In the 1960s, fear that West Germany could acquire nuclear weapons, either alone or in cooperation with other European nations, was a key driving factor for negotiation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) (Shaker 1980, 142–147). Fifty years later, the issue of an independent German or European nuclear deterrent has once again appeared on the proliferation agenda.

Two developments were catalysts for the new discussion of nuclear proliferation dangers in Europe. The 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea and the military chest-beating of Russian President Vladimir Putin have revived concerns about nuclear blackmail by Russia. At the same time, in the eyes of many European decision makers, US President Donald Trump has fundamentally weakened transatlantic security ties. Before and after he was elected in 2016, Trump called into question the reliability of American security guarantees for Europe, including extended nuclear deterrence commitments.

A late-November 2016 opinion piece on the front page of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung kicked off the new discussion about nuclear weapons in Germany. The lead article of the influential conservative newspaper was headlined “After Trump’s election victory: the totally unthinkable” (Kohler 2016). The unthinkable were German nuclear weapons, which the author advocated in case Trump decided to leave the defense of Europe to the Europeans. Over the following three years, dozens of op-eds, articles, and analyses followed (Kühn, Volpe, and Thompson 2020). All raised similar questions: Would a German or European nuclear deterrent be feasible? And would such new nuclear arrangements be desirable from Berlin’s and Brussel’s perspectives?

No German nukes

By the end of 2019, it became clear that there is no reason to be concerned about a nuclear-armed Germany. Only a few attention-seeking experts on the political fringe made the case for Berlin going nuclear. One prolific proponent, the UK-based German academic Maximilian Terhalle, argued that “the answer to the lack of strategic protection for [Germany’s] national security must … be that Germany needs nuclear weapons” (Terhalle 2017, translation Oliver Meier). Like the retired history professor Christian Hacke (Hacke 2018), Terhalle maintains that the French and UK nuclear arsenals would be too small to effectively deter Russia and that, ultimately, decisions about the use of nuclear weapons must not and cannot be shared. So, these experts reasoned, Germany would need nuclear weapons to defend itself. While a few other think tankers (for example Benner 2017; Ischinger 2018) occasionally mused about the pros and cons of German nuclear weapons, the argument got zero traction among decision makers.

German acquisition of nuclear weapons would require multiple costly and radical shifts of Berlin’s foreign and security policies. Germany would have to withdraw from the NPT and violate legal obligations under the 1990 2 + 4 Treaty on Unification, in which it agreed not to possess nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons of mass destruction. That on hard security issues Germany must “never act alone” is a theme to which German decision makers have been socialized ever since the end of World War II. Germany’s constitution reflects Berlin’s internationalist orientation, stating that rules of international law take precedence over national laws (Meier 2001). Establishing a nuclear fuel cycle to support a German nuclear weapons program would require a reversal of the national decision to phase out nuclear energy generation by 2022 – a policy that has been supported by all mainstream parties. Even Germany’s far-right national populists of the Alternative für Deutschland, which advocates a withdrawal of US nuclear weapons from Germany, do not favor German nuclear weapons (AfD 2017).

Three reasons why a Eurodeterrent does not fly in Berlin

Although the idea of German nuclear weapons turned out to be politically irrelevant, some mainstream analysts and pundits have considered the risks and benefits associated with a strengthened nuclear dimension to the EU’s security and defense policies. The baseline for many analyses is the assumption that “[s]ince it would probably be beyond the means of [France and the United Kingdom] alone to extend a nuclear umbrella across all of Europe, the only feasible path appears to be to focus on an intra-European ‘nuclear sharing’” (Thränert 2017, 2). With the United Kingdom’s June 2016 decision to leave the EU, the role of the 300 nuclear-warhead-strong French force de frappe has moved center stage.

Proposals for a “Eurodeterrent” come in a variety of guises. These include joint financing of a Eurodeterrent¹; an inter-European division of labor for nuclear support operations; the basing of French dual-capable bombers (with or without nuclear weapons), on a rotating basis or permanently, in some European countries; and the joint development and/or operation of European nuclear forces (Tertrais 2018, 9–10). There is also broad agreement that German-French convergence on the role of nuclear weapons in European security is a necessary – though not necessarily sufficient – precondition for movement in the direction of a Eurodeterrent.

