Emerging and reemerging infectious diseases continue to threaten the global economy, society, and security. The collective experience with COVID-19 has led to increased skepticism about the recommendations of public health officials. The off-season appearance and in-season continuance of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI), the number and types of birds it has infected, the number and types of mammals to which it has spread, its appearance in dairy products, and the troubling occurrence of human cases have combined to create an increasingly worrisome situation. The ability of all influenza viruses to mutate, break apart, and recombine to create new strains makes the emergence of a human-transmissible version of bird flu a serious possibility. Meanwhile, climate change is altering the characteristics of habitats worldwide, with more animals carrying, and more insects spreading, diseases to each other and to humans.

Concern is also growing over the continued proliferation of high-containment biological laboratories around the world, indicating scientific interest in high-risk biological research. Such research often underpins advances in biological science, and nations cannot afford to back away from biological research and development that will increase their competitiveness in the global bioeconomy. Yet such research also poses dangers. Continued arguments about dual-use and gain-of-function research acknowledge both the risks associated with such research efforts—including the possibility of pathogen escapes from biological labs—and the need to continue this research to find ways to treat some of humanity’s worst diseases. Proponents of synthetic biology say that it could provide much-sought-after medical breakthroughs; opponents say that the ability to engineer organisms could lead to the development of entirely new and dangerous pathogens. That we “don’t know what we don’t know” with regard to secret biological research undertaken for nefarious reasons remains an ever-present concern.

The combined threat of AI and biological research is now widely recognized. Nonetheless, governments and the relevant scientific communities hesitate to limit or restrict AI involvement in biological research and development, fearing that doing so could cause researchers to miss important scientific breakthroughs.

Geopolitical tensions, skirmishes, and outright war all disrupt (and in some cases, destroy) health care and public health infrastructure, increasing the risk that diseases will spread—even without the use of biological weapons. But nations known to possess active offensive biological weapons programs (i.e., Russia and North Korea) could deploy these weapons at any time. Russia’s recent refurbishment and expansion of one of its former biological weapons complexes increases global fears. Terrorist organizations and violent extremists continue to make known their desires to obtain and use biological agents.

Leaders around the world could reduce the biological threats facing humanity, and thereby move the hands of the Doomsday Clock away from midnight, by:

• Increasing surveillance of disease in humans, animals, and plants and sharing the results with all nations.
• Establishing knowledgeable authorities and experts to provide  trustworthy up-to-date information about diseases of concern and their movement throughout the world.
• Increasing the reporting of changing disease patterns as the climate changes and updating preparedness, surveillance, response, recovery, and mitigation plans accordingly and immediately.
• Slowing the proliferation of high-containment laboratories and establishing norms for the use and acquisition of biological material.
• Dismantling active biological weapons programs.

Read the 2025 Doomsday Clock statement »