Ten years after Fukushima: The experts examine lessons learned and forgotten

A decade later, the footage of the dramatic hydrogen explosions in the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant, broadcast live on television—and the subsequent disruptions to livelihoods, ecosystems, and economic activities—still reverberate.

In the wake of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster in 1986, several new nuclear safety institutions such as the World Association of Nuclear Operators and the Convention on Nuclear Safety were created. Nevertheless, the West-based nuclear industry used an “us and them” pretext to mask some of the intrinsic and global flaws in nuclear safety practices, asserting that an accident like Chernobyl, caused by flawed technology and operational practices, could never happen within their own national borders. Then came Fukushima, a catastrophe that flipped such a narrative on its head and exposed the nuclear industry’s limitations in understanding the risks of the so-called “beyond design basis accidents”.

Amid a looming climate crisis and a desperate need to curb emissions, analyzing the costs, risks and benefits of nuclear energy cannot be more timely and relevant. If the global expansion of nuclear energy to address climate change is inevitable, how can we prevent, or at least mitigate, the effects of the next nuclear accident or disaster? If nuclear accidents are no longer unimaginable, can we accept the inevitability of future nuclear accidents and focus our efforts just as much on mitigation as accident prevention?

Providing coherent and credible answers to these questions in a polarized and opinionated world is not easy. Nevertheless, this is a task we took on when we organized “Nuclear Safety and Security after Chernobyl and Fukushima: Lessons learned and forgotten,” a three-day international conference hosted by the Project on Managing the Atom at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government.

This commentary series is more than just a distillate of the views that were presented during the conference by some of the world’s leading thinkers, scholars and practitioners on the 10^th anniversary of Fukushima. It is a call for action, for change, and for a genuine collective engagement.

As our experts share in this series, the lessons learned and forgotten from past nuclear disasters are many. But, broadly speaking, they can be placed under four themes:

First, the impacts of nuclear accidents should not be measured quantitatively alone. Quantitative measures such as the number of fatalities or deaths per kilowatt hour are not only inappropriate, they are incomplete and unethical. The lingering human suffering resulting from forced dislocation and resettlement due to the destruction of human habitats and ecosystems ought to be fully appreciated and accounted for.

Second, there are many intangible and unquantifiable aspects of nuclear safety. These include good organizational culture (“safety culture” in the nuclear parlance), leadership, memory (so that we may remember our past failures), and imagination (so that we may anticipate the unexpected). We must look beyond hardware when we think about safety. We must consider not only technological failures but also organizational, institutional, and human failures and examine how each of them might interact with one another.

Third, it is vitally important to strike a balance between sharing information and harmonizing practices and approaches, while also developing and preserving country-specific ways of thinking about safety and security. Yet, these shared accountability mechanisms should not dilute national, organizational and individual accountability.

Finally, an aphorism bears repeating: A nuclear accident anywhere is an accident everywhere. Countries tend to assert that an accident could never happen within their own national borders because of differences in technological or institutional designs. When we embrace narratives of national exceptionalism, we lose opportunities to learn lessons from each other and set ourselves up for future catastrophe.

We hope that the commentaries presented here will inspire renewed and creative reflection on the future of nuclear safety and the governance of nuclear technologies.

Editor’s note: This collection was produced in a collaboration between the Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard Kennedy School and the Bulletin.

By James O. Ellis, Jr., Sonja D. Schmid

What are we waiting for? The need for stronger international nuclear energy relationships.

In the decade since, the nuclear industry and those who regulate it have come a long way in many countries but, arguably, still haven’t made sufficient progress in cultivating and codifying effective, trusting, and transparent international relationships.

By William Tobey

Nuclear safety and security lessons from Chernobyl and Fukushima

Here are nine nuclear safety and security lessons that international experts examined at last week’s Harvard Belfer Center conference on the Chernobyl and Fukushima Daiichi disasters.

By Edwin Lyman

Fukushima 10 years later: It still could happen here

Last summer, an aging nuclear reactor several miles outside of Cedar Rapids, Iowa came uncomfortably close to experiencing a similar fate to Fukushima.  

By Joyce Connery

Nuclear power: A question of risk and balance

Abandoning nuclear power would unbalance the risk equation, increasing societal risks while decreasing societal benefits.

By Rumina Velshi

Are we ready for the unimaginable? Ensuring nuclear safety post-Fukushima

The nuclear sector learned important lessons from the Fukushima crisis a decade ago—and enacted important reforms and improvements. But we must never become complacent. There is more we can do.

By Annelise Riles, Hirokazu Miyazaki

A call for transnational citizen-expert engagement in nuclear compensation

In preparedness for the next large scale nuclear disaster, we need forums where ordinary citizens from nations with differing histories of nuclear power can engage directly with nuclear experts from both government and industry as well as representatives of international institutions.

By Malka Older

Nuclear accidents will happen. What do we do about them?

If accidents are going to happen, and we can’t mitigate them, what are the options?

By Mariana Budjeryn

Chernobyl: A nuclear accident that changed the course of history. Then came Fukushima.

Amid the renascent verdure, Chernobyl and Fukushima Daiichi power plants stand dormant, sullen testaments to nature’s relentless forces and to human folly and resilience. The question is not whether another nuclear accident will happen, but rather when it does, how prepared are we?

By Tatsujiro Suzuki

Remember Fukushima: The accident is not over

Earthquakes, contamination, and forgetfulness still threaten the region a decade after the disaster.

By Allison Macfarlane

The Fukushima accident: Do we have the wisdom to move forward?

Nuclear power is not free of risk—obviously. But these risks must be weighed against risks in the larger energy context. And possible accidents at nuclear reactors must be measured against the coming calamity of climate change brought on by our reliance on fossil fuels. 

By Jungmin Kang

Better nuclear fuel could reduce the likelihood and severity of nuclear power plant accidents

The Three Mile Island, Chernobyl and Fukushima nuclear accidents shared an important attribute: Each of the power plants experienced a fire involving the zircaloy (zirconium alloy) cladding of nuclear fuel assemblies

By Matthew Bunn

Asking the unasked questions

So-called "tsunami stones" alerted people in Fukushima, Japan, to not build in areas that had been devastated by the giant waves. Many people, however, including officials at Tokyo Electric Power, owners of the ill-fated Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant, ignored the warnings. In the aftermath of almost every technological disaster, reviews find that there were clear warnings before it occurred, but not enough was done to head off catastrophe.

By Julius Weitzdörfer, Denia Djokić

Highly enriched shareholders mean disasters down the line: Why utilities like TEPCO need new corporate governance

As we continue to learn from the intertwined social, technical, political, and economic factors of the Fukushima disaster, we must, at minimum, re-design and modernize corporate governance and incentive structures, just as we do with reactors and regulatory bodies.