This is by no means a new debate. The question of closer French-German cooperation on nuclear issues has been revisited periodically since the end of the Cold War. It was usually Paris, rather than Berlin, that raised the issue of a European dimension of nuclear deterrence.

In 1992, President François Mitterrand stated that the issue of a common European deterrent would “quickly become one of the major questions in the construction of a common European defence” (Quoted in Tertrais 1999, 56). At the time, there was little response from other European governments, including Germany’s. In September 1995, Prime Minister Alain Juppé used the concept of a “concerted deterrent” to argue that “we [French] should learn to make the collective dimension an integral part of our doctrine” (Quoted in Tertrais 1999, 56). In 1996, President Jacques Chirac went one step further, saying that discussions on a European dimension of nuclear deterrence are “about drawing all the consequences of a community of destiny, of a growing entanglement of our vital interests” (Chirac 1996).

In December 1996, the French and German governments attempted to open the path to dialogue on nuclear deterrence. But the tentative agreement to place the issue in the context of a European security and defense policy faltered, partly because of French sensitivities about preserving the independence of the force de frappe (Sloan 1997). In 2001, Chirac placed the nuclear issue again in a European context, saying that any decision by France to use nuclear weapons “would naturally take into account the growing solidarity of European Union countries” (Quoted in Tertrais 2007, footnote 72). For the next 10 to 15 years, however, the issue was put on the shelf of German-French relations. As French analyst Bruno Tertrais observed, the concept of “Europeanization” of the French nuclear deterrent enjoyed broad political support in Paris but “there are very few concrete ideas about how to do that” (Tertrais 2007, 263).

In Berlin, the issue remained unattractive, not least because of a strong anti-nuclear sentiment in the public. Discussions in the 1990s rarely moved beyond the inner circles of security policy experts. Implicitly, the idea of giving nuclear deterrence a European dimension came up whenever the concept of an integrated “European army” was discussed. Rather than tackling the issue head-on, however, decision makers carefully tiptoed around the nuclear question. All in all, nuclear deterrence largely remained a blind spot on the agenda of French-German consultations on security and defense for the first quarter of a century after the end of the Cold War.²

Despite the recent changes in Russian and US nuclear policies, Berlin has stuck to the division of labor between the two main institutions responsible for nuclear issues: NATO does deterrence and (sometimes) nuclear arms control; the EU is responsible for nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear security.³ Germany continues to support NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements, being one of five European nations to host US nuclear weapons on its territory. Three underlying factors explain why even the shocks of a populist US president and an adventurist Russian president are unlikely to change these basic premises of Berlin’s nuclear policy.

A clash of nuclear cultures

Berlin and Paris pursue similar interests within the international nuclear order. Both believe that strong international institutions, based on the rule of law, provide the best means to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Germany and France are supportive of the NPT and also are interested in working through the EU and NATO when addressing nuclear weapons issues.

Yet, at the same time, Berlin and Paris approach nuclear issues from different, sometimes opposite directions. France embraces the military and civilian use of nuclear technology. Paris considers the nuclear order to be inevitably shaped by nuclear weapons. As an NPT nuclear weapon state, France continues to value its force de frappe as an indispensable guarantee of its national security. At the beginning of their tenures, French presidents often demonstrate their support for the national nuclear deterrent with highly symbolic visits to nuclear forces, sometimes posing in front of nuclear submarines. Domestically, the basic tenets of French nuclear policies are not seriously contested. Even though the 2011 nuclear accident at Fukushima has somewhat reduced the French enthusiasm for nuclear energy, phasing out the civilian use of nuclear energy is not an option. Exports of nuclear technology are seen as a means of extending political influence (Tandler 2014).

Germany, on the other hand, is a non-nuclear weapon state, and its public remains deeply skeptical of all things nuclear. The security policy elite, in large parts, are convinced that nuclear deterrence can and does increase German security. However, the German involvement in NATO nuclear sharing and the continued deployment of about 20 US B61 gravity bombs at the German air force base in Büchel (Kristensen 2015) is a topic that decision-makers try to avoid addressing directly. This is because the broader public continues to emphasize the need for nuclear disarmament. There is general agreement that, at least in the long-term, a nuclear-weapon-free world is a desirable goal. No major political actor has seriously contested the conservative-liberal government’s 2011 decision to completely phase out civilian nuclear energy use by 2022.

