terrorists; these were tough decisions that indeed required human control. But killing soldiers or terrorists embedded among civilian populations is only one kind of warfare. It is not the kind of war the United States will face against China. That war would play out on the sea, or in the skies above it, with few to no civilians present. There is variation across types of warfare. So too, there should be variation in levels of autonomy, without blanket restrictions or bureaucratic handcuffs that slow weapons development.

Unfounded fears about autonomous weapons will lead to inferior weapons, which will embolden American adversaries, raising the risk of war.

Recommendations

The Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 3000.09, issued by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy under the Biden administration, impedes the development of fully autonomous weapons systems, and creates an incentive structure that stifles innovation at the service and industry levels.

First, it explicitly requires systems to be designed with a human control option in use-of-force decisions. Second, it vests approval authority even for development of these systems—not just their fielding—at the highest levels of the Department of Defense.

• “Autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems will be designed to allow commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force.”
• Weapon systems with both autonomous and semi-autonomous modes of operation, “must be approved by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)), the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (USD(R&E)), and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS) before formal development. They must be approved again by the USD(P), the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (USD(A&S)), and the VCJCS before fielding.”

Mr. President, Americans don’t have the time for this red tape. Having a human in the loop in most autonomous weapons systems will not reduce the risk of escalation or ensure more ethical decisions. The decision to make war will always be in human hands, and it is not ethical to give American adversaries a military advantage by kneecapping tactical and operational autonomy.

The Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 3000.09 should be reissued without the blanket requirement that every autonomous weapon be designed with a human-control option. A new directive should permit research and development of autonomous weapons at the service-level, without requiring approval at the undersecretary and joint level. Final high-level approval before fielding can still be retained.

Conclusion

The first part of “peace through strength” is peace. Nobody wants machines to start a war by accident, and nobody wants autonomous weapons to kill innocent people. Right now, there’s nearly zero risk of either. But there is a risk that America’s excessive—and unwarranted—caution about autonomous weapons will give China, or other adversaries, a military advantage. This increases the risk of a war that could kill millions. For the sake of deterrence, and ultimately peace, it is time to unleash American innovation in the weapons of the future.