The authoritative guide to ensuring science and technology make life on Earth better, not worse.

North Korea

Soviet nuclear test, 1949

Preserving the nuclear test ban after Russia revoked its CTBT ratification

By Pavel Podvig | Nuclear Risk, Nuclear Weapons

radiation warning sign in Nevada desert

The logic for US ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

By Steven Pifer | Nuclear Risk, Nuclear Weapons

Kim Jong-un and Hwasong-17 ICBM

To do or not to do: Pyongyang’s seventh nuclear test calculations

By Rachel Minyoung Lee | Nuclear Risk, Nuclear Weapons

The nuclear year in review: A renewed interest in nuclear weapons—for and against

By François Diaz-Maurin | Nuclear Energy, Nuclear Risk, Nuclear Weapons

Why North Korea may use nuclear weapons first, and why current US policy toward Pyongyang is unsustainable

By Robert E. Kelly | Nuclear Risk, Nuclear Weapons

Biden’s horse-trading on nuclear technology and fuels is an unprecedented proliferation risk

By Alan J. Kuperman | Nuclear Energy, Nuclear Weapons

Bigger isn’t always better: Why the US fails to deter North Korea, despite nuclear superiority

By Lauren Sukin | Nuclear Weapons

Watching Ukraine, South Korea and Japan eye nuclear weapons. Here’s what the US should do.

By Sayuri Romei | Nuclear Weapons

Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un shake hands

The US must trade muscles for diplomacy to end the North Korean nuclear crisis

By Colleen Moore | Nuclear Weapons, Opinion

Some countries plan to decentralize control of nuclear weapons in a crisis. Here’s why that’s dangerous.

By Giles David Arceneaux | Nuclear Weapons

Victor Gilinsky offers a less optimistic view of North Korea’s negotiating tactics and nuclear program

By Victor Gilinsky | Nuclear Energy, Nuclear Weapons

Siegfried Hecker, a Senior Fellow at Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico, testifies before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 21 January, 2004 on Capitol Hill in Washington, DC. Hecker, who was a member of an unofficial US delegation that visited the controversial Yongbyon research complex this month, told lawmakers that North Korea can accumulate six Kilograms (13.2 pounds) a year of plutonium that could be used to make a nuclear weapon. "The five megawatt reactor has been re-started, it appears to be operating smoothly, providing heat and electricity, also accumulating approximately six kilograms (13.2 pounds) of plutonium per year in its spent fuel rods." Photo credit: Stephen Jaffe/AFP via Getty Images

An excerpt from “Hinge Points: An Inside Look at North Korea’s Nuclear Program”

By Siegfried S. Hecker, Elliot Serbin | Nuclear Energy, Nuclear Weapons