In short, for France, nuclear weapons remain symbols of independence and a national security asset, while Germans see these weapons mainly as a liability. But this gap may be closing somewhat. In late 2019, a poll conducted on behalf of the German Körber Foundation found that 40 percent of respondents believed that Germany should “seek nuclear protection from France and the UK.” The result came as a surprise because other polls had consistently shown large popular support within the German population for a withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Germany and Europe and confirmed anti-nuclear sentiments in the German population.⁴ The result of the Körber poll does reflect a growing public distrust of Russia and the United States. It is also indicative of a greater awareness that Europe and Germany are expected to assume more responsibility in international affairs.

It is far from clear, however, that these changes in international security attitudes also imply growing German support for nuclear weapons as an acceptable and useful instrument of national security. Proponents of a European nuclear deterrent have so far been unwilling – or unable – to explain the presumed security benefits associated with a stronger European role on nuclear weapons. Most of the time, advocates of a Eurodeterrent simply state their paradigmatic belief that control over nuclear weapons increases the possessor’s security. The ubiquitous use of the “nuclear umbrella” analogy in the German nuclear debate is telling. The German term “nuklearer Schutzschirm” (nuclear shield) emphasizes even more strongly the presumed protective character of a nuclear deterrent, suggesting the image of a harmless, cheap, safe nuclear weapons posture that can be quickly “folded away” when international relations improve. The Körber questionnaire, too, framed the issue in a similarly biased manner by introducing the choices given to respondents with the proposition that “currently, the US nuclear umbrella plays a crucial role for Germany’s security … ”.⁵

There is one notable exception to the fuzziness of the arguments of Eurodeterrent proponents. They argue that a Eurodeterrent is needed to protect Europe from Russian nuclear blackmail. Nuclear deterrence advocates often describe a scenario under which Russia annexes parts of the Baltics and then deters a NATO response by explicitly threatening use of nuclear weapons, underpinned by strong nuclear signals (Krause 2017, 16). In this narrative, NATO would be unable to respond because of weakened US security commitments, and Moscow would get away with its land grab. A European nuclear deterrent, the argument goes, would be more credible in deterring Russian aggression than US extended security guarantees emanating from Donald Trump.

It is unlikely that this narrative will sway Germans to buy into the Eurodeterrent project. Germans these days are more distrustful of Donald Trump than Vladimir Putin and would not necessarily find the scenario convincing.⁶ Nuclear blackmail historically has been less successful than is commonly assumed (Sechser and Fuhrmann 2017). And a French nuclear guarantee would bring with it its own dilemmas in terms of credible nuclear force postures and in particular joint decision-making.

Nuclear consultations meet French nuclear independence

Germany is involved in NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements primarily for security reasons. But the Federal Republic of Germany has always viewed nuclear consultations as an instrument that helps it keep informed about the nuclear policies of nuclear-armed allies, so it can prevent changes that it views as detrimental to its own security (Lutsch 2016). This view of consultations influences the US nuclear force posture in Europe. Germany’s involvement in the alliance’s integrated nuclear force planning and standing arrangements for nuclear consultations in NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group and High Level Group have been core elements of this policy (Lunn 2018a, 2018b).

France has historically insisted on maintaining the full political and operational independence of its nuclear forces. France rejoined NATO’s integrated military structures in 2009 but remains the only alliance member that stays away from the NATO’s nuclear institutions. In 2015, French President François Hollande reconfirmed that France “does not and will not participate in the NATO nuclear planning mechanisms.” At the time, Hollande stated that “France does wish to contribute actively to the drafting of the alliance’s nuclear policy” (Hollande 2015). Some interpreted this to mean that Paris might wish to participate in NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group, but so far no such movement has been detectable. More recently, French President Macron categorically reconfirmed that “France does not take part in the Alliance’s nuclear planning mechanisms and will not do so in the future” (Macron 2020). For the time being, then, France prefers to “live in the best of both worlds,” not exposing its nuclear policy to military-technical discussions with allies, while at the same time, keeping open the option to veto any outcome it does not like in NATO’s political decision-making bodies, such as the North Atlantic Council, in which France is participating (Hlatky 2014).

