Three nuclear policy challenges for the second Trump administration

The incoming Trump administration will have to deal with many challenges in domestic and foreign policy, including threats and dangers related to nuclear weapons, deterrence, and arms control. Three nuclear challenges will prove particularly difficult to address: Russia’s repeated threats of nuclear first use in Ukraine and their relationship to viable endgames for that conflict; Iran’s status as a threshold nuclear weapons state and its implications for regional stability; and the emergence of a Chinese nuclear superpower and its implications for global security.

The policies adopted and decisions made during the second Trump administration will involve the fate of the war in Europe, nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, and China’s nuclear arsenal. If they incorporate military and diplomatic tools properly, those policies and decisions could open the door to a more peaceful and stable world. But in the absence of a balanced and thoughtful approach, the door may open wide to a world of continued war, nuclear weapons proliferation, and worldwide arms racing.

Russia’s nuclear threats. Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly reminded Ukraine, the United States, and the other NATO members of Russia’s large inventory of nuclear weapons. He also warned them that, under certain circumstances, Russia would not hesitate to use these weapons.

Some Western government officials and policy experts have dismissed Putin’s warnings about the possibility of nuclear first use as saber-rattling or bluffs. But, according to its military doctrine, Russia could resort to nuclear first use if Russia—or its allies—were attacked with nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction. In addition, an attack with conventional weapons threatening Russia’s survival would also justify a nuclear response. Recent adjustments to Russian nuclear doctrine have extended the scenarios under which Russia might feel justified in using nuclear weapons. These scenarios include attacks on Russian territory with deep-strike weapons by a non-nuclear state that is supported by a nuclear power. The obvious reference is to Ukraine which is supported by NATO.^[1]

On the other hand, Putin has also asserted that Russia does not need to use nuclear weapons to prevail against Ukraine. Russia’s advantage in manpower and war material for a prolonged war of attrition are obvious. Yet, this edge is not without constraints. Putin has been reluctant to order another large-scale mobilization, preferring to offer sizable bonuses for enlistment. He has intensified his attacks against Ukraine’s infrastructure, and Russian troops in the Donbas province continue to push forward on several fronts against stiff resistance. Putin has even turned to North Korea for thousands of ground troops. One irony of this situation is that Putin wants to appear as formidable as possible prior to the onset of any serious negotiations. But Russia’s partial dependency on support from North Korea—a pariah in the eyes of the international community—sends a different message.

Nuclear weapons are not only a consideration for Russian military planners.

Ukraine’s exit strategy from the conflict might also involve Kyiv’s acquisition of a nuclear deterrent against future Russian aggression in one of two ways. Ukraine might be granted NATO membership and, thereby, be included under the protection of NATO’s nuclear umbrella. If NATO membership is not possible, then Ukraine might consider acquiring its own nuclear weapons capability. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has referred to a choice between “NATO or nukes” as a possible precondition for any lasting peace agreement. In an address to the European Council meeting in Brussels in October 2024, Zelensky reminded his audience of the Budapest Memorandum of 1994, according to which Ukraine surrendered its portion of the former Soviet nuclear arsenal in return for security guarantees from the United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom.^[2]

Zelensky’s comments were provocative and possibly deliberately intended to advance his case for NATO membership as the only viable security guarantee for a postwar Ukraine. Kyiv remains officially committed to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear weapons state, and major technical challenges would stand in the way of a Ukraine developing a nuclear weapons capability. As for Ukrainian membership in NATO, experts have argued both for and against it. Putin’s war against Ukraine was at least partly motivated by his perception of an intention by NATO to incorporate Ukraine. At the same time, Ukraine’s postwar position outside of NATO could be politically and militarily precarious. The Budapest Memorandum is a reminder that when prevailing international circumstances change, so do the priorities and intentions of states.

Russia’s going-in position in any negotiation for an end to the war in Ukraine will doubtless preclude either Ukrainian membership in NATO or an independent Ukrainian nuclear deterrent. However, measures might be taken to expose Russian violations of any peace agreement. These include Ukrainian membership in the European Union supported by EU guarantees against further Russian encroachment on Ukrainian territory or other Russian subversion of Ukrainian self-determination. Even though the European Union does not have the military means to enforce any agreement, it can use economic sanctions and diplomatic demarches for that purpose.

