How China uses the Non-Aligned Movement to avoid nuclear accountability

On February 6, US Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Thomas DiNanno claimed—though public evidence remains inconclusive—that China conducted “nuclear explosive tests, including preparing for tests with designated yields in the hundreds of tons.” Beijing’s Foreign Ministry rejected these accusations, saying they “are completely groundless and are outright lies.” In response to an earlier accusation, President Donald Trump made in an interview, China’s Foreign Ministry claimed that it adheres to its nuclear testing moratorium and calls on all states to uphold the authority of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).

China’s denials exemplify a broader pattern displayed at meetings of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Its statements appeal to the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), a Cold War-era coalition of developing countries of which China is an observer state. By echoing NAM calls for a moratorium on testing, support for the CTBT, and opposition to new nuclear systems, Beijing presents itself as a responsible nuclear power. Its actions tell a different story: reported testing at Lop Nur, China’s longtime nuclear testing site, development of low-yield weapons, and refusal to engage in disarmament talks.

The NPT’s 2026 Review Conference, which began on April 27, risks producing a hollow consensus on disarmament. This won’t be just because states disagree on non-proliferation objectives and language, but because China has learned to leverage the NPT’s multilateral dynamics. State parties need to expose and address China’s contradiction at the review conference or else risk legitimizing behavior that erodes the global nuclear order.

The non-aligned strategy. China’s response to testing claims reflects a broad, systematic pattern: Beijing adjusts its nuclear narratives to the NAM across multiple policy areas to legitimize its standing with the group and portray itself as a responsible nuclear power. NAM countries make up most NPT state parties, and their support is valuable in shaping consensus outcomes at NPT Preparatory Committee meetings and Review Conferences. Beijing’s positioning on NPT statements insulates it from scrutiny, making it harder for states to challenge China’s record without appearing to oppose the treaty’s disarmament goals.

One policy area is nuclear testing, for which Beijing has mirrored NAM statements in three ways.

First, both China and NAM support the entry into force of the CTBT, a treaty that bans all nuclear explosions for both civilian and military purposes. In 2025, NAM emphasized “the significance of achieving universal adherence” to the CTBT, especially by the nuclear-weapon states. China has signed but not ratified the CTBT. Still, the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association states that Beijing supports early entry into force of the CTBT and supports its monitoring and verification mechanism. And in 2022 already, Beijing declared that it was “making steady progress” toward implementing the treaty. In doing so, China seeks to be seen as a good-faith actor.

Second, Beijing echoes NAM’s call for nuclear-weapon states to adhere to the testing moratorium, a unilateral pause on nuclear explosions observed by the five permanent members (P5) of the UN Security Council. Mirroring that call, China stated in 2025 that before the CTBT enters into force, nuclear-weapons states “should commit to the moratorium.” This makes challenging China’s compliance politically costly—it risks undermining the norm itself.

Last, China supports the NAM’s position on prohibiting the qualitative development of new weapon systems such as low-yield nuclear warheads. In 2022, China expressed concerns for nuclear-weapon states “developing and deploying low-yield nuclear weapons,” claiming it hinders the global disarmament process. By tailoring its messaging to the NAM, Beijing appears to support disarmament efforts—a key goal of the CTBT—which avoids scrutiny of its modernization program.

Reality gap in China’s statements. Beijing’s rhetoric on nuclear testing does not survive scrutiny. China claims to uphold the testing moratorium, but it reportedly conducted nuclear activities at Lop Nur, Beijing’s leading nuclear test site. In 2020, the State Department said, China’s lack of transparency over its testing activities raises questions about its adherence to its testing moratorium. Beijing has restricted the flow of data from the International Monitoring System (IMS) stations on its territory to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) Preparatory Commission, which establishes and operates the international verification regime.