Some Paris-based analysts have recently been sensing changes in the French nuclear thinking. Emmanuelle Maitre (2019, 41) has argued that “Paris … made moves toward its Eastern neighbor: It increasingly considers its deterrent as more than a pure national concern, is more involved in NATO, and, though it does not participate in the Alliance’s nuclear planning, is consulted on NATO’s nuclear policy and has committed to the strengthening of the Alliance’s nuclear culture.” Bruno Tertrais suggested that in case of a dramatic shift in transatlantic security, France might be willing to consider “legal and security arrangements (host nation support, etc.) but also, possibly, a common nuclear planning mechanism, based on a common conception of nuclear deployment, which could coexist with national ones” (Tertrais 2018, 9–10).

Yet, for the time being it is unclear to what degree Paris might be willing to give up the separateness of its nuclear forces, should there be a stronger nuclear dimension to the EU’s foreign and security policy. Officially, there are no indications that such an opening of the French nuclear policy process might be possible. French President Emmanuel Macron’s February 7, 2020 keynote speech on nuclear policies and deterrence did not change that assessment. The president restated that France’s vital interests now have a European dimension. He tried to square the nuclear policy consultation circle by arguing that France’s “independent decision making is fully compatible with our unwavering solidarity with our European partners” (Macron 2020). Macron invited Europeans to participate in a strategic dialogue and in nuclear exercises but stopped short of suggesting any joint decision making (Meier 2020). Thus, it still seems as if “for France, the future of nuclear deterrence seems quite predictable, as it is hard to imagine how Paris could turn its back on its independent nuclear deterrent, at least in the near future” (Maitre 2019, 22).

One of Berlin’s substantive goals has been to bring NATO allies to the negotiating table on nuclear arms control and disarmament. France has pushed back against such a policy, as became evident in 2009–2010, when the conservative-liberal government in Berlin initiated a debate on the possible withdrawal of US tactical nuclear weapons from Europe (Meier 2011). While France officially remained agnostic on issues related to nuclear sharing, it rejected any changes in NATO’s nuclear doctrine that could have affected its own posture.

From a German perspective, France still acts as a “lone wolf” (Schuller 2019) on nuclear weapons policies. This isolationism continues to make it difficult for Berlin to justify nuclear consultations with Paris by invoking the same arguments that are used in the NATO context, namely that such arrangements could lead to changes in French nuclear policies. Last but not least, given the wave of populism sweeping over Europe, Germans will have to ask themselves what would happen to any European nuclear consultative mechanism that extends a French nuclear umbrella over the rest of Europe should Marine Le Pen or another national populist be elected French president.

Disunity on deterrence

European unity on foreign and security policy issues is a high priority for Berlin. On the few occasions that Germany has stuck its neck out on nuclear issues, it quickly reverted to the prevalent mainstream once it was criticized for undermining European or transatlantic unity.⁷ In 2009, the newly elected conservative-liberal government stated that it supported “the proposals made by US President Obama regarding comprehensive new disarmament initiatives – including the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons” and promised to “advocate within the alliance and with our American allies the removal of the remaining nuclear weapons from Germany” (Coalition agreement between the CDU, CSU, and FDP for the 17th legislative period 2009). Berlin stopped that initiative once it became clear that it risked further divisions within NATO (Meier and Lunn 2014).

Germany is acutely aware that any push for a European nuclear deterrent would very likely increase divisions within Europe, in at least two ways. First, many Central European allies see NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements as symbols of the United States’ commitment to European security and collective defense commitments under Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty. They are generally skeptical of rebalancing European defense from NATO to the EU (Kacprzyk 2018).

For many in Berlin, a policy that aims at increasing European coherence on nuclear deterrence but runs the risk of alienating Poland, the Baltic states, and other European nations geographically close to Russia would be akin to throwing the stability baby out with the unity bathwater. Until Central and Eastern Europeans trust Brussels more than Washington, the idea of a Eurodeterrent will remain a nonstarter for German decision makers.

Second, consideration of a Eurodeterrent would widen the gap between supporters of nuclear deterrence and supporters of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). Domestically, the Green Party and the Socialists advocate German membership in the ban treaty. In 2017, however, the German government decided to not take part in negotiations on the accord, marking the first time since World War II that Germany is not participating in a UN-based multilateral negotiation on a new disarmament treaty. The German government since then has stuck to the NATO line that prohibiting nuclear weapons through a legal instrument is the wrong way to go about nuclear disarmament and that the ban treaty increases divisions within the nuclear nonproliferation regime (NATO 2017). Any push to give the EU a broader role in nuclear deterrence is likely to inflame the debate on the German position on the ban treaty.