Iran’s nuclearization. The Iranian proxy wars against Israel escalated on all fronts in 2023 and 2024—from the outbreaks of war in Gaza to Lebanon, Yemen, Syria, Iraq, and other zones of conflict. Rising tensions between Iran and the United States continued despite efforts by the Biden administration to broker cease-fire agreements with Hamas and to conciliate Iran with a possible reboot of the 2015 nuclear deal. Currently, Iran is a de facto threshold nuclear-weapons state, weeks away from the capability to fabricate an atomic bomb.

The imminent danger was not only the possibility of an Iranian first use of nuclear weapons. Once acquired and deployed, Iran could use its nuclear weapon(s) as an instrument of coercive diplomacy to support its drive for regional hegemony. An Iranian bomb could also spur other states to follow in its footsteps and imperil the nuclear non-proliferation regime even further. In addition, Iran’s close military ties with Russia and significant military support of its war against Ukraine pose a continuing threat to US and Western interests. The extended reach of Iran’s longer-range ballistic missiles could threaten military and other targets in Europe, including those located in NATO member states.

China’s nuclear rise. Last year, the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States warned that US strategy should no longer treat China’s nuclear forces as a “lesser included threat” and recommended that the United States develop a nuclear posture capable of simultaneously deterring both countries.^[3] In addition, the US Defense Department has projected a consistent pattern of improvement for China’s growing nuclear capabilities.^[4]

Robert Gates, a former US Defense Secretary under Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama and a former CIA director under President George H.W. Bush, warns that a rising China combined with a repolarization of international politics creates an especially challenging environment of national security threats.^[5]

As part of a year-long strategic review, the Defense Department is considering options to increase the number of nuclear weapons’ launchers and warheads. Vipin Narang, the former acting assistant secretary for space policy, noted that the United States is “exploring options to increase future launcher capacity or additional deployed warheads on the land, sea and air legs” that could offer US officials “increased flexibility, if desired, and executed.”^[6] In addition, Pranay Vaddi, a special assistant to the President and senior director for arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation at the National Security Council, indicated that senior Biden officials would be taking a fresh look at the assumptions behind US nuclear modernization because of the changed international environment—including Russia’s efforts to develop a satellite carrying a nuclear weapon; China’s accelerated nuclear buildup; and North Korea’s continuing expansion and improvement of its nuclear ballistic missile and conventional force capabilities.^[7] In a similar fashion, the National Institute for Deterrence Studies (a US nuclear research and policy center supporting nuclear deterrence) has put forward a blueprint for US nuclear modernization based on the concept of “dynamic parity” that balances the US nuclear arsenal against the collective arsenals of Russia, China, and North Korea and suggests the creation of a flexible framework for managing the growth or decline of US operationally deployed nuclear weapons with, or without, arms control.^[8]

One challenge facing the US government and other estimators of China’s future nuclear capabilities is the lack of transparency in its declaratory policy about its nuclear deterrence strategy and force modernization plans. Will China opt for a so-called “minimum deterrent” based on a secure second strike capability or a more ambitious deterrent that would provide for various nuclear options across the spectrum of possible political, military, economic, and other targets? Should China be assumed to be planning for nuclear war against the United States and its allies or, as well, for possible conflict with Russia or India? How will China’s nuclear modernization overlap with improvements in its conventional forces for possible conflict with the United States over Taiwan?

Based on its prior experience, Chinese strategizing would treat issues of nuclear force modernization and nuclear deterrence within a more inclusive frame of reference that would privilege information-based deterrence and warfighting, together with non-military instruments of influence. China would see nuclear weapons as insurance against any attempt by the United States (or any other state for that matter) to defeat China in a conventional war or any attempt to use nuclear coercion against China as an instrument of influence. From this perspective, China would view the actual use of nuclear weapons as a last resort.

The Pentagon assesses that China intends to modernize its capabilities across all domains of warfare to conduct a full range of land, sea, air, space, counter-space, cyberspace, and nuclear warfare.^[9] China currently has about 500 nuclear warheads deployed on various ground-based, sea-based, and air-launched delivery systems. China has continued to expand its missile silo fields for both liquid fuel and solid fuel intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), developed new variants of ICBMs and advanced strategic delivery systems, expanded its dual-capable intermediate-range missile force, refitted ballistic missile submarines with the longer range JL-3 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), and recently reassigned an operational nuclear mission to its bomber force. China is also developing an air-launched ballistic missile with possible nuclear capability. Overall, China’s growing nuclear arsenal is among the largest and most rapid modernizations of the nine nuclear weapons states.^[10]