In February, the CTBTO said that while the IMS system detected two very small seismic events on June 22, 2020, it could not “assess the cause of these events with confidence” as they were below the detection threshold of 500 tonnes of TNT equivalent. The Trump administration alleged that China used decoupling—a method known to decrease the effectiveness of seismic monitoring—to evade detection of its testing. Satellite imagery between 2020 and 2024 shows that Beijing expanded the Lop Nur Test site, including an area allegedly intended for underground nuclear testing. While the testing claims remain contested, Beijing continues to restrict IMS data and refuses transparency at its test site.

China criticizes low-yield weapons even as it develops them and refuses to disclose details of its nuclear buildup. The Defense Department estimates that China could have over 1,000 warheads by 2030, and that it pursues nuclear weapons with yields below 10 kilotons. According to nuclear expert Hui Zhang, China is thought to have a lower-yield warhead, called the “#5×5 warhead.” China echoes NAM concerns over low-yield nuclear weapons but develops such systems.

In October, President Trump announced that the United States would resume testing, claiming, “Russia’s testing, and China’s testing, but they don’t talk about it.” China rejected Trump’s comments and called on Washington to “take concrete actions to safeguard the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime.” The NAM did not collectively respond to Trump’s announcement. Iran, a NAM member, called President Trump’s recent comments about nuclear testing compound the credibility problem, giving China rhetorical leverage over its own violations.

Beijing’s contradictory behavior has consequences for the nonproliferation regime. State parties to the NPT have failed to produce a successful consensus document since the 2010 Review Conference. Treaty experts note the consensus process has always been prone to gridlock; more review conferences have failed to produce outcomes than have succeeded. The consensus process hinges on political imperatives of the state parties. Beijing has learned to exploit this structural vulnerability.

In 2015 and 2022, the NAM countries expressed concern over the failure of nuclear-armed states to meet their disarmament commitments. Despite China having voiced concerns about the lack of progress on disarmament, its nuclear arsenal keeps growing. Beijing’s actions reduce the likelihood of an enforceable consensus document and undermine the credibility of the NPT review process.

Last year, President Trump proposed disarmament dialogues with Russia and China. But China rejected Trump’s offer, claiming trilateral discussions were “neither reasonable nor realistic” because China and the United States do not have equal nuclear capabilities. Instead, China demands that Moscow and Washington “fulfill their special and primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament.” The disparity claim loses force as China’s arsenal rapidly approaches 1,000 warheads and Beijing refuses to engage in preliminary dialogues, preferring to support the NAM’s calls for a multilateral approach to disarmament instead.

Seeking compromise. Washington and its allies have begun to challenge Beijing’s alleged decoupling efforts and lack of transparency over its activities at the Lop Nur test site. In his April 29 statement to the review conference, US Assistant Secretary for Arms Control and Nonproliferation Chris Yeaw revealed that the United States has provided detailed proposals to China and other P5 countries on “transparency, risk reduction, and nuclear testing.” Washington should build on that opening by pressing a specific ask: that Beijing voluntarily share data, such as monitoring data from IMS stations.

For its part, Washington must clarify its position on nuclear testing—despite public US evidence for the alleged Chinese test remaining thin—and reaffirm its proposals for disarmament talks with Beijing. The conference offers Washington a platform to present evidence of Beijing’s violations of the moratorium and its reluctance to share test-site data, all while promoting transparency.

The United States—along with the United Kingdom, which currently chairs the P5 process—should also lead a dialogue among the five NPT nuclear-weapon states on the moratorium on nuclear testing. Washington and London can propose clear parameters for distinguishing between compliance with the testing moratorium and violations. The United States should ask P5 countries, particularly China, that have undertaken domestic implementation, to share testing data. The dialogue provides China a platform to share data to substantiate its claims of domestic preparations to enforce the CTBT.

Finally, Washington must engage with the NAM members who express concerns about China’s nuclear expansion and use backchannel diplomacy to present the contradictions between China’s rhetoric and actions, framing this effort as a way to strengthen the nonproliferation regime and hold nuclear states accountable. Without action from the state parties, this year’s NPT review conference risks producing a hollow document that fails to constrain China’s actions or advance the treaty’s nonproliferation and disarmament goals.