NATO allies differ on the best way to make progress on nuclear disarmament, but divisions among EU members are even bigger. Or, as German expert Oliver Thränert has pointedly observed, “[t]he considerable differences that exist regarding nuclear weapons between Vienna and Dublin on the one hand and London and Paris on the other have repeatedly caused massive disagreement within the European Union for a number of years, and this background makes it highly unlikely that European nuclear sharing could practically be shifted to the EU” (Thränert 2017, 3).

What now?

The different nuclear cultures in France and Germany, French aversion to nuclear consultations, and inter-European divisions on the role of nuclear weapons are three factors that make it unlikely that Germany will seriously work toward a Eurodeterrent anytime soon. That is largely why the three-year ideological drumfire (and some believe concerted campaign; see Volpe and Kühn 2017) from conservative German pundits, think-tankers, and analysts arguing that Europe needs to go nuclear has so far fallen on deaf decision maker ears in Berlin.

This analysis was confirmed when in early February the deputy chairperson of the ruling conservative party in the German Parliament again tested the Eurodeterrent waters. A few days ahead of Macron’s long-awaited nuclear deterrence speech, Johann Wadephul suggested that Germany and France could cooperate on nuclear deterrence and that Berlin should contribute its “own capabilities” to such an undertaking, while France should be ready to place its force de frappe under NATO or European command (Wadephul 2020). The uniform reaction from across the political spectrum was a strong pushback, including from his own party, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU). Roderich Kiesewetter, a senior member of the CDU on the defense committee, argued that the force de frappe is “too small” to defend Europe and maintained that Paris has a track record of pursuing its own security interests against others, including Germany (Vates and Köpke 2020). Defense minister and CDU chairwoman Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer rejected Wadephul’s argument by stating that “Germany relies and will continue to rely on the NATO nuclear umbrella and not on protection based on individual, bilateral agreements” (Ismar and Meier 2020). No major decision maker in Berlin came out to defend Wadephul’s vision of greater German-French nuclear cooperation.

Nevertheless, aggressive Russian policies and the Trump administration’s transactional approach to alliances have put nuclear issues back on the agenda for European governments. In the short-term, two issues will be indicative of possible changes to German nuclear attitudes and policies.

First, after the end Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) in early August, 2019, NATO allies are debating how to react to the deployment of new nuclear-capable Russian cruise missiles in Europe. Many in the German security community instinctively compare today’s situation to NATO’s dilemmas in the 1970s, when the Soviet Union deployed intermediate-range SS-20 missiles in Europe. At the time, German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt was concerned that the threat from the new Soviet missiles might “decouple” Europe from the United States.

The range of responses NATO is now discussing – strengthened conventional and nuclear deterrence capabilities, as well as an arms control offer to Russia – indeed look very similar to the dual-track decision taken by allies in 1979 (NATO 2019). This time around, however, it is unlikely that technical fixes will be able to dispel fears the United States might not come to Europe’s aid during a nuclear crisis. Unlike in the 1980s, the main problem with extended deterrence today is political, posed by a nationalist-populist US President who has vowed to put “America First” under any circumstances (Meier 2019).

Some in Germany therefore would like to see a response to the INF crisis that would decrease dependence on US policies and capabilities. The EU issued a statement on the INF Treaty shortly before the accord expired. By speaking directly on Russia-US nuclear arms control, the union entered uncharted territory, because this had previously been NATO’s prerogative (Council of the European Union 2019). Foreign Minister Heiko Maas has described the deployment of US nuclear-armed intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe in response to Russia’s policies as “the wrong answer” (Maas 2019). While Berlin and Brussels (NATO 2019) agree that there is currently no need to deploy new nuclear weapons in Europe, differences between the alliance position on arms control and the preferences of some German lawmakers persist. NATO insists that any dialogue on intermediate-range nuclear weapons with Russia can begin only after Russia has dismantled its new cruise missiles and associated infrastructure in a verifiable manner. Influential German parliamentarians, however, have argued that it would be in Europe’s interest to engage Russia on the idea of a deployment “moratorium” and the idea of a “non-deployment zone” in Europe now, while insisting that any such agreement would have to be verifiable and agreed jointly by all allies (Gutschker and Schuller 2019). The degree to which NATO will be responsive to these positions will influence the German debate on how to pursue its security interests. Specifically, any US unilateral push toward deployment of new nuclear weapons in Europe would likely increase Germany’s estrangement with Washington.