Implications for arms control. Getting the United States and Russia on the same page for an immediate post-New START regime will be a demanding task requiring that Washington and Moscow improve their relations and agree on at least a provisional peace settlement for the war in Ukraine. Meanwhile, China will be reluctant to jump into negotiations about limits on nuclear weapons unless, or until, it has built its strategic nuclear forces to levels that are essentially equivalent to those of the United States and Russia. “Essentially equivalent” does not mean identical in force structure or military-operational doctrine. Past behavior suggests that China may not make nuclear threats as routinely as Russia has been doing since the war in Ukraine started. China, however, will be concerned about US missile defenses and whether they have the potential to nullify China’s second strike capability. A great leap forward in missile defenses by any of the strategic nuclear triumvirate creates a threat to strategic stability based on assured retaliation.

A third issue will be China’s approach to transparency, especially on issues of monitoring and verification necessary for viable arms control agreements. Here again, China may become more explicit about its nuclear forces as it closes in on matching the arsenals of the United States and Russia. An entirely open-ended arms race, however, would benefit none of the nuclear Big Three. Even though China is still a long way from transparency, Chinese leaders have demonstrated remarkable skills in economic competition, information warfare, scientific and technological innovation, and high-end diplomacy. It would not be a surprise to see China take a “reasonable sufficiency” approach to arms races in existing technologies while it leapfrogs into next-generation leadership in potentially disruptive technologies—artificial intelligence, big data, autonomous systems, military uses of space, and human-machine interfaces. The prospects for crisis stability under a tripartite post-New START regime are open-ended, but the case for arms race stability among China, Russia, and the United States is more problematical—and yet to be formulated.

The door remains open to ending the war in Europe, resuming Russian-US nuclear arms control, containing Iran’s nuclear ambitions, and including China as a nuclear superpower within a trilateral consensus on limiting the arms race. But the same door, swinging in the opposite direction, could yield continued war in Europe, an Iranian nuclear weapons state, and a Chinese outlier within the ranks of nuclear superpowers. Current US plans for nuclear modernization must provide the necessary military tools for maintaining nuclear deterrence stability well into the next decade. But military modernization should go hand in hand with astute and imaginative diplomacy and a commitment to peaceful settlement of disputes within an uncertain global geopolitical landscape.

Notes

[1] Vladimir Soldatkin, “Security hawk says Russia will take more steps up nuclear ‘ladder of escalation,’ Reuters, November 6, 2024, in Johnson’s Russia List 2024 – #232 – November 7, 2024, [email protected]

[2] Zelensky, quoted in Mariana Budjeryn, “NATO or Nukes”: Why Ukraine’s nuclear revival refuses to die,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November 1, 2024, https://thebulletin.org/2024/11/nato-or-nukes-why-ukraines-nuclear-revival-refuses-to-die/

[3] Madelyn Creedon and Jon Kyl, Co-Chairs, America’s Strategic Posture: The Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States (Washington, D.C.: October, 2023), Executive Summary, viii, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/America’s_Strategic_Posture_Auth_Ed.pdf

[4] U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, Annual Report to Congress, 2023 (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2023), VIII, https://media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/19/2003323409/-1/-1/1/2023-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF

[5] Robert Gates, quoted in David E. Sanger, New Cold Wars: China’s Rise, Russia’s Invasion, and America’s Struggle to Defend the West (New York: Crown Publishers, 2024), pp. 437-438.-

[6] Theresa Hitchens, “DOD ‘exploring’ options for nuclear buildup as part of strategic review,” Breaking Defense, August 1, 2024, https://breakingdefense.com/2024/08/dod-exploring-options-for-nuclear-buildup-as-part-of-strategic-review/, also in Johnson’s Russia List 2924 – #162 – August 2, 2024, [email protected]

[7] Ibid.

[8] Curtis McGiffin and Adam Lowther, Dynamic Parity: A New Approach to American Nuclear Deterrence (Fairborn, Ohio: National Institute for Deterrence Studies, 2024), www.thinkdeterrence.com

[9] U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2023, p. IV.

[10] Hans M. Kristensen, Matt Korda, Eliana Johns, and Mackenzie Knight, “Chinese Nuclear Weapons, 2024,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 80:1, 49-72,: https://thebulletin.org/premium/2024-01/chinese-nuclear-weapons-2024/. See also: Mark B. Schneider, Current and Projected Growth of China’s Nuclear Arsenal (Fairfax, Va.: National Institute for Public Policy, Occasional Paper, Vol. 4, No. 10, October 2024), www.nipp.org)