Second, Germany’s decision on a successor to its aging nuclear-capable Tornado aircraft is influenced by the question of whether Europe might in the future become more engaged on nuclear issues. The United States has until now unsuccessfully pressured Germany to follow other NATO nuclear host nations in buying the American F-35 as the future German dual-capable aircraft (Sprenger 2019). Instead, Germany might purchase nuclear-capable F-18 Super Hornets, or it could ask the United States to certify a new variant of the Eurofighter Typhoon for the delivery of US nuclear weapons (Trevithick 2018).

In the long run, Germany wants to develop a new European sixth-generation fighter aircraft, the Future Combat Air System (FCAS), with France, Spain, and possibly other European nations. Once it becomes operational sometime after 2040, the FCAS will replace Rafale bombers as the French nuclear-capable aircraft. Whether FCAS might also be Germany’s future nuclear-capable aircraft of choice is one of the key decisions on Germany’s long-term nuclear orientation, possibly paving the way for a European nuclear option. So far, however, no German decision maker wants to discuss a possible nuclear dimension of European defense cooperation.

For the time being it is difficult to imagine arguments for a Eurodeterrent becoming politically relevant in Berlin. For this to happen, views in France and Germany on whether nuclear weapons pose a risk or contribution to European security would have to converge. It would likely require additional tectonic shifts in Germany’s security orientation before Berlin chose to consider a European nuclear option.

From an NPT perspective, these differences in nuclear approach may actually be positive. Should the EU begin to develop its own nuclear deterrent, a difficult and contentious debate among NPT members about the legal and political implications of such proliferation would be certain. Leaving aside the question of whether arguments used to justify NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements under the NPT can also be invoked to legalize a Eurodeterrent, Europeans would be rightly accused of double standards, preaching nuclear abstinence to countries like Iran while they themselves increase the role of nuclear weapons in their security policies. For the time being, however, this is one problem NPT members do not have to worry about. Germany is not ready to pursue its own nuclear option, or an EU-based one.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Funding
This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.

Notes

1. Conservative member of the Bundestag Roderich Kiesewetter in 2017 asked the Parliamentary research service to evaluate the legality of a joint financing by EU members of a European nuclear deterrent. The report found that such an option would be legal under the NPT and the 2 + 4 Treaty on Unification as long as the funds do not come from an EU budget line, but questioned the political added value of such an arrangement (Wissenschaftliche Dienste 2017; see also Fisher 2017).

2. See Schmidt (2004), 59. Strategic nuclear issues have been on the agenda of a series of Franco-German track 1.5 meetings that took place since 2016. On this specific set of meetings see Maitre (2017). The author of this article has participated in some of these meetings, which took place under the Chatham House rule.

3. Article 42(7) of the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon states that “[i]f a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with article 51 of the United Nations charter.” It is unclear whether this mutual defense clause might also entail nuclear deterrence commitments, with some analysts arguing that French nuclear forces de facto are already contributing (Tertrais 2018a).

4. Such polls are often commissioned by disarmament advocacy groups. The results however consistently indicate 60–70 percent or larger majorities in favor of nuclear disarmament and a withdrawal of US nuclear weapons from German territory. See for example ICAN (2018).

5. The other choices were that “Germany should” forego nuclear protection (31 percent), continue to rely on the United States (22 percent), and develop its own nuclear weapons (7 percent); 7 percent of respondents did not know how to answer. Multiple answers were possible (Körber Stiftung 2019).

6. A January 2020 poll found that 57 percent of Germans absolutely do not trust the United States, while 25 percent do not trust in Russia (Politbarometer 2020).

7. In 1993, Germany tried to push back against US counterproliferation policies by emphasizing that military actions against proliferators must take place only on the basis of a UN mandate. In 1998, Berlin suggested that NATO should renounce the option to use nuclear weapons first. In both cases, Germany backed down after it was criticized by nuclear allies. See (Meier 2001, 77–78).

References